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ABSTRACT 
Elinor Claire Smith 
“The World would start Turning Again”: identifying and measuring victims’ 
restorative justice needs at the International Criminal Court 
The integration of victim participation into the Rome Statute introduces a restorative 
function into the practices and procedures of the International Criminal Court alongside its 
more traditional, retributive mandate, engendering an obligation on the Court to provide 
restorative justice, or at least, aspects of it, to participating victims. Restorative justice, 
however, is under-developed in international criminal law in both theory and practice. 
Moreover, the Court itself has failed to indicate what it means by restorative justice, or 
what restorative justice would encompass in practice for participating victims. The thesis 
demonstrates instead that the restorative mandate is in danger of being either subsumed by 
the retributive function or usurped by a purely procedural justice model.   
Through an exploration of what restorative justice for participating victims would 
comprise, this thesis addresses the disconnect between the intentions of the drafters of the 
Rome Statute and the realisation of restorative justice for victims in practice. Through an 
interdisciplinary approach, using psychological literature and theory, the thesis identifies, 
examines and argues for an appropriate overarching goal for restorative action at the ICC: 
the achievement of a sense of justice in participating victims. This goal is developed and 
disaggregated into its constituent parts with a view to rendering the concept of restorative 
justice tangible, applicable and operational within the practices and procedures of the 
Court. The thesis thereby provides a contribution to theory and practice.  
The thesis then considers how the Court’s progress in the pursuit of its restorative 
mandate can be evaluated. In the absence of any existing assessment instrument, the thesis 
develops and proposes the detailed framework of a psycho-legal assessment tool for the 
monitoring and evaluation of the Court’s pursuit of restorative justice for participating 
victims, thereby providing a further contribution to practice. 
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Introduction 
The integration of victims into the practices and procedures of the International Criminal 
Court (“ICC” or “Court”) has been hailed as a significant and innovative development in 
the status of victims in international criminal justice. According to Bassiouni,“[o]ne of the 
most important recognitions of the victim as a subject of international criminal law is 
contained in the ICC  Statute…[reflecting] the most advanced position that exists in 
established international criminal justice”.1 Cohen observes that the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (the “Rome Statute”) “completely modifies the position of 
victims from witnesses of crimes to…the subject of rights”,2 while Mettraux states that the 
new role provided for victims in the Rome Statute marks a “momentous advance in the 
field of international criminal law….The regime adopted by the ICC…is the promise of 
justice for, and not just with, the victims”.3  
It is widely accepted in academic and expert practitioner literature that in incorporating 
victim-focussed measures into the Rome Statute, the drafters introduced elements of 
restorative justice alongside the Court’s more traditional, retributive function.4 
                                                          
1
 Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’ (2006) 6:2 Human Rights Law 
Review 203, 230, and see also Wemmers, who describes the integration of victims into the Statute 
as “one of the major innovations of the ICC”, Jo-Anne Wemmers, ‘Victims’ rights and the 
International Criminal Court: perceptions within the court regarding the victims’ right to 
participate’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law  629; William A. Schabas, An 
Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3
rd
 edn, Cambridge University Press 2007), 328, 
who describes the Court’s victim participation scheme as “one of the great innovations of the Rome 
Statute”; Fiona McKay, ‘Victim Participation in Proceedings before the International Criminal 
Court’ (2008) Vol. 15, Issue 3, Human Rights Brief, Centre for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law, American University Washington College of Law, available online, 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=hrbrief>, last 
accessed 26 March 2015. 
2
 Miriam Cohen, ‘Victims’ Participation Rights Within the International Criminal Court: A Critical 
Overview’ (2008 – 2009) 37:3 Denv. Int’l L. and Pol’y 351. 
3
 In Guénaël Mettraux, ‘Victims’ Participation in International Criminal Law’ (2010) 8(1) Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 75. See also Christine Chung, ‘Victims’ Participation at the 
International Criminal Court: Are Concessions of the Court Clouding the Promise?’ (Spring 2008) 
Vol.6, Issue 3 Journal of International Human Rights 459. 
4
 Notably, while there is wide agreement in the literature of the Court’s restorative mandate, 
agreement is not universal; for an alternative position, see Luke Moffett, Justice for Victims before 
the International Criminal Court (Routledge 2014) 49; Sergey Vasiliev, ‘Victim Participation 
Revisited: What the ICC is Learning About Itself’ in Carsten Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice of 
the International Criminal Court (OUP 2015) 64; and, to a lesser extent, Conor McCarthy, ‘Victim 
Redress and International Criminal Justice: Competing Paradigms, or Compatible Forms of 
14 
 
McGonigle, for example, describes the Court’s victim participation endeavour as “an 
attempt [by the drafters] to make a court that punishes individual perpetrators as well as a 
court that focuses on administering restorative and reparative justice.”5 Mekjian and 
Varughese write that the Rome Statute represents “the creation of a new dynamic wherein 
punitive justice, found within adversarial court systems, [is] to be balanced with 
restorative justice principles”,6 while Haslam observes that the Statute marks a departure 
from a purely retributive model of international criminal justice in favour of a “more 
expansive model…that encompasses social welfare and restorative justice.”7 Restorative 
measures in the Rome Statute are manifested in the ability of victims to participate in 
proceedings
8
 and to seek reparations in respect of the crimes charged.
9
 The focus of this 
thesis is on the Court’s victim participation endeavour. 
 
For proponents of victim participation, engagement has the potential to provide a number 
of restorative benefits, including the generation in the victim of “healing and 
rehabilitation”10 and a sense of empowerment and closure.11 Victim participation is not, 
                                                                                                                                                                
Justice?’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 351. The restorative mandate of the 
Court is examined substantively in Chapter 1. 
5
 Brianne McGonigle, ‘Bridging the Divides in International Criminal Proceedings: An 
Examination into the Victim Participation Endeavour of the International Criminal Court’ (2009) 
Vol.21 Florida Journal of International Law 93, 96. 
6
 Gerard J. Mekjian and Mathew C. Varughese, ‘Hearing the Victim’s Voice: Analysis of Victims’ 
Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International Criminal Court’ (2005) Vol. 
17.1 Pace International Law Review 1, 20.  
7
 See Emily Haslam, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope 
Over Experience?’ in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe and Eric Donelly (eds), The Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Hart Publishing 2004). 
8
 Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. 
9
 Article 75 of the Rome Statute. 
10
 See, for example, Fiona McKay, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe: Criminal Prosecutions in 
Europe since 1990 for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity, Torture and Genocide Redress, 
1999, 15; Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice Recommendations and Commentary for August 
1997 PrepCom on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 4
th
 – 15th August 1997, 
33. 
11
 Yael Danieli Victims: Essential Voices at the Court (September 2004) 1 VRWG Bulletin 4; 
Jonathon Doak Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation (2005) 32 Journal 
of Law and Society 294, 295. 
15 
 
however, restorative per se. Instead, it is the nature and content of participation that will 
determine if, and the extent to which, participating victims experience any restorative 
benefit by virtue of their engagement with the Court, and hence, whether the Court is 
successfully realising its restorative mandate. It is therefore vital to the success of the 
Court’s endeavour that it has a clear vision of precisely what, in restorative terms, it is 
seeking to achieve for victims of international crimes, including what, in practice, a 
restorative aim would comprise within the particular context of the ICC.  
Yet despite the ambitions of the drafters to devise and construct a new and innovative 
restorative regime for the benefit of victims, restorative justice remains an under-
developed concept in international criminal law in terms of its specific aims and 
parameters, thereby inhibiting the operation and realisation of that ambition. While the 
Court itself formally recognises its restorative mandate, it has not indicated either what it 
means by restorative justice in the context, or what restorative justice would comprise in 
practice for participating victims. Moreover, academic and expert practitioner literature 
does not currently respond to this problem. In particular, where the Court’s restorative 
mandate is acknowledged in the literature, there has been little attempt to expand upon 
what restorative justice means in the context of international criminal law, or what its 
manifestation and realisation would constitute in practical terms. Where attempts have 
been made to amplify the concept, the proposed ambit of the proffered description is 
confined to the particular article or study at hand, and in any event, provides little in the 
way of further guidance in the identification and delineation of the concept for broader 
application within the Court itself. McGonigle, for example, in adopting a working 
definition of restorative justice for the purpose of her analysis of the Court’s joint 
restorative and retributive mandate, notes simply that “restorative justice calls on 
international courts to focus attention on the interests of victims rather than strictly on the 
prosecution and punishment of the accused.”12 A similar approach is adopted by the War 
Crimes Research Office, Washington College of Law, in its review of the Court’s victim 
participation project, indicating that, for the purpose of the study, the authors understand 
“restorative justice” to mean that “mechanisms created to deliver criminal justice should 
focus on the interests of victims, as opposed to strictly punishing wrongdoers”.13  
                                                          
12
 McGonigle (n 5), 96 (at footnote 7). 
13
 War Crimes Research Office, International Criminal Court Legal Analysis and Education 
Project, Washington College of Law, ‘Victim Participation Before the International Criminal 
16 
 
These amplifications remain, however, working definitions. In the absence of any clearly 
identified aim(s) or delineated parameters of the concept, they remain ultimately abstract, 
and while reference is made to the interests of victims, there is no indication what the 
specific interests of victims of international crimes would constitute in this regard, or 
whether those interests are themselves consistent with restorative justice theory.   
The ability of the Court to identify and proactively pursue the specific restorative needs of 
participating victims contained in the Rome Statute is essential not only to the success of 
the innovative endeavour, but also, potentially, to the Court itself.  
Failure by the Court to realise its restorative mandate risks victim disappointment and 
disillusionment, leading potentially to the active disengagement of victims from the Court. 
The Court would thereby not only fail to achieve a restorative benefit for the very 
individuals it was designed to help, to their obvious detriment, but a withdrawal of support 
from within the victim community would also impinge upon the perceived legitimacy of 
the institution itself in the eyes of the affected population. Moreover, a lack of victim 
engagement and cooperation with the Court may also have consequences for the ability of 
the Court to successfully pursue, investigate and prosecute suspected perpetrators, and so 
affect the achievement of its retributive mandate.
14
 At the same time, in the absence of any 
specific parameters to contain the expectations of participating victims in terms of what 
they might realistically achieve by virtue of their participation, the potential for victim 
disillusionment and disengagement is exacerbated.
15
  
                                                                                                                                                                
Court’ (November 2007) 8 (at footnote 15), available online at < 
https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/icc_reports.cfm> last accessed 10
th
 June 2015. 
14
 See, for example, Wemmers, J. A., Victims in the Criminal Justice System: A Study in to the 
Treatment of Victims and its Effects in their Attitudes and Behaviour (Kugler publications 1996) 22 
– 24, 27 – 28, 210. Richard Young, ‘Integrating a Multi-Victim Perspective in to Criminal Justice 
Through Restorative Justice Conferences’  in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a 
Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice: International Debates (Ashgate 2000); Jo Goodey, ‘An 
Overview of Key Themes’ in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim 
Perspective within Criminal Justice, International Debates (Ashgate 2000). Significantly, there is 
already emerging evidence of dissatisfaction with the Court: see for example, Sudan Victim 
Lawyers recount their experiences with the ICC so far, Issue 9, Summer/Autumn 2007 ACCESS, 
available online at < http://www.vrwg.org/ACCESS/ENG09.pdf> last accessed 22
nd
 June 2015. 
15
 The need for courts to manage the expectations of victims has been noted, for example, in the 
case of the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia, in Nadine Kirchenbauer, Mychelle 
Balthazard, Lat Ky and others, ‘Victims Participation Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia: Baseline Study of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development 
Association’s Civil Party Scheme for Case 002’ (January 2013), available online at < 
17 
 
In addition, the need for the Court to achieve restorative engagement for victims poses a 
further challenge: at present, the Court has no way of knowing whether, and to what 
extent, it is meeting its restorative mandate. As a result, it is unable either to assess its 
progress in the pursuit of restorative justice for participating victims or to make informed, 
targeted and evidence-based adjustments to its participation regime with a view to 
enhancing the potential for effective and meaningful engagement. 
In particular, to date there has been no monitoring or assessment of the Court’s victim 
participation mandate by reference to the achievement of any restorative benefit in the 
victim. Without any understanding of the specific parameters of restorative justice for 
participating victims, evaluation in this regard is not currently achievable, and there is 
presently no assessment tool for the evaluation of perceptions of substantive justice more 
broadly in victims engaging with international criminal justice mechanisms. Moreover, 
despite a heightened interest in victims’ experiences of engaging with transitional justice 
mechanisms, we still know relatively little about why, for some victims, judicial 
engagement is experienced positively while for others it is not.
16
 A greater understanding 
of those variables which have the potential to affect victims’ experiences would improve 
the potential for the achievement of effective and meaningful participation, and hence 
victim satisfaction with the Court itself. 
In addition to challenges posed to the Court in the realisation of its mandate, the lack of 
any clear articulation of restorative justice in the context inhibits academic and expert 
practitioner discussion, and hinders any attempts to modify or refine the endeavour. The 
endeavour itself has engendered much debate. In some cases, this has concerned an 
identified need to ensure that participation is effective and meaningful.
17
 In other cases, 
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th
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has also been noted, see Human Rights Centre, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 
Bearing Witness at the International Criminal Court: An Interview Survey of 109 Witnesses (June 
2014) 5. 
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 Noted, for example, in Eric Stover, Mychelle Balthazard and K. Alexa Koenig, ‘Confronting 
Duch: civil party participation in Case 001 at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia’ (June 2011) Vol.93 No. 882 International Review of the Red Cross 503, and see also 
David Mendeloff, ‘Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological and Emotional Effects of 
Post-Conflict Justice’ (2009) Vol. 31 Human Rights Quarterly 592. 
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 See, for example, Mariana Pena, ‘Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: 
Achievements Made and Challenges Lying Ahead’ (2009) Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 497, 511; McGonigle (n 5) at 145; Bob Cryer, Håkan  Friman, Darryl Robinson 
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authors have questioned the probity of actively pursuing a restorative mandate within an 
otherwise retributive mechanism and/or have called for the review and reform of the 
endeavour.
18
 In the absence of any tangible articulation of the functions, aims and 
parameters of restorative justice within the context, however, these debates lack a 
unifying, shared conceptual framework and to some extent are premature. Unless, for 
example, we know what restorative justice should comprise in practice for participating 
victims, we are unable to say whether or not participation has been effective and 
meaningful, or what it would take to make it so. Likewise, calls for an overhaul of the 
participation system that are not based on any clear and common understanding of what 
the restorative endeavour should be seeking to achieve in practice, somewhat beg the 
question “overhaul with a view to achieving what?” In short, in the absence of any 
practical amplification of restorative justice in the context, we lack the language and 
framework required for these debates, rendering them of limited potential impact in real 
terms.           
 
The successful identification, pursuit and achievement by the Court of its restorative 
mandate, including the evaluation and monitoring in its progress in this regard, is 
therefore essential to both the functioning and legitimacy of the Court.  In the absence of 
any clear understanding of what restorative justice means for victims in the specific 
context, including any concrete indicators of the restorative needs and interests of 
participating victims, however, the endeavour itself remains intangible, and hence 
problematic in its pursuit, realisation and assessment, and the Court is thereby left with the 
challenge of realising a non-specific mandate that is also essential to its success and 
legitimacy, and at the same time, has no way of knowing if it is achieving it. 
                                                                                                                                                                
and Elizabeth Wilmhurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2
nd
 edn, 
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th
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The aim of this thesis is therefore to develop and advance the concept of restorative 
justice for victims of international crimes into one that is tangible and apposite to the 
particular victim community, and to consider how its achievement can be measured in the 
particular context of the Court. 
The thesis rests on the assumption that the Rome Statute incorporates restorative justice 
notions into an otherwise retributive context, and hence seeks restorative goals for 
participating victims. In Chapter 1, the theoretical basis of the participation endeavour is 
explored in more depth and in light of the drafting history and documentary sources of 
Article 68(3). The chapter then considers whether and to what extent the underlying 
restorative rationale for the provision is formally acknowledged in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, and examines the consistency of current approaches to the operation of the 
endeavour with the restorative intent of the drafters. Particular attention is paid to the 
potential impact of alternative interests which are operational at the Court on the 
achievement of restorative benefit for participating victims. These alternative interests 
include the pursuit of a retributive mandate, the Court’s search for the truth, and the 
achievement of procedural justice for victims.  
In Chapter 2, this thesis explores and considers a suitable and appropriate overarching 
goal for restorative action at the Court. A therapeutic rationale for victim participation is 
examined, and its suitability to the ICC project is assessed by reference to clinical 
literature. An alternative restorative aim – the pursuit of a sense of justice in the victim – 
is then considered, and existing literature from the fields of law, psychology and political 
science is examined in order to evaluate the feasibility of achieving the aim in the context 
of the ICC. In the second part of Chapter 2, consideration is given to how a psychological 
goal can be rendered operational within a judicial forum. A restorative goal is then 
delineated into its constituent parts with a view to rendering it tangible, meaningful and 
operational in practice for the Court. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis considers how the Court’s progress in the pursuit of its restorative 
mandate can be evaluated, and the detailed framework of a psycho-legal assessment tool 
for the monitoring and evaluation of the Court’s pursuit of restorative benefit for 
participating victims is developed and proposed. To this end an assessment framework 
from an alternative transitional justice context is examined with a view to considering the 
extent to which it is applicable and transferable to the ICC’s victim participation project. 
The Chapter then goes on to consider how assessment might be conducted in the context 
20 
 
of the ICC in respect of factors which have the potential to affect the achievement of 
effective and meaningful participation. The current state of knowledge in relation those 
factors known to impact upon experiences of judicial engagement is examined and a 
number of alternative variables proposed for incorporation into the assessment 
framework.  
 
Approach to the research 
While the International Criminal Court is not a restorative justice mechanism, it has, it is 
argued,
19
 through the inclusion of participative and reparative provisions, effectively 
integrated restorative justice notions within what is otherwise a traditional, retributive 
context. Restorative justice therefore provides the theoretical basis of this research.  
An interdisciplinary approach is taken to this research which seeks to combine and 
integrate theory, methodology and practice from the fields of law and psychology. The 
approach provides an innovative means of analysing and addressing challenges and gaps 
in legal theory and practice, and, it is argued, in bridging legal and psychological 
disciplines, better recognises the realities for victims approaching the Court as 
participants.  
Despite a growing recognition of the need for interdisciplinary research as a means of 
responding to complex, “real-world” problems, 20 there is, as yet, no common definition of 
interdisciplinary studies,
21
 and since interdisciplinary approaches and practices span both 
academic and professional arenas, there is no single or unified body of discourse on the 
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 In Chapter 1. 
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 See, for example, Carole Palmer, who notes that “real-world research problems…rarely arise 
within orderly disciplinary categories, and neither do their solutions”, Work at the Boundaries of 
Science: Information and the interdisciplinary research process (Springer 2001) vii. 
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Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory (2
nd
 edn, Sage Publications 2012) 3, 12; Julie 
Thompson Klein Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory and Practice (Wayne State University Press 
1990) 11 – 12; Rick Szostak ‘Modernism, postmodernism, and interdisciplinarity’ (2007) 25 
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meaning and ambit of interdisciplinarity.
22
 For critics of interdisciplinary approaches, the 
absence of any common definition renders the term “close to meaningless” in its 
application.
23
 A number of definitions have, however, gained wide recognition within the 
literature, and a number of common features can be discerned by reference to them,
24
 
indicating that the term is not so void of meaning as its critics might suggest.  
According to Klein and Newell, interdisciplinary studies comprises “a process of 
answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that is too broad or 
complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline or profession….[It] draws on 
disciplinary perspectives and integrates their insights through construction of a more 
comprehensive perspective”.25 Newell’s subsequent refinement of this definition posits 
that interdisciplinary studies “draws critically on disciplinary perspectives, and it 
integrates their insights into a more comprehensive understanding…of an existing 
complex phenomenon …[or] the creation of a new complex phenomenon”.26   
Boix Mansilla identifies the goal of any interdisciplinary approach as the integration of 
“knowledge and modes of thinking in two or more disciplines to produce a cognitive 
advancement – e.g., explaining a phenomenon, solving a problem, creating a product, 
raising a new question – in ways that would have been unlikely through single 
disciplinary means”,27 while the US National Academies define interdisciplinarity as “a 
mode of research…that integrates information, data, techniques, tools, perspectives, 
concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge 
                                                          
22
 Noted, for example, in Klein (n 21) 13, and more recently in William H. Newell ‘Six arguments 
for agreeing on a definition of interdisciplinary studies’ 2007 29(4) Association for Integrative 
Studies Newsletter 1 – 4. 
23
 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom ‘Expanding the I-word’ (2006) Section B The Chronicle of Higher 
Education. 
24
 Repko (n 21) 14. 
25
 Julie Thompson Klein and William H. Newell ‘Advancing interdisciplinary studies’ in Jerry G. 
Gaff and Jim L. Ratcliffe (eds) Handbook of the undergraduate curriculum: A comprehensive 
guide to purposes, structures, practices, and change (Jossey-Bass 1997). 
26
 William H. Newell ‘Decision making in interdisciplinary studies’ in Goktug Morcol Handbook 
of Decision Making: Public Administration and Public Policy (Marcel-Dekker 2007) 248. 
27
 Veronica Boix Mansilla, ‘Assessing student learning at interdisciplinary crossroads’ (2005) 
37(1) Change 14. 
22 
 
to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond 
the scope of a single discipline or area of research practice”.28 
 
Notably, the indicated definitions share a number of common features. In particular: 
- An interdisciplinary approach provides a means of responding to a problem that is 
too complex to be dealt with by a single academic discipline and/or one which 
extends beyond the ambit of a single academic discipline. 
- It seeks to draw upon and integrate the knowledge, insights and/or methods of 
specific disciplines. 
- In doing so, it aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding or cognitive 
advancement in respect of the identified problem.   
Drawing upon areas of commonality between current definitions, Repko proposes an 
“integrated definition of interdisciplinary studies” as: 
“a process of answering a question, solving a problem, or addressing a topic that 
it too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single discipline, and 
draws on the disciplines with the goal of integrating their insights to construct a 
more comprehensive understanding.”29  
Repko’s definition of interdisciplinary research therefore seeks to unify the existing 
definitions of interdisciplinary study through the combination and synthesis of elements 
common to those definitions, and represents the most advanced position to date in the 
achievement of a single definition of interdisciplinarity. It is therefore used here as the 
basis for discussion of the interdisciplinary approach taken to this research. With this 
definition in mind, it is appropriate to consider why an interdisciplinary approach is 
appropriate to this research: 
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Victim engagement with international transitional justice processes is premised upon the 
assumption that it has the potential to provide the victim with a cathartic, therapeutic 
benefit and contribute to societal peace and reconciliation.
30
 The ability of survivor 
engagement to advance peace goals assumes, in turn, that engagement will generate in the 
victim a sense of justice, and thereby negate the potential for the re-escalation of violence 
amongst affected communities.
31
 The aims of victim engagement are therefore articulated 
in psychological terms, and entail the generation in the victim of a positive psychological 
impact – be it a therapeutically rehabilitative benefit, or the production in the victim of a 
sense of justice. Moreover, the extent to which a judicial mechanism is judged to have 
been successful in the pursuit of its restorative mandate for participating victims will 
naturally depend upon whether victims feel that participation has been restorative for them 
(within the meaning of an appropriate and delineated understanding of the concept), and 
so will be measured by them in psychological terms.  
To this extent, the participation endeavour of the Court can be understood as the pursuit of 
a positive psychological impact in the victim,
32
 and the Court therefore has both legal and 
psychological aims. The challenge of this thesis is therefore to identify and delineate, for 
application and pursuit within the Court, appropriate psychological aims and impacts 
which are in turn compatible with the Court’s mandate in respect of victims. The problem 
is therefore a complex one which does not reside within a single academic field of 
enquiry, spanning both legal and psychological disciplines. An interdisciplinary approach 
which seeks to draw upon and integrate the insights, perspectives and approaches from the 
fields of law and psychology, as a means of achieving a more comprehensive 
understanding of the issue and producing a cognitive advancement in respect of the 
identified problem, is therefore needed. To this end, a thorough review of perspectives 
from both disciplines has been conducted in order to achieve a more informed and 
coherent understanding of the issue, and particular consideration given to where and how 
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the insights and approaches of the respective disciplines might be brought together and 
employed to respond to the identified issue and to enable a furtherance of theory in the 
specific context of reparative justice for victims in the field of international criminal law.  
This thesis seeks to do this in the following ways: 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the perceived psychological impacts of victim engagement in 
international transitional justice processes are examined with a view to amplifying the 
content of restorative justice theory in international criminal law. In doing so, impacts are 
examined by reference to their compatibility with restorative justice theory and the 
specific ambit of the Court, and the approach is therefore ostensibly a legal one. Within 
the course of that examination, the sustainability of assumptions made in transitional 
justice literature is considered by reference to empirical clinical research with victims. 
Clinical interpretations of psychological impacts are then explored as a means of 
expanding legal understandings, and comparisons made between legal and clinical 
approaches to the incorporation of more qualified, objective elements with a view to 
rendering the aim appropriate for judicial application.  
In Chapter 3, a detailed assessment framework is developed and proposed for the 
evaluation of the Court’s restorative endeavour. In particular, assessment is proposed in 
respect of the justice goals of participating victims, together with their attitudes and 
evaluations in respect of the achievement of those goals. Reference to psychological 
approaches to the assessment and measurement of attitudes and perceptions in a 
substantial research population is therefore justified, and an appropriate approach is 
considered, identified and employed.
33
 The proposed assessment framework therefore 
borrows heavily from clinical methodology, providing an appropriate means of evaluating 
the achievement of the Court’s legal mandate in psychological terms. 
Interdisciplinary research is not, however, without its challenges, and the respective 
disciplines from which this thesis draws come with their own language and methodology. 
In particular, differing terminology is used between (and to some extent, within) legal and 
psychological disciplines to refer to and describe psychological impacts, an issue which is 
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examined in some detail at para 2.2.2.(i).
34
 Time has therefore been taken both during the 
process of this thesis and through earlier work and research conducted by the author,
35
 to 
engage with the literature with a view to obtaining a clear understanding of the various 
uses of terms within the disciplines. In addition, there are clear differences in 
methodological approaches between legal and psychological disciplines. For the purpose 
of this thesis, the starting point for the identification of appropriate methodologies for 
Chapters 2 and 3, identified above, has been a consideration of the nature of the problem 
at hand, rather than any specific methodologies within the respective disciplines.  
Finally, it is recognised here that in the aftermath of international crimes, affected 
communities and societies may be seeking ways to come to terms with the legacy of 
widespread and gross violations. In some cases, societies may themselves be in transition 
from autocratic to democratic rule, or otherwise be emerging from conflict. The 
transitional context within which individuals seek justice has a clear bearing on the nature 
of victims’ reparative needs, an issue that is considered in more depth below,36 as well as 
on how those needs might be effectively pursued and managed within the Court. 
Transitional justice literature is therefore referred to in this research to the extent it relates 
to the pursuit and achievement of positive psychological benefit in victims. 
Transitional justice is understood here as “the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability”.37 The related concept of “post-conflict justice” 
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is understood as encompassing two elements, “retributive and restorative justice with 
respect to human depredations that occur during violent conflicts” and “restoring and 
enhancing justice systems which have failed or become weakened as a result of internal 
conflict”.38 The focus of this research is on the first of these elements. 
Transitional justice therefore seeks to respond to the wide and sometimes disparate needs 
of societies in transition and typically concerns situations of mass victimisation,
39
 where 
the justice needs of substantial numbers of victims arise against the backdrop of a need for 
collective repair and healing. Particular reference is had in this research to the perceived  
psychological benefits of victim engagement identified in transitional justice literature, 
and these are examined in Chapter 2 from the specific perspective of their applicability 
and suitability to the ICC context. The issue of mass victimisation and its relationship to 
the pursuit of individually reparative benefit is examined further below in this section. 
 
Notably, the research is theoretical in nature. During both the development and conduct of 
the research, specific thought was given to the possibility of conducting an empirical 
study involving participating victims. In particular, consideration was given to the 
possibility of (1) validating the assessment parameters identified in Chapter 2 (and 
reiterated in Chapter 3 in the context of an assessment tool) with a sample of the ICC 
participating victim population in order to assess the extent to which the parameters 
accurately reflect the justice aims of victims participating in ICC proceedings, and (2) 
piloting the assessment tool and/or conducting an initial assessment of victims’ 
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perceptions of their participation experience with a view to obtaining preliminary data in 
relation to victims’ sense of justice in respect of their participation.  At a practical level, 
piloting and empirical assessment in respect of (2) would, of course, first require the 
physical development of the assessment tool itself, and so evaluation in that regard was 
not feasible. The decision not to validate justice parameters for participating victims at 
this stage of the research was taken for a number of reasons:  
The conduct of an empirical study, including validation of justice parameters, was 
recognised to offer potential advantages to the thesis in terms not only of the generation of 
data but also, from a pragmatic point of view, in framing the scope of the thesis in terms 
of both content and structure. Against these advantages, thought was given to the impact 
on the thesis itself of conducting and including an empirical study. In particular, 
consideration was given to the fact that the identification of the justice aims of victims of 
international crimes had, to a large extent, already been conducted elsewhere, albeit not in 
the specific context of the ICC, and there was therefore a concern that the opportunity to 
make a contribution to knowledge in the field might be limited. In addition, in light of the 
time taken to conduct an empirical study, it was probable that the scope of the thesis itself 
would become more limited, such that the identification of an assessment framework 
would likely not be feasible.  
Finally, and decisively from the point of view of conducting any empirical research at this 
stage, discussions with the Head of the Court’s Victims Participation and Reparations 
Section revealed that while she was amenable, in principle, to the conduct of  research 
into the justice perceptions of participating victims, access for the conduct of such 
research would only be considered once the findings of a study by researchers from 
Berkeley University concerning victims’ evaluation of the processes and procedures allied 
to the participation endeavour became available. The findings of the Berkeley study were 
published in December 2015. 
While, however, the thesis is, as a result, theoretical in nature, it provides the basis for a 
substantive empirical study, and envisages, at a preliminary stage, validation of 
assessment parameters and piloting of the assessment tool prior to any larger-scale 
evaluation. These elements are considered further at para 3.6. 
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Scope and limitations of the research 
According to Parmentier and Weitekamp, “human rights discourse has been criticized for 
overemphasizing the claims of individual persons, without due attention to the duties and 
responsibilities they bear in society, and without reference to other entities that may 
possess rights and responsibilities, such as communities and even states.”40 In the 
introduction to their edited book, the authors identify three waves in the development and 
emergence of human rights, giving rise, in turn, to what they describe as three discrete 
human rights “generations”: (1) civil and political rights; (2) economic and social rights; 
and (3) “solidarity rights”, most often viewed in ‘collective’ terms”.41  
While the emphasis of this research is on the justice needs and experiences of individual 
participating victims, the separation of individual and collective experiences and 
corresponding reparative needs is somewhat artificial. In particular, it is recognised here 
that victims’ needs and experiences arise in the context of crimes of mass victimisation 
that are inherently collective in their perpetration, and which engender a complex and 
interrelated interplay of individual and collective needs in both individual victims and the 
affected community.  
The reparative needs of victims of international crimes arise ostensibly in response to the 
harm(s) suffered by the crime(s) committed.
42
 These needs may, in turn, be physical, 
psychological and/or financial in nature, together with more immediate protection needs 
and a desire for recognition within the justice system.
43
 The interdependency of individual 
and collective needs of victims in the aftermath of international crimes can best be 
illustrated through a brief exploration of the form and nature of the psychological impacts 
typically engendered in both individual victims and societies by the perpetration of 
organised or mass violence. 
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At an individual level, the trauma occasioned by the perpetration of international crimes 
can give rise to “a metamorphosis of the psyche…mental decomposition and collapse”, 44 
leading to the rupture of mental functioning.
45
  Associated violations can impact upon a 
survivor’s sense of self,46 producing identity disorientation and depersonalization, and 
essentially eliciting “the devastation of one’s core identity”.47 Man-made trauma such as 
that associated with gross human rights violations and war can shatter core beliefs, 
including belief in the world as a just place (“the existential dilemma”),48 in others as kind 
and trustworthy individuals, and in the inviolability of the self.
49
 In addition, survivors 
may experience feelings of shame, guilt and self-blame, together with a sense of 
disempowerment and helplessness.  Survivors may also suffer grief for the loss of others 
and the self, anxiety, depression (including suicidal ideation), intrusive phenomena such 
as flashbacks and nightmares, avoidance, emotional numbness and difficulties in 
recollection.
50
 Where abuse has included forms of sexual violence, survivors may also 
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experience sexual dysfunction, fear of intimacy, self-loathing and rejection of their body, 
which in turn can engender self-injurious behaviour.
51
  
In addition to the psychological impact of international crimes experienced at an 
individual level, affected societies may suffer collective trauma.
52
  
Manifestations of trauma at a societal level can include varying forms of community 
dysfunction. Abuses such as torture or ethnic violence may create “an order based on 
imminent pervasive threat, fear, terror, and inhibition,…a state of generalized insecurity, 
terror, lack of confidence, and rupture of the social fabric”.53 Societies that witness the 
perpetration of atrocities such as war rape and other forms of violence against community 
and family members may experience severe trauma.
54
 Collectively, communities enter 
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1721; Kira (n 46) 55.  
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context, Article 1(1), United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment of Punishment (1984) (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 2 June 
1987) 1465 UNTS 85. 
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 Hagen (n 51) 19. War rape serves to instil fear in other women and to demonstrate suppression of 
a community, and can be interpreted by witnesses as both a physical and psychological defeat; see 
Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender (Cambridge University Press 2001) 362-363; Christoph 
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order and to destroy the self-worth of the victim through the generation of profound feelings of 
shame and dishonour; see, for example, Bell (n 51) 115 – 121; Annette Lyth, ‘The development of 
the legal protection against sexual violence in armed conflicts – advantages and disadvantages’ 
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into shock, which is compounded by grief for the loss of the victim through either death, 
the debilitating physical and psychological impact of the violation, or, in the case of rape, 
familial and community rejection.
55
 
Whilst the perpetration of international crimes can generate psychological trauma at the 
individual and societal levels, the respective nature of individual and collective traumas 
may differ. Individual and collective trauma reactions can seemingly be influenced, and 
therefore differentiated, by factors such as the specific targeting of abuse and the duration 
or intensity of the stressor.
56
 These factors in turn affect the degree of life threat - i.e. the 
assessed risk of surviving the event - and hence the resulting trauma response. In 
particular, individually-targeted violations are more likely to represent a threat of 
imminent death than a repressive, longer-term and chronic stressor targeted at a specific 
community.
57
 Notably, while mass conflict is recognised as having a widespread, 
psychological impact upon society, it should also be acknowledged that its effects will not 
necessarily be uniform, and may be dependent upon the extent to which specific groups 
were affected.
58
 
Far from being conceptualised discretely, however, individual and collective/societal 
forms of trauma are interlinked and interdependent. Victims experience international 
crime(s) in varying and concurrent capacities: individually, as a direct victim; indirectly, 
as a family member of a direct victim; and as a member of a victimised community or 
                                                                                                                                                                
(2001) available online at 
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group, indicating a potentially complex array of reparative needs in those participating in 
proceedings before the International Criminal Court. In particular, clinical literature 
describes a “layering” of trauma, such that an individual, as a member of a particular 
group or of society more broadly, may experience the first phase of traumatisation with 
the onset or increase in group repression, persecution (which may include elements of 
social and political change) and violence. The period(s) during which the individual 
personally becomes a victim of serious human rights violations or international crimes 
marks the second phase in the traumatisation process.
59
  
In addition, community or societal allegiance or affiliation in the individual, as aspects of 
social and cultural identity, form part of the individual’s personal identity system.60 Where 
persecutory or abusive actions, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing, are directed at entire 
ethnic or cultural populations, the sense of group identity and allegiance is heightened,
 61
 
producing collective solidarity, identity and mutual support.
 62
  When the group, or 
members of it, are attacked, “interdependency can be threatened by the disruption of the 
social network with a subsequent weakening of people’s individual or collective 
identity”.63 In these circumstances, the consequences of an act of ethnic cleansing, such as 
the destruction of a village or community, amounts essentially to the destruction of the 
personal point of existential reference.
64
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At the same time, psychological trauma can affect the individual’s sense of attachment 
and connectedness, and this, coupled with a loss of trust in others, may impact upon 
familial and social roles - as parent, spouse, employee, employer, citizen etc.
65
 - 
engendering a deterioration in social, educational and occupational functioning.
66
 This in 
turn can lead to social withdrawal and isolation, affecting societal and cultural aspects of 
personal identity.
67
  
Finally, it should be noted that social, political and cultural factors prevalent within the 
victim’s broader societal context may influence the way in which trauma is conceived and 
interpreted by the individual,
 
in turn affecting the trauma response itself and the victim’s 
corresponding reparative needs.
68
  
In addition to the relatively complex nature of reparative needs in victims of crimes that 
have been perpetrated on a wide and systematic scale against ethnic or community groups, 
the physical and psychological harms suffered may themselves be exacerbated by the 
prevailing, mass victimisation context. Notably, this factor will pose additional challenges 
for the Court in the operation of its victim participation and reparations endeavours. 
Where, for example, crimes are perpetrated within an ongoing conflict setting, or where 
there is otherwise insecurity and/or destruction of the healthcare infrastructure, physical 
and psychological sequelae, and therefore resulting needs in victims before the Court, may 
be exacerbated by prevailing unsanitary conditions and a lack of access to clinical services 
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familial, communal and societal rejection; see for example, Hagen (n 51) 19; Bell (n 51) 118 – 119; 
Smith and Boyles (n 54). 
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or medication. At the same time, reparative benefit is sought by victims within a 
participation system that must simultaneously be responsive to the needs of many 
thousands of victim participants whilst also ensuring that justice is done for the accused in 
a fair and timely manner. 
Besides the challenges posed by the problem of mass victimisation, the related transitional 
context within which victims seek justice presents further challenges to the Court in the 
realisation of individual reparative needs. In particular, societies that are seeking to come 
to terms with past abuses have additional needs, including the need to learn the truth about 
the abuses that occurred, to ensure  accountability in respect of those abuses and the need 
to pursue and achieve measures aimed at societal cohesion, trust and reconciliation.
69
  The 
nature of reparative needs in this context is therefore exponential. While the specific focus 
of this research is on the reparation of the victim, it must be recognised that this is one 
need amongst many for both the society seeking to come to terms with its violent past and 
the Court itself.  
The challenges for the Court in providing reparative benefit, in whole or in part, to 
participating victims are therefore significant. While the focus of this research is on the 
identification and evaluation of reparative benefit in the individual participant, it is 
recognised here, and subsequently within the research, that victims’ needs arise against 
the backdrop of mass victimisation and the challenges this poses. To this end, it should be 
noted that it is not the premise of this thesis that individual reparative benefit is 
necessarily achievable for (all) victims participating in proceedings before the ICC. The 
focus of this research, instead, concerns an exploration of what that reparative benefit 
would comprise in victims of international crimes, and how its achievement or otherwise 
might be evaluated in the context of the ICC. 
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In addition to the above, it should also be acknowledged that empirical evaluation of the 
experiences of victims in engaging with international transitional justice mechanisms has 
been relatively limited to date.
70
 Moreover, in light of the innovative nature of the Court’s 
restorative participation endeavour, available systematic studies typically arise in 
alternative justice contexts and as such, the direct transferability of their findings to the 
ICC experiment is limited. In adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this thesis draws 
together and analyses the findings of studies from both the legal and clinical fields, as well 
as further afield. In doing so, it presents a consolidated review of current knowledge in the 
area, thereby maximising the evidential base from which proposals can be advanced and 
conclusions drawn.  
Finally, while much of the clinical literature referred to in this thesis emerges in the 
specific context of victims of international crimes engaging with international transitional 
justice mechanisms, in a number of instances, materials refer instead to the experiences of 
victims within a purely therapeutic context. Particular care is therefore taken in this thesis 
to ensure that where findings have arisen in an alternative context, the extent of their 
transferability to the ICC is considered. To this end, differences between judicial and 
therapeutic contexts are acknowledged, and particular attention is paid within the thesis to 
the exigencies of the discreet disciplines and the direct transferability of concepts and 
practices between the two. Where assumptions are made as to the transferability of 
concepts and outcomes, they are expressly indicated in the text. For the purpose of 
incorporating clinical insights into legal theory in this thesis, particular regard is had to the 
need to ensure that clinical evidence is itself methodologically robust, explored further in 
paras 2.3.1.(ii) and 2.3.2.(iii)(a). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the terms “victim” and “survivor” are used interchangeably. 
“Restorative” and “reparative” justice are used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated 
in the text.
71
 The terms are examined in depth in para 1.2.1. 
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1. Considering the potential for the realisation of effective and meaningful 
participation at the ICC: the incorporation and reflection of restorative justice 
theory and values in the Statute and practice of the Court 
1.1. Introduction 
The right of victims to participate in proceedings before the International Criminal Court 
is contained in Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, which provides: 
“Where the personal interests of the victim are affected, the Court shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is 
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal 
representatives of the victims where the Court considers it appropriate, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”. 
Article 68(3) therefore provides victim participants with the right to present their views 
and concerns to the Court where their personal interests are affected, at a stage of the 
proceedings to be determined by the Court, and in a manner which is not prejudicial to the 
right of the Defendant to a fair and expeditious trial. The use of the word “shall” in the 
text of Article 68(3) denotes that, where the various conditions of the provision are 
satisfied, the right of victims to present their views and concerns is not subject to the 
exercise of any permissive discretion on the part of the Court.
72
 The provisions of Article 
                                                                                                                                                                
Procedure’ in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective within 
Criminal Justice: International Debates (Ashgate 2000) 193. 
72
 This interpretation is reinforced by the use of the word “may” subsequently in the Article, and is 
consistent with an “ordinary meaning” approach to treaty interpretation, Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Recognition of a similar approach to the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Rome Statute has been acknowledged in the caselaw of the 
Court, see, for example, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (“Lubanga”) (Judgment on the 
appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' 
Participation of 18 Jan. 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1432 (11 July 2008) [85]. See also The Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui  (“Katanga and Ngudjolo”) (Decision on the 
Modalities of Victim Participation at Trial) ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG (22 January 2010) [53], 
in which the right of victims to present their views and concerns is described in terms of a statutory 
entitlement;  Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo (“Gbagbo”) (Decision on issues related to the victims’ 
application process) ICC‐02/11‐01/11‐33 (6 February 2012), in which the single judge describes 
“her obligation to guarantee the rights of victims to express their views and concerns in a 
meaningful manner” [emphasis added] [5]. See also Mariana Pena and Gaelle Carayon, ‘Is the ICC 
Making the Most of Victim Participation?’ (2013) International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, 2. 
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68(3), together with Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“Rules” or “RPE”), 
however, indicate that the manner in which the victims’ right to participate is exercised is 
subject to a number of judicial discretions, including the determination of an appropriate 
stage of proceedings in which victims’ views might be presented, the specific modalities 
of participation and the meaning and ambit of “views and concerns” in the given case.73 In 
exercising its discretion in this regard, the Court is required by Article 68(3) to give 
primacy to the right of the Defendant to a fair and expeditious trial. Participants must, in 
turn, be “victims” within the meaning of Rule 85 RPE.74 
Victims wishing to participate in specific proceedings before the International Criminal 
Court are required to submit a written application to the Registrar. Applications are 
processed by the Victims Participation and Reparation Section (“VPRS”) of the Registry, 
and victim participation status is determined by the Tribunal on a case-by-case basis.
75
 
The potential modalities of participation are wide-ranging, and include the ability of 
victims to attend and participate in specific hearings, either orally or in writing,
76
 the 
opportunity for victims to present any views and concerns which are specifically engaged 
by the proceedings in question,
77
 and the chance to make opening and closing statements 
in a case.
78
 Victim participants may also be able to question, challenge and seek to 
discredit witnesses,
79
 contest the admissibility of evidence
80
 and submit evidence 
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themselves,
81
 including by testifying as a witness in their own right, independently of the 
Defence or Prosecution.
82
 
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the integration of victims into the criminal 
justice process is widely described in academic and practitioner literature as “[o]ne of the 
major innovations of the ICC”,83 which “completely modifies the position of victims from 
witnesses of crimes to that of being the subject of rights”.84 The pioneering, victim-
focussed provisions of the Rome Statute reportedly provide “the promise of justice for, 
and not just with, the victims”.85  
In this section, the potential of the Court’s victim participation endeavour to provide a 
positive, restorative benefit to participants is examined and assessed, firstly in terms of its 
theoretical underpinnings and content, and secondly, in relation to the practical 
interpretation and application of the endeavour by the Court and expert commentators 
alike.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (“Bemba”) (Decision on Directions for the Conduct of 
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80
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1.2 The Court’s victim participation endeavour: restorative in theory? 
 
In creating a discrete role for victims in proceedings before the Court, drafters of the 
Rome Statute intended that role to be distinct both from the role of victims as witnesses, 
and from the role of the Prosecutor.
86
 It is argued here that in enacting the victim 
participation scheme, drafters intended to incorporate into the Rome Statute restorative 
justice notions, designed in turn to be of sole or principal benefit to the individual victim 
participant. 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
87
 requires that the provisions of a treaty must be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with their ordinary meaning and in light of their 
object and purpose.
88
 The recognition and practical application of the restorative rationale 
for Article 68(3) is therefore instrumental to the achievement of effective and meaningful 
participation for victims in accordance with the intended object and purpose of the 
provision.
89
 
Before therefore proceeding to a discussion of the potential for victims to achieve 
effective and meaningful participation at the International Criminal Court in practice, it is 
appropriate to consider the extent to which the provision, as drafted, could be considered 
restorative in theory, and so one of potential for victims participating in proceedings 
before the Court. It is therefore necessary to situate the provision within its broader, 
conceptual context with a view to substantially exploring its underlying rationale and 
theoretical basis. The chapter therefore begins with an examination of the concept of 
restorative justice, and in particular, the application of restorative justice conceptions and 
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notions within the ICC participation context, as the theoretical basis for this research. The 
chapter goes on to examine the extent to which the restorative basis of the provision is 
recognised in academic and Court literature. Consideration is then given to the potential of 
the provision, as drafted, to provide restorative benefit for the individual victim 
participant. 
1.2.1. Restorative justice as an underpinning theory for victim participation at the ICC? 
(i) Overview: restorative justice and the ICC 
Drafters of the Rome Statute were seemingly influenced by growing concerns relating to 
the impact of traditional retributive criminal justice systems on victims both domestically 
and internationally, and the resulting re-emergence of restorative justice theory as a means 
of repositioning the victim as the central figure in the criminal process.
90
 
Traditional retributive approaches to criminal justice situate the State as the central actor 
in a criminal action,
91
 and the alleged crime that has been committed is thereby 
conceptualised in turn both as a breach of its laws and as an offence against society, rather 
than primarily as an offence committed against the victim. To this extent, retributive 
justice theory essentially designates the State and society as the “victims” of the offence, 
and the focus of the judicial investigation and action is on the wrong allegedly committed 
by the perpetrator, rather than on the harm suffered by the victim. As a result, the role of 
the individual victim in the investigation and prosecution of the offence is essentially 
relegated to that of information provider/witness. 
For proponents of restorative justice, purely retributive approaches to criminal justice 
result in the effective marginalisation and disenfranchisement of the victim from the 
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 See also War Crimes Research Office (November 2007) (n13) 2. 
91
 The traditional retributive approaches described above stem from the early nineteenth century, 
when the State began to assume prosecutorial responsibility for criminal acts. Prior to this, 
prosecutions were pursued through the courts by individual victims of crime or by prosecution 
societies acting on their behalf; see James Dignan, Understanding victims and restorative justice 
(Open University Press 2005) 63. The assumption of prosecutorial responsibility is described by 
Renée Zauberman as an expression of sovereignty, see ‘Victims as Consumers of the Criminal 
Justice System’, in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds) Integrating a Victim Perspective within 
Criminal Justice: International Debates (Ashgate 2000) 37, 40, although it must also have 
substantially eased the financial burden for victims of pursuing a private criminal action. 
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judicial process
 92
 and provide an inadequate response to the nature and complexity of 
harm suffered by the victim.
93 
Restorative justice theory arises as a response to these 
concerns. While, therefore, the specific focus of judicial action under a purely retributive 
process is the prosecution and punishment of the offender, the primary aim of restorative 
justice theory is the restoration of the victim and, as far as possible, the reparation of harm 
done.
94
 Howard Zehr notes to this end that while retributive approaches to criminal justice 
seek answers to three questions: what laws have been broken? Who did it? And what do 
the offender(s) deserve?, restorative justice asks: who has been harmed? What are their 
needs? And whose obligations are these?
95
  
As indicated in the Introduction, restorative justice is not defined in the context of 
international criminal law, and it is therefore appropriate to consider how the practice is 
understood within its broader context of application. 
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(ii) Exploring definitions and understandings of restorative justice 
Notably, the restorative justice movement is “far from monolithic”,96 and a degree of 
conceptual confusion exists around the meaning of restorative justice as a result. Dignan 
and Lowey, for example, observe that “restorative justice initiatives display considerable 
variations, which is why it is difficult to formulate a precise definition that would apply to 
them all”.97 Moreover, it is clear that for (some) restorative justice experts, the flexibility 
of the concept is valued, such that the emergence of a single and unified definition is 
unlikely, Zehr and Mika, for example, noting that “we do not believe that any single 
definition will ever be likely, or even particularly useful…we value its fluid nature, and 
above all, its responsiveness to the needs of key stakeholders in the justice equation”.98 It 
is further noted in this context that for proponents, the specific parameters or elements of 
restorative justice are not intended to be static, but instead should be understood as 
“dynamic in response to changing needs, changing relationships and cultural values”, and 
in addition, that restorative practices are unlikely to incorporate all parameters in any 
event.
99
 
 
While the ensuing fluidity of the concept may be valued by proponents, however, it also 
presents challenges in the conduct of research, as well as for the Court in the realisation of 
any restorative goal. With this in mind, a number of the definitions of restorative justice 
proposed in the literature are briefly described and considered here with specific reference 
to their applicability to the ICC context, their potential responsiveness to crimes of mass 
victimisation and the specific focus of this research.  
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The most widely accepted definition of restorative justice was proposed by Tony Marshall 
in 1999,
100
 who notes that: 
“Restorative justice is a process whereby parties with a stake in a specific 
offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of that offence and 
its implications for the future”.101  
From the point of view both of the ICC’s participation endeavour and the focus of this 
research, the definition is an interesting one due to its focus on process, and in particular, 
the notion that substantive justice (or at least aspects of it) may be achievable for the 
victim within the judicial process rather than solely as a reparative outcome of the legal 
proceedings. That said, restorative justice, including that for victims of international 
crimes, naturally also encompasses the award of reparations, a factor which is clearly 
recognised in the context of the ICC by the inclusion in its mandate of reparations 
provisions.
102
 While the specific focus of this research is on the Court’s participation 
endeavour, a conception of restorative justice that focuses solely on process to the 
exclusion of reparative outcome measures is somewhat incomplete in the context. In 
addition, the definition fails to make specific reference to any restoration of the victim. 
Moreover, instead of referring to the reparation of harm done, Marshall’s definition refers, 
in more abstract terms, only to the aftermath of the offence, and hence is arguably 
insufficiently victim-focussed. Finally, in referring to the collective efforts of all parties, 
including the Defendant, to consider how best to respond to the harms inflicted, the 
definition is, it is suggested, more apposite for application within a mechanism designed 
to be wholly restorative, such as a Truth Commission, as opposed to an international 
criminal justice mechanisms which remains, first and foremost, a vehicle for the pursuit 
and delivery of retributive justice. 
103
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The Restorative Justice Consortium, a UK national umbrella organisation and charity 
comprising organisations and individuals with an interest in restorative justice, define the 
practice in the following terms: 
“Restorative Justice works to resolve conflict and to repair harm. It encourages 
those who have caused harm to acknowledge the impact of what they have done 
and gives them an opportunity to make reparation. It offers those who have 
suffered harm the opportunity to have their harm or loss acknowledged and 
amends made.”104  
Explicit reference to the repair of harm arguably renders the definition more victim-
focussed than that proposed by Marshall, and because the notion of harm here is not 
expressly linked to the direct victim of the offence, the definition would also encompass 
harms suffered by the victims’ families and communities in the aftermath of mass 
victimisation. Moreover, reference to the resolution of conflict arguably speaks to the 
ICC’s broader peace-building aim.105 The proposed definition is, however, once again of 
limited broader transferability in its entirety to the ICC experiment. In particular, in 
seeking to encourage the defendant to acknowledge the harms they have inflicted and to 
make amends accordingly, the definition is more apposite to a process that is intended to 
be exclusively restorative. While, therefore, it would arguably be appropriate for 
application within a transitional justice context such as a Truth Commission,
106
 it is of 
                                                                                                                                                                
truth commissions, designed to address intercommunal or group conflict, including wide scale 
human rights violations. 
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more limited applicability to victim-focused measures designed to operate within a 
mechanism with primarily retributive aims.  
Finally, a broad definition of restorative justice has been proposed by Bazemore and 
Walgrave, who define the practice as: 
“every action that is primarily oriented towards doing justice by restoring the 
harm that has been caused by a crime”.107 
The proposed definition is interesting in that it makes no reference to the defendant, and in 
his subsequent expansion of the elements of the definition, Walgrave indicates that 
“restorative justice can function in the absence of a known offender”.108 There are obvious 
issues with the potential interdependence of perpetrator accountability and the extent to 
which any form of justice can be fully “restorative” or “rehabilitative” where a perpetrator 
is absent, particularly in the context of gross abuses of human rights.
109
 Moreover, as this 
research goes on to show, a number of the elements of justice, from the perspective of 
victims of international crimes, require the presence of a perpetrator.
110
 For the many 
survivors of abuses who will never see “their” perpetrator held accountable in the 
International Criminal Court, however, the potential of achieving justice, or at least some 
aspect of it, beyond the ICC in the absence of an offender is an interesting one which 
merits further exploration in the context of victims of international crimes.
111
 Within the 
specific context of the ICC, however, the absence of a perpetrator is not an issue for 
victims who have been formally recognised as participants in proceedings.  
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Significantly, in referring to “actions” that are oriented towards repairing harm, rather 
than to entire judicial processes or practices, the definition is seemingly sensitive to justice 
mechanisms such as the ICC which were not designed, first and foremost, as restorative 
justice bodies.  While the Court is an ostensibly retributive judicial mechanisms, it also 
incorporates a number of elements that were designed with primarily victim-centric aims 
and, it is suggested, in the more limited context of judicial actions aimed at the practical 
implementation of those elements, the aim and focus of those actions should be the 
reparation of harm(s) suffered. Moreover, as a definition which takes harm as its starting 
point and conceives of justice in terms of the reparation of that harm, it is consistent with 
the focus of this research. In addition, the broad wording of the definition means that it is 
able to encompass the complex array of harms suffered by survivors of mass 
victimisation, by both direct and indirect victims, and at the individual, communal and 
collective levels. Finally, in concerning actions that are “primarily”, rather than “solely” 
oriented towards repairing harm, the definition is sensitive to the competing interests at 
play within the context of the ICC, and so is arguably responsive to the need for the 
Court’s participation scheme to operate within an ostensibly retributive context, where 
certain actions, whilst primarily victim-centred, are likely to have impacts beyond those 
experienced by the victim.
112
  
 
Despite the absence of a common definition, there is broad agreement in the literature that 
the primary aim of restorative justice is the restoration of the victim and the reparation of 
harm done. Fattah, for example, describes the practice as “a justice paradigm that has 
healing, closure, redress and prevention as its primary goal”.113 Liebmann similarly 
identifies victim support and healing as the primary aims of restorative justice.
114
 Zehr and 
Mika note that “[t]he needs of victims for information, validation, vindication, restitution, 
testimony, safety and support are the starting points of justice”,115 while Wright observes 
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that restorative justice aims at “repairing (as far as possible) or making up for the damage 
and hurt caused by the crime”.116  
That said, it should be noted that while the victim is seen as the primary focus of 
restorative action, they are not the sole focus of restorative justice approaches. In addition 
to repairing the victim of the crime, restorative approaches typically seek to address 
harm(s) at a community level, as well as to provide the potential for offender 
rehabilitation and reintegration. Morris and Maxwell, for example, note that “[c]entral to 
the ideas underlying restorative justice are the involvement of victims in processes that 
have the potential to repair the harm they have experienced, the involvement of offenders 
in making amends for that harm, and the restoration of some kind of balance between the 
two”.117 In comparison with its purely retributive counterpart, restorative justice is 
described by McKenna as “a more inclusive approach to dealing with the effects of the 
crime, which concentrates on restoring and repairing the relationship between the 
offender, the victim and the community at large, and which typically includes reparative 
elements towards the victim and/or community”.118 To this end, proponents have 
identified a number of characteristics or constituent elements of restorative justice, 
although note that, consistent with the fluid nature of the subject, the exact parameters of a 
restorative justice approach should be determined by the prevailing circumstances. 
According to Zehr and Mika, key elements of a restorative justice approach include:
119
  
(i) The notion that the perpetration of a crime constitutes a violation of people and 
interpersonal relationships. Those most directly affected by the crime, together 
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with family members, witnesses and members of the affected community have 
been harmed, and need restoration.
120
  
(ii) The violation gives rise to an obligation on the offender to make amends to 
the victim and the affected community. As primary stakeholders, victims are 
empowered to effectively participate in the restorative process, including in 
defining the nature of restorative actions required. Dignan and Lowey describe 
this as the principle of inclusivity, by which the direct victim and others with an 
interest in the outcome are entitled to participate.
121
 At the same time, the 
community is understood as having an obligation to support victims in meeting 
their needs and to support offender efforts at social reintegration. 
(iii) Restorative justice approaches seek to heal. In particular, the justice process 
should produce a context which promotes the recovery, healing and 
empowerment of the individual victim, and within which victim input and 
participation is maximised. A similar element is identified by the Centre for 
Restorative Justice, who note that “[r]estorative responses empower victims by 
offering them a voice in the process, an opportunity to ask questions and seek 
answers, afford them a role in decision-making and avenues for healing, 
restitution and emotional support”.122 
The process should also seek to strengthen and support the community by 
providing a forum for the identification of factors and conditions which generated 
or facilitated harm, enable articulation of community values and to facilitate 
action aimed at the prevention of future offences.
123
 
There are, therefore, a number of potentially competing interests at stake within a 
restorative justice approach, and Dignan and Lowey highlight the need for any process to 
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strike a balance between those interests.
124
 With this in mind, Greif approaches restorative 
justice as a balance between a number of tensions: between therapeutic and retributive 
justice models, the needs of the victim and the rights of the offender; and the need to 
rehabilitate the offender and the duty to protect the public.
125
 These tensions are 
particularly apparent in cases concerning gross violations of human rights, where, as 
discussed, the needs of victims are likely to be extensive. Moreover, the need to balance 
competing interests is expressly recognised in academic literature relating to the ICC, 
Garkarwe, for example, noting that  
“the ICC must attempt to strike a balance between a number of legitimate 
objectives. There are the fair trial rights of accused persons, the right of victims 
to have their say and participate in proceedings where their personal interests are 
affected, and a workable procedure that will not be overwhelmed by the 
numbers of victims and survivors wishing to participate”.126  
In addition, the scale of violations under consideration by the ICC and the resulting needs 
for justice at a communal and societal give rise to a further area of potential tension: that 
between the restorative interests of the individual victim and those of the affected 
community.  
Restorative justice thereby aims to reassert the position of the victim within the criminal 
justice process by refocusing the criminal process on the victim and the harm suffered. 
Restorative approaches seek to repair harm, empower the victim and provide opportunities 
for acknowledgment of their suffering and validation of their feelings by providing 
victims a greater role in judicial proceedings, the opportunity to be heard, the right to be 
kept informed about the progress of their case and the prospect of pursuing reparations.
127
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(iii) In the context of the ICC: considering tensions and an alternative theoretical 
basis for the research 
In cases of mass victimisation, the various elements of restorative justice – the individual, 
offender and societal dimensions – are readily identifiable and operational within 
transitional justice mechanisms such as Truth Commissions, where, for example, 
reconciliation is sought at the political,
128
 societal
129
 and interpersonal levels,
130
 
131
 
personal forms of justice are sought through truth-telling by victims as well in the 
revelation of truths by perpetrators,
132
 and offender rehabilitation and reintegration is 
sought through their acceptance of responsibility for, and full disclosure in respect of, the 
crimes committed.
133
 To this end, Truth Commissions can be seen as the international 
manifestation of restorative justice practices, dealing with issues of individual 
victimisation, reconciliation and healing at the group level.
134
  
It must be acknowledged, however, that in the more limited context of the International 
Criminal Court, while the inclusion of dedicated, victim-focused measures is recognised 
within the academic literature, a restorative basis for those measures is not universally 
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identified or accepted. The fluidity of the concept of restorative justice has already been 
noted. According to Daly and Proietti-Scifoni, restorative justice has been attributed 
various and different meanings “depending on [the author’s]…frame of reference and 
affiliation with domestic or international criminal justice.”135 Within the context of 
transitional justice, including international criminal law, the authors go on to note that 
scholars have drawn upon domestic literature to extrapolate an understanding of 
restorative justice that best suits the proposed context of application and analysis.
136
 To 
this end, for example, the War Crimes Research Office of Washington University notes in 
relation to the operation of restorative justice elements at the ICC that “the term 
‘restorative justice’ is a broad term used in a variety of contexts, including as a shorthand 
reference to programs designed to facilitate victim-offender mediation outside the 
traditional criminal justice realm. However, we restrict our use of the term…to the 
movement within the criminal justice context that holds mechanisms created to deliver 
criminal justice should focus on the interests of victims, as opposed to strictly punishing 
wrongdoers”.137  
For other scholars, however, the adoption of restorative justice terminology and 
approaches represents the problematic supplanting of selected terms and notions from 
domestic to international criminal law without reference to the specific exigencies of the 
international context, and without regard to the nature of restorative justice in its entirety. 
For Goetz, for example, the purported application of restorative justice within the ICC as a 
theoretical basis for its victim-focussed measures poses difficulties due to the additional 
focus of restorative justice practices on the perpetrator, the affected community, and the 
promotion of victim-offender dialogue as a means of collectively resolving the aftermath 
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of the offences charged.
138
 It is therefore appropriate to briefly consider here the 
alternative and emerging concept of reparative justice in the context of victims of 
international crimes.  
While restorative justice practices are understood to have offender and community aspects 
in addition to its primary victim focus, reparative justice, according to Goetz, “is 
singularly concerned with victims’ experience of the justice process in terms of how far it 
repairs the specific harm suffered”.139 Goetz goes on to delineate three aspects of 
reparative justice: (1) the scope and content of a reparation award, as an outcome aimed at 
addressing the harm suffered; (2) procedural rights that facilitate effective access in order 
that victims are able to pursue an outcome; and (3) what she describes as “more subtle and 
nuanced aspects of victims’ experiences of the justice process”.140 Reparative justice, as 
described, would thereby encompass both process and outcome measures, and to that 
extent, is compatible with the victims’ mandate of the International Criminal Court. The 
multidimensional nature of reparative justice for victims of international crimes is also 
recognised by Danieli, who notes that in addition to the award of reparations as an 
outcome measure, “the justice process as a whole can be reparative, rather than reparation 
being merely an end result.”141 She goes on to conclude that “reparative justice insists that 
every step throughout the justice experience…presents an opportunity for redress and 
healing”.142 Letschert and van Boven in turn describe reparative justice for victims as 
comprising “(i) The Right to Know, (ii) The Right to Justice and (iii) The Right to 
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Reparation” (emphasis in the original).143 The authors here define the second element – 
the right to justice – in purely retributive terms,144 but include within their third element – 
the right to reparation – a process element which “gives prominence to participation and 
empowerment”,145 thereby echoing to some extent the experiential element identified by 
Goetz. 
That said, however, the concept of reparative justice within the specific context of victims 
of international crimes is not (yet) universally understood and utilised as the 
multidimensional notion propounded by Goetz and Danieli that encompasses both 
procedural and outcome aspects of justice for the victim. In his consideration of the 
approach taken by the Appeals Chamber of the Court to the award of reparations in the 
Lubanga case, for example, Stahn employs the term to refer to reparative outcomes alone, 
an approach that is echoed by McCarthy in his examination of the ICC reparations 
endeavour more broadly. Jones, Parmentier and Weitekamp, too, define reparative justice 
simply as “the provision of reparations to victims of crimes”, and where the authors refer 
to victim participation, their consideration is confined to the determination of the nature 
and manner of reparation to be provided, without reference to any broader participatory 
role or the more nuanced impact(s) on the victim of their judicial engagement identified 
by Goetz.
146
 Moreover, while writers such as Goetz seek to expressly distinguish the term 
from “the better-known notion of restorative justice”, others use the two interchangeably. 
Mani, for example, describes reparative justice as having three discrete focuses: the 
individual victim, the affected community, and the perpetrator.
147
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Jones, Parmentier and Weitekamp observe that “there is a great deal of overlap between 
reparative and restorative justice”.148 In particular, each notion calls for a paradigmatic 
shift that “returns the primary focus of addressing these crimes to the redress and repair of 
the victims’ needs as opposed to the acts committed by the perpetrators”.149 While the 
relatively fluid nature of each concept renders a detailed comparison between the two 
problematic, Goetz’s understanding of reparative justice, at least, with its sole victim 
focus and its responsiveness to process as well as outcome, would provide an appropriate 
theoretical basis for this research.  In particular, the specific focus of this research is solely 
on the participating victim and the reparation of harm done, and to this extent, the 
restorative justice notions incorporated into the Court’s mandate are understood, for the 
purpose of this research, to essentially correlate to those victim-focussed measures 
identified by Goetz, including in particular the experiential component.  
There are, however, advantages to preferring a restorative justice approach in this 
instance. As the preceding indicates, a common understanding of reparative justice in the 
context of victims of international crimes has yet to emerge and concretise, and while the 
concept of restorative justice is also somewhat elusive, reparative justice in the broad form 
identified remains in its comparative infancy. Moreover, as this research observes 
below,
150
 the Court self-identifies a restorative justice mandate in respect of participating 
victims, and in terms both of access and impact for the purpose of the conduct of 
assessment, considered substantively in Chapter 3, there are obvious advantages in 
adopting the same language as the Court. Finally, the acceptance by the Court of a 
restorative aim in respect of participating victims elevates victims’ restorative aspirations 
from being simply needs which may or may not be realised within the judicial process, to 
self-recognised responsibilities on the part of the Court (subject, of course, to the 
compatibility of those aspirations with the Court’s primary retributive mandate) and hence 
of considerably greater potential impact from the perspective of the victims concerned. 
                                                          
148
 Jones, Parmentier and Weitekamp (n 146) 143, 145. 
149
 Ibid. 
150
 At para 1.2.2. 
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(iv) Restorative justice and the evolution of the Rome Statute 
 
Having examined the concept of restorative justice within the context of the ICC’s 
participation endeavour and for the purpose of this research, it is appropriate to consider 
whether and the extent to which restorative justice notions were incorporated within the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. 
 
The momentum surrounding the recognition of victims’ needs, rights and status within the 
judicial process domestically coincided with the emergence of a greater understanding of 
the rehabilitative possibilities in the aftermath of gross human rights violations 
internationally,
151
 and a victim-centred approach to the search for justice in the field of 
international human rights law.
152
 This victim-conscious momentum culminated 
internationally in the promulgation of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985),
153
 (the “UN Declaration”). 
The UN Declaration itself was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly, and 
provides victim-focused measures aimed at ensuring victims’ access to criminal justice 
mechanisms at the domestic and international level, including the right for victims to 
receive information about the proceedings in question,
154
 to be treated with dignity and 
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 Garkawe, (n 126), 350. 
152
 The right of victims to access and pursue effective avenues of justice and reparation is widely 
recognised within the body of international human rights law; see, for example, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered in to force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171, Article 2(3)(a); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered in to force 7 March 1966) 660 UNTS 
195, Article 6; Convention against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entered in to force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85, Article 14; 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, 
entered into force September 3 1953) 213 UNTS 222, Article 13; Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978) 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 
Article 25(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted June 27, 1981, entered into 
force Oct. 21, 1986) 1520 UNTS 217, Article 7(a). In addition, the international human rights 
movement has been particularly significant in the recognition of the ability of victims to pursue an 
action against an abusing State in their own right at an international level, thereby investing the 
individual victim with status as a legal actor on the international stage, through the granting of 
individual rights of petition in certain circumstances: see for example, Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights, Article 45(1); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Articles 55 and 
56. 
153
 UNGA (November 29, 1985) UN Doc. A/RES/40/34.  
154
 Article 6(a). 
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respect,
155
 to participate in criminal justice proceedings
156
 and to receive reparation,
157
 
thereby directly echoing themes of restorative justice.
158
  
Against this backdrop, dissatisfaction with the exclusion and isolation of victims from 
criminal justice processes within the domestic sphere was echoed in the international 
arena.
159
 The ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and Rwanda (“ICTR”) respectively, established “for the sole 
purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of humanitarian law”,160 
failed to recognise the interests of victims in the cases before them
161
 or to provide any 
role for victims in the proceedings beyond that of witness. As a result, both Tribunals 
were heavily criticised, with one former ICTY President and former ICC Judge describing 
survivors as “passive objects” in the judicial process.162 In addition, their purely 
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 Article 4. 
156
 Article 6(b). 
157
 Article 4. The forms of reparation are described in Articles 8 – 17. 
158
 Noted also in War Crimes Research Office (November 2007) (n13) 2, 10. 
159
 See, for example, Wemmers (2010) (n 1) at 32; Liesbeth Zegveld, ‘Victims’ reparations claims 
and international criminal courts: incompatible values?’ (2010) 8(1) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 79, 79 – 80. For an overview of the limited role of victims in the ICTY and ICTR 
respectively, see Mary Will, ‘A Balancing Act: The Introduction of Restorative Justice in the 
International Criminal Court’s Case of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ (2007 – 2008) 17:1 
Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 85, 90 – 93. 
160
 UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993), UN Doc S/RES/827, para 2; UNSC Res 955 (8 November 
1994), UN Doc S/RES/955, para 1. 
161
 In the case of Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, for example, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY stated that 
“[c]rimes against humanity are serious acts of violence which harm human beings by striking what 
is most essential to them: their life, liberty, physical welfare, health, and/or dignity. They are 
inhumane acts that by their extent and gravity go beyond the limits tolerable to the international 
community, which must perforce demand their punishment. But crimes against humanity also 
transcend the individual because when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes under attack 
and is negated. It is therefore the concept of humanity as victim which essentially characterises 
crimes against humanity” [emphasis added], (Sentencing Judgment, Trial Chamber) IT-96-22-T 
(26 November 1996) [28]; and see also Prosecutor v. Kambanda (Judgement) ICTR 97-23-S, (4 
September 1998) [15]. Notably, the assumption that it is humanity, rather than the individual that is 
the victim in such a case is akin to the “theft of conflict” by the State espoused by Nils Christie (n 
92) within modern domestic restorative justice approaches, wherein the victim’s interest in the case 
is conceived of as a property right. 
162
 Claude Jorda and Jérôme Hemptinne, ‘The Status and Role of the Victim’ in Antonio Cassese, 
Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a 
Commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) at 1389. David Donat-Cattin, for example, notes that 
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retributive focus meant that they became viewed not only as geographically removed but 
also conceptually isolated from the affected communities and the harms suffered, and 
therefore of limited relevance to a society in transition.
163
 Moreover, it is apparent that 
victims themselves were not satisfied with their level of engagement with the ad hoc 
Tribunals.
 164
 Within this context, a report written by the judges of the ICTY in September 
2000, reflecting upon their observations and experiences of the Yugoslav Tribunal, 
observes that “justice should not only address traditional retributive justice, i.e. 
punishment of the guilty, but should also provide a measure of restorative justice by, inter 
alia, allowing victims to participate in the proceedings and by providing 
                                                                                                                                                                
“the inclusion of norms on victims’ participation in the Court’s proceedings…was the result of 
widespread and strong criticism against the lack of provisions of this kind in the Statutes and Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc Tribunals”, in ‘Article 68: Protection of the victims and 
witnesses and their participation in the proceedings’, in Otto Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Nomos Verlagsgesllschaft 1999) 1281; 
McGonigle (n 5) at 113. The limited victim focus of humanitarian law was not peculiar to the ad 
hoc Tribunals; Schabas, for example, observes that “until recently, international humanitarian law 
focused on the methods and materials of war, and had relatively little to say with respect to 
victims”, Schabas (n 1), 324. See also Wilhelmina Thomassen, who observes that “[v]ictims of 
criminal offences have been the focus of growing attention in recent years. They are no longer 
viewed as mere instruments in the search for the truth….Crimes are now primarily seen as 
violations of the individual rights of victims. This conceptual shift gives theoretical legitimacy to 
the more active role for victims in criminal proceedings” in ‘Victims’ Rights and the Rights of the 
Accused’, lecture given on the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute, The Hague, 3 
July 2008, text available online at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ReplyThomassenCICCquestionnaire_Aug08.pdf> from 12, last 
accessed 26
th
 March 2015. 
163
 See, for example, Redress (October 2012) (n 18). By contrast, the direct and formal involvement 
of victims in criminal processes arguably provides a link between the Court and the affected 
community, with the prospect of cultivating a sense of investment in judicial activities and 
therefore affording the Court legitimacy in the eyes of the affected community. See, for example, 
Eric Stover, Camille Crittenden, Alexa Koenig and others, ‘The impact of the Rome Statute system 
on victims and affected communities’ (30th May, 2010), ICC Review Conference document 
RC/ST/V/INF.4, para 8, available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/RC-
ST-V-INF.4-ENG.pdf> last accessed 22
nd
 June 2015; Mekjian and Varughese (n 6) 29. The 
advantage to the Court in this regard has been formally recognised in its jurisprudence, see, for 
example, Katanga and Ngudjolo (Decision on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural 
Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case) ICC-01/04-01/07-474 (13 May 2008) [63]. 
164
 In respect of victims appearing before the ICTY, see Eric Stover, The Witnesses, War Crimes 
and the Promise of Justice in the Hague (University of Pennsylvania Press 2007). In respect of the 
ICTR, see Redress/African Rights, ‘Survivors and Post-Genocide Justice in Rwanda: Their 
Experiences, Perspectives and Hopes’ (November 2008), available online at < 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/country-
reports/Rwanda%20Survivors%2031%20Oct%2008.pdf> last accessed 26
th
 March 2015; Godfrey 
Musila, Rethinking International Criminal Law: Restorative Justice and the Rights of Victims in 
the International Criminal Court (Saabrüken: Lap Lambert  2010) noting that the lack of 
engagement by the Tribunal with victims led many to consider it “a wasteful parody of justice”, at 
45. 
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compensation”.165 The need for more victim-focussed, restorative elements in the 
prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes was therefore evident in the minds of 
those engaged in the practical operation of international criminal justice at that time, and 
according to the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, criticisms of the ad hoc tribunals 
“underscore the overall importance of restorative justice in the drafting of the Rome 
Statute”.166 
At the same time, in situations where international criminal justice mechanisms might 
otherwise have been employed, States began to resort instead to transitional justice 
mechanisms such as Truth Commissions, which were perceived to be a more victim-
friendly means of addressing widespread and gross human rights violations and serious 
breaches of humanitarian law.
167
  
Victim dissatisfaction with international criminal justice processes therefore threatened 
the continued support for criminal justice institutions from within affected communities, 
and hence jeopardised the perceived legitimacy of the institution itself, together with any 
measure of justice it might seek to administer, while active victim disengagement from 
criminal justice mechanisms was recognised to affect the success of investigative and 
prosecutorial work both domestically and internationally.
168
 As a result, the incorporation 
of more victim-focussed, restorative measures within criminal justice processes both 
domestically and internationally, whilst of potential benefit to the victim, should not be 
understood as a purely altruistic act on the part of the State or drafting body.  
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 Judges’ Report, ‘Victims Compensation and Participation’, International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (13
th
 September 2000) CC/P.I.S./528-E. 
166
 Recommendations and Commentary for the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Submitted to Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 12
th
 – 30th 
June 2000, 20. 
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 Garkawe (n 126) at 351; and see also Susanne Karstedt, ‘From Absence to Presence, From 
Silence to Voice: Victims in International and Transitional Justice Since the Nuremberg Trials’ 
(2010) 17:9 International Review of Victimology 10. 
168
 The impact on investigative and prosecutorial work of negative victim experiences of the 
judicial process is documented in Wemmers (1996) (n 14). Wemmers notes in particular that 
“[b]esides enhancing victims’ suffering, negative experiences with legal authorities are associated 
with diminished victim cooperation with authorities, decreased support for authorities and reduced 
respect for the law”, at 215; Mike Maguire, Burglary in a Dwelling: The Offence, The Offender and 
The Victim (Heinemann, 1982). See also Young (n 14) 228 – 9. 
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Article 68(3), together with other pro-victim measures of the Rome Statute, was therefore 
drafted against this backdrop and as a response to these numerous concerns, and followed 
significant lobbying efforts on the part of the victim and NGO communities. The intention 
of the drafters to incorporate restorative elements in to the judicial process of the ICC is 
evident in the wording of the Rome Statute itself. The Preamble to the Statute makes 
express reference to the plight of victims of “unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the 
conscience of humanity”, thereby acknowledging the harm suffered by victims and their 
consequential stake in activities aimed at the pursuit of justice. Moreover, in its 
incorporation of participative and reparative provisions, the Rome Statute borrows heavily 
from restorative justice themes.  
In particular, and in relation to its victim participation endeavour in particular, drafters of 
the Rome Statute consulted the relevant provision of the UN Declaration to inform the 
wording of Article 68(3).
169
 Article 6(b) of the UN Declaration provides that: 
“6. [t]he responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of 
victims should be facilitated by: 
… 
(b) Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, 
without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant national criminal 
justice system”.  
The similarities between the wording contained in the UN Declaration and that found in 
Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute is striking, and the direct incorporation of language 
from the UN Declaration, itself an international human rights instrument reflecting 
restorative themes, further evidences the reparative intention of the drafters.
170
 In addition, 
                                                          
169
 Notably, states parties were bound to consider the provisions of the UN Declaration because of 
a footnote included by the Rome Conference’s Working Group on Procedural Matters in its report 
on Article 68, transmitted to the Drafting Committee, which read “in the exercise of its powers 
under this article, the Court shall take into consideration the United Nations Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power”, reported by David Donat-Cattin, 
‘The Role of Victims in ICC Proceedings’, in Flavia Lattanzi and William Schabas (eds)  Essays 
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Vol. 1, (Il Sirente 1999) 260.  
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 See, for example, War Crimes Research Office (November 2007) (n13) 2, 10. The direct 
incorporation of language from the UN Declaration in to the text of Article 68(3) poses its own 
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the separation of participation and reparations provisions in the Statute is particularly 
noteworthy, marking a “significant departure from the mere conceptualization of victim’s 
rights in terms of reparation”,171 and thereby indicating a recognition of the potential, at 
least, for participation to be restorative in its own right.
172
 
1.2.2. Acknowledgment of a restorative rationale in academic and Court literature 
The preceding paragraph naturally incorporates a number of examples of the recognition, 
in academic literature, of a restorative function for the Court in respect of its participation 
endeavour. Looking now at this issue in particular, it is noted that the incorporation of 
restorative elements within the function of the Court is widely recognised in expert 
academic literature. According to the War Crimes Research Office of the University of 
Washington, for example, “the framework of victim participation at the ICC is the product 
of a desire to achieve restorative justice for victims”, 173 while Emily Haslam notes that 
                                                                                                                                                                
challenges, including a failure on the part of the drafters to recognise and reflect the differing 
contexts of domestic and international application and the challenges of realising participation in 
situations of mass victimisation. This is considered further, at para 1.3.2. The influence of the 
victim-focused, human rights movement has since been formally acknowledged by the Court itself 
and in academic literature; see, for example, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, 
VPRS4, VPRS5 and VPRS6) ICC-01/04-101 (17 January 2006) [50]-[51]; Schabas (n 1), 327; 
Karstedt (n 167) at 10. 
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 Carsten Stahn, Héctor Olásolo and Kate Gibson, ‘Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial 
Proceedings of the ICC’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 219, 219-20. 
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 A belief in the restorative potential of participation as a distinct element is evidenced further in 
the Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which includes victim participation provisions 
based directly upon the Rome Statute, but which indicates that reparations are to be claimed instead 
before the State’s national courts. Notably, however, the Court has exhibited a tendency to link 
victim participation to the interest of the victim in pursuing and receiving compensation or other 
forms of redress, thereby erroneously combining the procedural and outcome elements of 
restorative justice included in the Rome Statute: see, for example, Lubanga (Decision on the 
Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation 
Hearing) ICC-01/04-01/06-462-tEN (22 September 2006), 5. This tendency was formally noted by 
the Single Judge in Bemba (Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation) ICC-01/05-01/08-320 (12 
December 2008) [90]; see also in Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali (26 August 2011) (n 79) [52]. 
Notably, however, language proposed by the French delegation which specifically linked 
participation to compensation was not included in the final Statute, see U.N. GAOR, Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/L.3 
(1996), Article 126. See also the report of the expert panel plenary session convened at the 12
th
 
session of the ASP, in Nick Wilson and Theo Boutruche, ‘Victims’ Rights discussed as ASP 12 
Plenary’ 29th January, 2014, available on the website of the Victims’ Rights Working Group, at  
<http://www.vrwg.org/home/home/post/51-victims-rights-discussed-at-asp-12-plenary> last 
accessed 11
th
 June, 2015. 
173
 War Crimes Research Office (2007) (n 13) 1 – 2. 
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the Rome Statute marked a “major departure from a hitherto limited theory of 
international criminal justice, which is centred on punishment and international order,” 
towards a “more expansive model of international criminal law that encompasses social 
welfare and restorative justice.”174 
 
Roy Lee, writing shortly after the inception of the International Court, and in particular, in 
relation to the innovative, victim-focussed provisions of the Rome Statute, observes that 
“[t]his new Court has been transformed from an instrument initially designed for 
punishing individual perpetrators of atrocious crimes to an international court 
administering restorative justice”175, while in their analysis of participation by victims’ 
advocates in proceedings before the ICC, Gerard Mekjian and Mathew Varughese write 
that Article 68(3) represents “the creation of a new dynamic wherein punitive justice, 
found within adversarial court systems, was to be balanced with restorative justice 
principles”.176  
 
That said, while much of the academic literature agrees that the endeavour introduces, and 
was intended to introduce restorative elements into an otherwise retributive system, the 
recognition of a restorative goal for the ICC is not universal. In addition to the concept of 
reparative justice, described above, additional alternative bases for the Court’s victim-
focussed measures are also evident within the literature. McCarthy, for example, argues 
that restorative justice theory alone is an inadequate justification for the inclusion of 
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 See Haslam (n 7) at 315.   
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 Introduction to Roy S. Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publishers 2001) lxiv.  
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 Mekjian and Varughese (n 6), 20. The restorative basis of the Court’s victim-focussed 
provisions is acknowledged in numerous other sources; see, for example, Gilbert Bitti & Håkan 
Friman, ‘Participation of Victims in the Proceedings’ in Roy S. Lee (ed) The International 
Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational 
Publishers 2001), 457; McGonigle (n 5), 96; Pena and Carayon, (n 72), 4 – 5; T. Markus Funk, 
Victims’ Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court, (2nd edn, OUP 2015), 2; Claire 
Garbett, ‘The Truth and the Trial: Victim Participation, Restorative Justice, and the International 
Criminal Court’ (2013) Vol.16 No.2 Contemporary Justice Review 193. 
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reparations provisions in the Rome Statute,
177
 and suggests that elements of vindication 
and moral denunciation, as functions of reparations,
178
 indicate the additional 
incorporation of an expressive rationale or goal.
179
 McCarthy, however, seemingly bases 
his conclusion on the purpose of reparations per se rather than on the drafting history of 
the Rome Statute and the apparent intent of its drafters. Moreover, while McCarthy 
examines the re-emergence of restorative justice in the context, he does not indicate the 
definition of restorative justice he is relying upon, and in particular, does not explore the 
ambit and parameters of the concept in terms of its potential to encompass expressive 
elements.  
Moffett, meanwhile, argues that while the ICC introduces a more victim-orientated notion 
of justice, it cannot be taken to indicate the introduction of a restorative goal for victims 
where the prime purpose of the Court remains the investigation, prosecution and 
punishment of perpetrators of international crimes.
180
 Again, however, Moffett reaches his 
conclusions without any discussion of what restorative justice might comprise in the given 
context, and adopts a somewhat absolutist approach in assuming that because the Court is 
not, first and foremost, a restorative justice mechanism, it cannot have been intended to 
provide restorative justice, or aspects of it, to participating victims.
181
 Moreover, Moffett’s 
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 McCarthy (Victim Redress) (n 4). 
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 Ibid, at 366. 
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 Ibid, 365 – 368. 
180
 Luke Moffett (Justice for Victims) (n 4), 49; see also Luke Moffett, ‘Realising Justice for 
Victims before the International Criminal Court’ (2014) ICD Briefing 6, 5. Moffett in turn 
describes justice for victims in terms of procedural satisfaction together with the achievement of 
retributive outcomes (including a judicial determination of the truth in respect of the charges 
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 Dan Van Ness, cited in Liebmann (n 92), 33, Paul McCold and Ted Wachtel ‘In Pursuit of 
Paradigm: A Theory of Restorative Justice’ (2003) paper presented at the XIII World Congress of 
Criminology, 10
th
 – 15th August 2003, who similarly divide judicial processes into fully, mostly or 
partly restorative. Available online at < http://www.iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=NDI0> 
last accessed 11
th
 May 2015. Notably, there is also somewhat of a “backlash” emerging in the 
academic literature concerning the restorative rationale; see for example, Sergey Vasiliev, who, 
while acknowledging that restorative justice was “on the minds of the drafters of the ICC legal 
framework”, suggests that the difficulties occasioned by the practical application of the victim 
participation endeavour warrants revisiting the rationale for victim engagement. Vasiliev (n 4), 
64.To this end, Vasiliev advocates the Court simply drop any restorative intent from its mandate 
and realign the endeavour instead to its retributive function, 63 - 66.  Notably, Vasiliev does not go 
on to examine how, under his suggested theoretical revisions, the new role of victim participant 
would be distinct from the role of witness, or how the changes might position the victim participant 
vis-à-vis the prosecutor, and in particular, whether such an approach would, in part, replicate the 
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“all or nothing” approach is at odds with restorative justice experts such as Van Ness, or 
McCold and Watchel, who consider and assess restorative impacts on a continuum in 
order to gauge whether a judicial system is minimally, moderately or fully restorative in 
nature, an approach which is more sensitive to the operation of victim-focused measures 
within a variety of judicial forums, including those such as the ICC that have primarily 
retributive goals. 
Counter arguments to the inclusion of restorative elements within the Court’s mandate 
therefore raise important issues about what is meant by restorative justice in the specific 
context of the ICC. The absence of a definition of restorative justice in the context is 
clearly problematic, and inevitably renders any assessment of the applicability of the 
concept to the ICC deeply challenging, an issue which is addressed substantively in the 
following chapter.  
 
In the meantime, it is suggested, the debate over the presence of a restorative element in 
the mandate of the Court has, to some extent, been obviated by the express recognition by 
the Court itself of a restorative function, referred to above,
182
 thereby providing both an 
indication of the Court’s recognition and acceptance of the theoretical basis of its victim-
focussed provisions and a promising basis for the potentially restorative realisation of 
those measures.  
In particular, in its 2009 Report on the strategy in relation to victims, the Court observes 
that “[a] key feature of the system established in the Rome Statute is the recognition that 
the ICC has not only a punitive but also a restorative function.”183 The Court’s Revised 
Strategy in Relation to Victims expressly acknowledges its dual mandate,
184
 and its 
                                                                                                                                                                
role of the prosecutor to some extent and affect the right of the accused to a fair trial. The 
positioning of the victim as second prosecutor is discussed further below, at para 1.3.3.(ii). 
182
 At para 1.2.1. Although of course debate as to whether the Court should have a restorative role 
are likely to continue. 
183
 Report of the Court on the strategy in relation to victims (10 November 2009) ICC-ASP/8/45, 
para 3. 
184
 Court’s Revised Strategy in relation to Victims (5 November 2012) ICC-ASP/11/38, para 2, 
noting that “the ICC has not only a punitive but also a restorative function”.  The Strategy goes on 
at para 10 to note that participation has the potential to empower victims, as well as to provide 
recognition of their suffering.  
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subsequent Report on the Revised Strategy notes that the vision of the Rome Statute “is of 
justice in the broadest sense, an end to impunity for the perpetrators of mass atrocities, 
and the notion that justice is not just punitive but restorative”.185   
Further reference to the restorative intent is contained in the manual for victims’ legal 
representatives, prepared by the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (“OPCV”), noting 
“the clear recognition of the States that drafted and endorsed the Statute that the ICC 
should not only be retributive, but also restorative”.186 Moreover, the Court’s own website 
observes, in specific relation to the victim-focused measures contained in the Rome 
Statute, that: 
“The victim-based provisions within the Rome Statute provide victims with the 
opportunity to have their voices heard and to obtain, where appropriate, some 
form of reparation for their suffering. It is this balance between retributive and 
restorative justice that will enable the ICC to not only bring criminals to justice 
but also to help the victims themselves rebuild their lives”.187  
Finally, in an address to the Assembly of Parliamentarians for the ICC, Judge Sang-Hyun 
Song, President of the ICC, stated that the Court 
“is about much more than just punishing the perpetrators. The Rome Statute and 
the ICC bring retributive and restorative justice together.”188 
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Having examined the restorative basis of Article 68(3), and before going on to consider 
the individual as intended beneficiary of the provision, it is appropriate to briefly examine 
and define, for the purpose of this research and to the extent presently possible, the 
associated notion of “effective and meaningful” participation. 
1.2.3. Defining concepts: “effective and meaningful” participation 
Having created a new and distinct role for victims within the procedures of the ICC, it is 
reasonable to assume that the drafters of the Rome Statute meant its innovative, victim-
focussed provisions, including victims’ right to participate in the Court’s proceedings, to 
be more than symbolic. Within the Court itself, as well as within academic and expert 
practitioner literature, a notion of “effective and meaningful” participation has emerged as 
the common discourse for any discussion, examination and consideration of the victim 
participation endeavour.  
In its report into the implementation of the revised victims’ strategy during 2013,189 for 
example, the Court includes, as a strategic objective, the realisation of the victims’ right to 
participate effectively in proceedings, thereby providing clear acknowledgment that the 
measure is intended to be something more than symbolic. In expanding upon the strategic 
objective in the following paragraph of its report, the Court expressly notes that the right 
of victims to participate should be rendered both “effective and meaningful”.190 
Similar wording is found in the decisions of the Court in its consideration of victim 
participation issues. The need for the participation provisions of the Rome Statute to be 
interpreted in such a way as to render victims’ engagement meaningful was addressed 
directly in the decision of the Single Judge in her consideration of the procedural rights 
attaching to victims at the pre-trial stage of the Katanga and Ngudjolo case.
191
 In that 
case, Judge Steiner, in rejecting a casuistic approach to victim participation in favour of a 
clear determination of procedural rights at the outset, noted that she sought not only to 
provide legal certainty but also “to ensure that the role attributed to those granted the 
procedural status of victim at the pre-trial stage of a case before the Court is…meaningful, 
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and not purely symbolic”, a requirement that was reiterated by Trial Chamber II in its 
considerations of the organisation of victims’ Common Legal Representatives in the same 
case.
192
 
In considering the possible modalities of participation in the Lubanga case, Trial Chamber 
I observed that the provisions of Article 68(3) must be given “meaningful effect” for 
victims, within the limits of a fair trial.
193
 The requirement was repeated by the Appeals 
Chamber in its subsequent consideration of appeals from both the Office of the Prosecutor 
and the Defence,
194
 while in its consideration of the modalities of victim participation in 
the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, Trial Chamber II made express reference to the need to 
ensure that participation for victims was both effective and meaningful.
195
 
The phrase is similarly employed in academic writing on the subject. In her review of the 
achievements and challenges of the participation endeavour, for example, Mariana Pena 
calls upon all interested parties to move beyond a debate of the problems and acceptability 
of the Court’s victim participation scheme to a consideration of how the endeavour might 
best be rendered effective and meaningful in practice.
196
 The language is also adopted by 
authors in their consideration and examination of a number of issues, including victims’ 
participation in the pre-trial and investigation stages of proceedings,
197
 specific and 
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appropriate modalities of participation
198
 and in relation to victims’ access to justice, 
including in the context of the somewhat lengthy and complicated application process, the 
perceived unrealistic evidential burden on victims in the establishment of their identity, 
the need for competent legal representation and the geographical challenges involved in 
operating adequate victim consultation.
199
  
Discussion of effective and meaningful participation occurs along similar lines and 
employs similar language in expert civil society and practitioner literature.
200
 
Notably, however, the phrase “effective and meaningful” is undefined in academic, Court 
and practitioner materials and, as discussed further below, has come to mean different 
things to the Court, academics and expert legal practitioners.
201
 It is therefore necessary to 
consider an appropriate definition of “effective and meaningful participation” for the 
purpose of this research, and, it is suggested, for wider application within the Court.  
The phrase itself is not found in the Court’s constituent documents. Despite this, the Rome 
Statute, together with its supplemental implementing provisions, operates to impose 
certain limits on any interpretation that can be given to the phrase. In particular, in the 
absence of any statutory basis, the phrase cannot be interpreted in such a way as to impose 
additional statutory obligations on the Court or to grant legal rights to victims over and 
above those contained in the Court’s founding documents. Any interpretation must 
therefore operate within the confines of the Court’s pre-existing victims’ provisions.  
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Conversely, there is a danger that a narrow interpretation of the phrase may serve to limit 
the scope of victims’ rights in practice to something less than originally intended by the 
drafters of the Rome Statute, thereby operating to the detriment of victim participants. 
Moreover, there is a risk that while the notion of effective and meaningful participation 
becomes the common discourse for any discussion of victim participation, we lose sight of 
the Court’s restorative aim, and participation thereby becomes divorced from its 
underlying theoretical rationale.  
With these specific limitations and concerns in mind, it is suggested that any interpretation 
of the phrase must be directly allied to the Court’s pre-existing mandate in respect of 
victims, including its underlying restorative basis. 
“Effective and meaningful” participation must therefore be understood as participation 
which is or has the potential to be experienced by victims as in some way personally 
restorative within the meaning of restorative justice theory in the specific context of 
international criminal law. An interpretation that allies the notion of “effective and 
meaningful” to the underpinning theoretical rationale for the provision is, it is submitted, 
wholly consistent with the intention of the drafters to enact a system with the potential, at 
least, to be restorative, either in whole or in part, for the victim participant. Moreover, in 
allying the term to the Court’s restorative aim, the status of the victim as intended 
beneficiary of the right is maintained.   
Finally, the restorative goal of the International Criminal Court must, of course, operate 
within an ostensibly retributive system, and it is clear from the wording of Article 68(3) 
that its application is subject to the right of the Defendant to a fair and expeditious trial. 
To that extent, the Court is required to strike a balance between its retributive and 
restorative functions.
202
 The challenge for the Court, therefore, should be understood as 
facilitating participation, which is experienced by the participant as effective and 
meaningful, within the specific parameters of the Rome Statute and in light of its 
primarily retributive function.  
It should be acknowledged here that while directly allying the notion of effective and 
meaningful participation to the underlying theoretical rationale of the endeavour provides 
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the basis for the development and application of the notion in tangible and practical terms 
at the Court, the proffered definition itself is relatively abstract. This is an inevitable 
consequence of the undeveloped nature of restorative justice in the specific context of 
international criminal law, and the failure of the Court to indicate either what it means by 
restorative justice or to articulate the physical parameters of restorative justice within the 
particular forum, a factor which is considered and addressed substantively in the 
following chapter. 
 
Having examined and reaffirmed the restorative basis of Article 68(3) and delineated, as 
far as presently possible, concepts for application of the provision in the specific context, 
it is appropriate to consider the extent to which the provision, as drafted, has the potential 
to provide restorative benefit to the victim participant as an individual. 
70 
 
1.2.4. The individual as intended beneficiary of the right to participate  
(i) Introduction 
As discussed, restorative justice theory entails the supplanting of the notion of crime as an 
offence against society by the reconception of crime as an act perpetrated against the 
victim.
203
 The victim as beneficiary of restorative action is therefore consistent with 
restorative approaches. Within the context of international crimes, of course, the 
transference of this principle from the domestic to the international level is more complex. 
In particular, while the focus here is on the individual as intended recipient of the right to 
participate, it is recognised that in light of the scale of victimisation in crimes considered 
by the ICC and the varying capacities within which victims experience international 
crimes, the individual is likely, in turn, to have reparative needs that are both personal and 
collective in nature.
204
 The practical application by the Court of the right to participate is 
considered further below, at section 1.3, and particular challenges posed by the issue of 
mass victimisation are referred to there in more depth. It is appropriate here to briefly 
consider the extent to which, as drafted, Article 68(3) provides a theoretical basis for 
individually-focussed, restorative benefit. Particular reference is made in this regard to the 
notion of “victim” within the meaning of the Statute, together with the elements of “harm” 
and “personal interests” contained in the Article. 
(ii) A theoretical basis for individually reparative participation: exploring the 
notions of “victim”, “harm” and “personal interests”  
An exploration of the evolution of the definition of “victim” adopted for use in the 
proceedings of the International Criminal Court is particularly enlightening in terms of the 
further evidence it provides of the restorative intent of the drafters, as well as of the 
specific individual focus they had in mind in enacting the Statute’s victim participation 
endeavour. 
Rule 2 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for both of the ad hoc Tribunals defines 
“victim” as:  
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“a person against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction has 
allegedly been committed”.205  
Notably, the starting point of the definition is the crime which has allegedly been 
perpetrated, and hence runs counter to the more victim-centred, restorative approaches 
which had subsequently gained in prominence, and which focus instead upon the harm 
inflicted. In addition, the definition does not include indirect victims or dependants.  
Delegates involved in drafting the Court’s Rules were seemingly keen to move away from 
the narrow definition adopted by the heavily-criticised ad hoc Tribunals in favour of a 
more expansive approach which was better aligned with restorative thinking.
206
 Their 
attention was drawn to the definition contained in the UN Declaration,
207
 which provides: 
“1. ‘Victims’ means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered 
harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or 
substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that 
are in violation of criminal law operative within Member States, including those 
laws proscribing criminal abuse of power. 
“2. …The term ‘victim’ also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or 
dependants of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in 
intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization”. 
Notably, delegates recognised that the potentially large numbers of victim participants 
would entail logistical constraints which might overwhelm the Court.
208
 In acknowledging 
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the need to produce a realistic system for participation, delegates considered the 
possibility of limiting the number of participants through a strict delineation of the notion 
of “victim”, by restricting the mode of participation, or both.209 Within this context, 
having rejected the definition employed by the ad hoc Tribunals as being too narrow, 
delegates were unable to achieve a consensus around the broad definition contained in the 
UN Declaration, and were subsequently invited to abandon it as a point of reference.  In 
the spirit of compromise, a group of Arab States offered a simple definition, which 
provided that: 
 “For the purpose of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence: 
“(a) Victim shall mean any natural person or persons who suffer harm as a result 
of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
“(b) The Court may, where necessary, regard as [a] victim legal entities which 
suffer direct material damage”.210 
Paragraph (a) of the proposed definition subsequently became the basis of Rule 85(a). A 
compromise was then reached in relation to paragraph (b) of the definition, which, by 
inclusion of the word “may”, retained the Court as final arbiter in the case of legal entities 
seeking to engage with the Court as victims.
211
 The resulting definition is contained in 
Rule 85 RPE, and provides: 
“(a) ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
“(b) Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm 
to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or 
charitable purposes, and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places and 
objects for humanitarian purposes.” 
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Crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court are listed in Article 5 of the Rome 
Statute, and include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
Notably, the definition contained in the ICC Rules differs from both those adopted by the 
ad hoc Tribunals and the UN Declaration in a number of respects and can, to some extent, 
be interpreted in relation to those provisions on the basis of specific points of departure 
from them. 
Firstly, like the UN Declaration, and unlike the definition employed by the ad hoc 
Tribunals, Rule 85(a) defines “victim” by reference to the harm done rather than to the 
crime perpetrated. As already noted, this is the starting point of restorative justice, and so 
it is consistent with restorative justice theory in its focus.  
Arguably, the corollary of basing the notion of victim on the harm suffered is effectively 
to broaden the scope of the definition to encompass indirect as well as direct victims, 
since the link which must be established is between the criminal act and the harm which 
arises as a result of it, rather than between the criminal act and the direct victim of it,
212
 
and the inclusion of indirect victims within the definition has since been affirmed by the 
Court in its early jurisprudence on victim participation.
213
 
Secondly, unlike the UN Declaration, the definition of victim contained in Rule 85(a) 
makes no reference to harm which has been suffered collectively. In addition, although 
Rule 85(a) defines victims in the plural, as opposed to reference to the singular in the ad 
hoc Tribunal definitions, Rule 85(a) does not make any express reference to the possibility 
that the notion of victims might comprise a collective or group.  
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Given that the definition of victim contained in the UN Declaration had been expressly 
considered by the drafters, the exclusion of any reference to collective harm in Rule 85(a) 
was clearly a conscious act. While, therefore, crimes such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity, which fall within the Court’s remit, are crimes of scale and have an inherently 
collective component, it is the notion of personal harm to the individual, howsoever it 
arises, which is determinative of the individual’s status as a victim within the meaning of 
Rule 85(a) and hence decisive for the purpose of participation. In light of this, reference in 
Rule 85(a) to “victims” and “persons” must surely represent an acknowledgment by the 
drafters of the likely significant number of potential victim participants in Court 
proceedings. As a result, as drafted, at least, the requirement that harm be personal to the 
victim would theoretically exclude a broad, collective, diaspora-type application or one 
which might otherwise situate the individual participant in a representative capacity vis-à-
vis the affected community.
214
  
Finally, certain legal entities, albeit those with essentially social purposes, are 
encompassed by the definition. According to Donat-Cattin, however, “[t]he inclusion of 
legal entities…within the definition of victim does not detract the focus of [the] Rome 
Statute system from individual victims, given that the rights enshrined in articles 68 and 
75 of the Statute are primarily applicable to natural persons.”215[emphasis added]. 
The notion of harm itself is not defined in the Statute or Rules. Notably, however, in 
allying an individual notion of victimhood to the harm suffered, it is clear that the harm 
must in turn be personal to the victim, whether as a direct or indirect victim of the crime 
allegedly perpetrated. In addition, Article 68(3) provides that a victim’s “personal 
interests” must be engaged before they are able to participate in proceedings. Again, 
“personal interests” is not defined in the Statute or accompanying materials, although the 
language of the requirement itself, together with the intention of the drafters to create a 
role distinct from that of society or the Prosecutor and the individual approach to the 
interpretation of “victim” all indicate that the interests in question must be specific and 
personal to the individual victim participant.
216
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1.2.5. Discussion: a system with restorative potential for the victim  
A review of the drafting history of Article 68(3), the prevailing pro-victim context and the 
Court’s own literature evidence, it is argued, the intention of the drafters to incorporate 
restorative components into an otherwise retributive system, supporting the view evident 
in much of the academic literature. As a result, for the purpose of interpretation and 
application, the object and purpose of Article 68(3) must be understood as the provision of 
restorative benefit in the participating victim. 
While the participation of victims at the ICC occurs within the context of a retributive 
process, the Court’s restorative goal is distinct from its prosecutorial goal, and hence the 
ICC can be understood as having a dual mandate: to investigate and prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of crimes falling within its remit, and to provide restorative benefit to victims, 
albeit within the primary remit of an ostensibly retributive mechanism. The Court is 
therefore charged with balancing retributive and restorative functions whilst at the same 
time ensuring the fair and efficient operation of its judicial process. Moreover, an 
exploration of the definition of victim, together with an examination of the notions of 
harm and personal interests, as “entry conditions” for participation before the Court, 
reveals that the right, as drafted, vests in the individual. While, therefore, the reparative 
needs of the victim are likely to include both individual and collective elements,
217
 the 
participative provision, as drafted at least, applies to the individual as opposed to the 
affected community or society more broadly.  
The legislative framework of the Court’s endeavour therefore provides potential for the 
realisation of effective and meaningful participation by victims, and this is particularly so 
when the endeavour is considered and interpreted with its specific intended rationale in 
mind.  
 
Having considered the potential of the endeavour to provide restorative benefit at a 
theoretical level, it is appropriate to examine how the victim participation provision has 
been developed and interpreted by the Court and expert legal commentators with a view to 
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considering the extent to which the restorative potential of the provision is recognised and 
maximised in practice. 
1.3. Restorative in practice?  
1.3.1. A lack of statutory guidance: leaving the Court to its own devices 
Despite recognising the rights of victims to participate in proceedings, neither the Statute 
nor the Rules indicate how the right should be realised in practice.
218
 This absence of 
statutory guidance has given rise in turn to a considerable degree of ambiguity and 
confusion in respect of both the mechanisms and modes of victim participation,
219
 and is 
reflected in the sometimes disparate views of those in key positions within the Court itself 
as to the specific nature and purpose of the endeavour.
220
  
Instead, Article 68(3) indicates that the means by which the right to participate will 
operate is left for the Court to determine in the course of its jurisprudence,
221
 and it 
therefore for the Court to consider how this innovative provision should be 
operationalised within an international criminal justice context.  
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1.3.2. The legislative roots of the provision: a problematic basis for facilitating restorative 
participation 
Article 21(1)(b) of the Rome Statute indicates that where a provision of the Statute cannot 
be interpreted by direct reference to its text, the Court may have recourse to “applicable 
treaties and the principles and rules of international law”.  In practice, and as discussed 
further below, the Court has consulted and applied the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention as a guide to treaty interpretation. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention 
provides that where a clear interpretation is not apparent from an examination of the 
specific text of a provision, recourse might be had to any supplemental materials with 
direct bearing and relevance to the drafting of the provision in question.  
Notably, despite furnishing the legislative roots of Article 68(3), recourse to the UN 
Declaration as an aid to interpretation and application provides little in the way of 
guidance to the Court as to how it should implement the provision in practice.   
While Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute largely replicates the wording of Article 6(b) of 
the UN Declaration, there are problems with the wholesale incorporation of the provision 
into the Statute without any recognition of the characteristics of the nature and scale of 
international crimes, international criminal law processes or the specifics of the intended 
forum. Notably, the UN Declaration, as an international human rights law instrument, is 
intended to be applied primarily within domestic criminal procedures.
222
 As a result, it 
employs vague, aspirational language in order to enable a broad application within the 
multiplicity of domestic criminal mechanisms and legal systems of member states. 
Significantly, the detailed practical realisation of the principles contained in the UN 
Declaration are left for individual member states to determine and apply in any national 
incorporating legislation or instrument, and in light of the specifics and exigencies of their 
own criminal justice processes. In contrast, however, drafters of the Rome Statute 
seemingly failed to anticipate and reflect the realisation of the Declaration’s principles 
within the specific context of the International Criminal Court, and instead retained 
language which simply lacks specificity and context. 
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Moreover, the UN’s own Policy Guide to the Declaration indicates that it has been 
implemented domestically through the application of a range of differing models,
223
 none 
of which it considers to be preferable or otherwise better suited to specific scenarios or 
judicial contexts,
224
 and so is also of little help to the Court in this regard.  
The wholesale incorporation of the provision without particular reference to the intended 
forum is particularly problematic in light of the intended beneficiary of the UN 
Declaration. As an instrument which was crafted primarily for broad domestic 
implementation within the territories of member states, the Declaration is designed for 
application to cases involving one or otherwise few victims, as opposed to the substantial 
number of victims of international crimes recognised during the drafting process as likely 
to have an interest in a case before the International Criminal Court and the potentially 
complex nature of justice needs of participating victims in the specific context of mass 
victimisation.
225
 
The delegation of the responsibility to determine a workable process for victim 
participation therefore represents a missed opportunity to include targeted and practical 
measures in the Court’s Rules for the specific achievement of the intended restorative 
rationale and for the provision of certainty and clarity amongst victim participants. 
Instead, differing approaches to victim participation have developed on a case-by-case 
basis, and in the absence of any guiding or overarching restorative aim to serve as a focal 
point for victim-oriented measures. As such, the victim participation system as a whole 
lacks clarity and certainty for victims.
 226
 At the same time, the terminology of the 
provision, and in particular, the notion of “views and concerns”, is potentially broad. This, 
                                                          
223
 UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Guide for Policy Makers on the 
Implementation of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power (1999), available online at 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/UNODC_Guide_for_Policy_Makers_Victims_of_Cri
me_and_Abuse_of_Power.pdf> accessed 21
st
 June 2014, 20 – 21; see also Raquel Aldana-Pindell, 
‘An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to Curtail 
Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes’ (2004) 26 Hum. Rts. Quarterly 605, 656. 
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Systems’ (1987-88) 34 Wayne Law Rev. 95, 122. 
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 Discussed above, Introduction, Scope and Limitations, and considered in more detail below, at 
paras 2.3.1.(iii) and 2.4.3.  
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 This problem is also identified in the Report of the Independent Panel of Experts (n 200), para 
46. 
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combined with an expansive approach to the definition of “victim” contained in Rule 
85(a), renders Article 68(3) of theoretically wide-ranging application in the specific 
context of the ICC, while the inherent ambiguity within the provision risks raising 
unrealistic expectations amongst victim participants.
227
    
While the legislative basis of Article 68(3) does not therefore present difficulties for the 
theoretical realisation of restorative benefit in victim participants per se, the failure of 
drafters to tailor the provision contained in the UN Declaration to the specific intended 
forum, and with the nature and scale of victimisation in mind, is problematic.  
 
It is therefore appropriate to consider how the provision has been interpreted and applied 
in practice. The following section begins with an assessment of the extent to which the 
restorative rationale for the victim participation endeavour has been acknowledged at a 
practical level in the jurisprudence of the Court and in related academic literature, and is 
followed by a consideration of the emergence of competing or potentially alternative 
rationales for the endeavour, together with an assessment of the potential impact of these 
rationales on the achievement of effective and meaningful victim participation. 
1.3.3. Interpretation of Article 68(3) by the Court and commentators: losing sight of the 
restorative rationale?
228
 
Notably, while the Court formally acknowledges its restorative mandate at a theoretical 
level, any reference to the restorative basis of the provision is conspicuously absent from 
the Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of victim participation, indicating, it is suggested, a 
disconnect in the translation by the Court of the principle at a theoretical level into 
practice.  
                                                          
227
 Noted also in Mettraux (n 3), who observes that the lack of precision and generality may have 
raised victims’ expectations as to what participation might involve, at 76.  
228
 The focus of this section is on how the purpose of the endeavour has been subsumed by other 
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Significantly, while the Court itself has frequently acknowledged the need to interpret the 
provisions of the Rome Statute in light both of their specific context and their underlying 
object and purpose,
229
 it has failed to fully explore the theoretical basis for the endeavour 
in its many decisions on the issue of victim participation. In particular, where it has sought 
to identify the reasons for victim participation, it has done so without specific reference to 
the drafting history of the provision or its restorative rationale.
230
 The consequences of this 
failure on the part of the Court, and to some extent, by a number of expert legal 
commentators, to interpret the provisions in accordance with its restorative object and 
purpose are explored substantively below, and constitute the remainder of this chapter.  
In particular, while it is apparent that the inclusion in the Rome Statute of participatory 
rights for victims was prompted by the rise in prominence of restorative justice principles 
and the subsequent criticism of the ad hoc Tribunals,
 
it is also clear that the judges and the 
Court itself are losing sight of the rationale for the endeavour, a problem which is also 
replicated in the writings of a number of expert legal commentators. Instead, a number of 
wide-ranging and divergent reasons for the participation of victims in proceedings before 
the Court have emerged since the Court came into being. Many of these reasons are 
inconsistent with the specific aims of restorative justice or otherwise call into question the 
appropriate beneficiary of the participatory right, to the detriment of participating victims 
and the potential of the endeavour to provide them effective and meaningful participation.  
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 See, for example, Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, Lubanga (Decision of the Appeals Chamber 
on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the 
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discussion, see War Crimes Research Office, International Criminal Court Legal Analysis and 
Education Project, Washington College of Law, ‘Victim Participation at the Case Stage of 
Proceedings’ (February 2009) 30 - 34, available online at 
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th
 March 2015.  
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(i) Losing sight of the intended beneficiary? Subsumed by the Court’s retributive 
function 
Having formally acknowledged the restorative aim of the endeavour in its Revised 
Strategy,
 231
 the Court goes on, in the same paragraph, to describe the potential benefits 
that accrue to the Court as a result of victims’ participation.232 In doing so, it employs 
language that essentially positions these additional benefits on an equal footing with those 
that the provision was intended to afford to victims, thereby effectively situating itself as 
co-beneficiary of the provision. This approach is replicated in the Report of the Assembly 
of States Parties’ Bureau on victims, reflecting the results of informal discussions held by 
members of the Bureau with Court officials and stakeholder, which notes that 
“participation must be meaningful for victims but also for the purposes of the proceedings, 
in other words, to provide sufficient relevant information for the Judges, the parties and 
participants”. 233 A similar approach was also evident during oral discussion of the issue of 
victim participation during a dedicated plenary session hosted by the Assembly of States 
Parties in November, 2013. In particular, during panel discussion of the participation 
endeavour, delegates identified a perceived requirement that participation should be 
meaningful for both the victim and the trial, and thereby should also provide some form of 
contribution to the retributive mandate.
234
   
Notably, it is clear that victim participation has the potential to provide a wide-range of 
benefits to the Court in addition to those it was designed to bring to the individual victim 
participant. Moreover, and particularly within the context of a global economic crisis 
within which State Parties are seeking to reduce their financial contributions in respect of 
                                                          
231
 Court’s Revised Strategy (n 184) para 2. 
232
 Ibid, and see also para 11. 
233
 Report of the Bureau on victims and affected communities and the Trust Fund for Victims, 
including reparations and intermediaries (15 October 2013) ICC-ASP/12/38, para 10. 
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 The proceedings of the plenary session are documented in Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, ‘Report on the 12th session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
20 – 28 November 2013’ (undated) available online at 
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th
 June, 2014, and see 
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conducted during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, 31 May – 11 June 2010, held in 
Kampala, and involved discussion by a high-level panel of experts of recommendations intended to 
advance the rights of victims contained in the Rome Statute, at 9. 
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victim-focussed measures of the Rome Statute,
235
 it is important for proponents of the 
endeavour to acknowledge and highlight those additional benefits.
236
 At the same time, 
however, the Court must take care to draw clear distinctions between itself, as an 
institution that profits from victim participation, and the notion of the victim as right-
bearer and intended beneficiary of the provision. Such a clear separation and distinction is 
not currently evident within Court documents, and instead the Court and a number of 
commentators alike have failed to distinguish between those benefits which have the 
potential to arise as a result of the rationale for the provision, and hence accrue to the 
individual victim as right-bearer, and those which are a consequential by-product of the 
right of victims to participate.
237
  In the absence of such a demarcation, the Court is 
effectively positioned not only as an institution that profits from the operation of the 
endeavour, but as a co-right-bearer or subject of the provision.  
Further, this partial or wholesale encroachment upon the notion of the victim as right-
bearer of the provision is particularly evident in the writings of a number of expert legal 
commentators, as well as in the jurisprudence of the Court itself, in the specific context of 
the Court’s prosecutorial duties. As a result, rather than presenting an opportunity for 
restorative action, and hence an end point in itself, the victim participation endeavour is in 
danger of being subsumed by the furtherance of the Court’s retributive function, and in 
particular, the Court’s search for a forensic truth.238   
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 The budgetary concerns are demonstrated, for example, in the International Criminal Court, 
Report of the Bureau on victims and affected communities and the Trust Fund for Victims (22 
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Former ICC judge Claude Jorda, for example, writing with Jérôme Hemptinne, notes in 
relation to victim participation that: 
“[t]he presence at the trial of a third protagonist having first-hand knowledge of 
the crimes, and whose personal intervention in the trial could cast a more subtle 
perspective on the reality of events which are often depicted by the parties in 
some-what absolute terms might assist the judge in clarifying the facts of the case, 
thereby making a decisive contribution to establishing the truth and preventing 
repetition of the crimes”.239  
In addition, in a 2011 lecture, serving ICC judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, having 
identified the truth-finding function as the means to achieve the Court’s “basic objective” 
– the fight against impunity – similarly situates the role of victim participation squarely 
within that cause,
240
 whilst Donat-Cattin, states that “any form of positive contribution 
from victims appears indispensable for the accomplishment of the Court’s [truth-finding] 
function.”241  
Finally, there is a clear tendency in the decisions of the Court to consider victims’ 
participation to be meaningful to the extent it impacts upon, or has the potential to impact 
upon, the judicial proceedings, thereby allying the endeavour to the Court’s retributive 
function, and in particular, the extent to which participation makes a tangible contribution 
to the Court’s search for the truth in its prosecution of the accused.  
In her consideration of the procedural rights attaching to victim participants at the pre-trial 
stage of the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, for example, and with particular reference to the 
right of victim participants to introduce evidence, Judge Steiner notes that “the object and 
                                                                                                                                                                
crimes. The forensic focus of the Court and the broad truth needs of victims are discussed further 
below, at paras 2.4.3.(iii)(i) and 3.4.4. 
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 Jorda and Hemptinne (n 162), at 1397. 
240
 Judge Wyngaert notes that “[a]s [victims] are the ones who lived through the relevant events, 
their experience and knowledge of the circumstances of the case could be helpful in providing 
judges with important insights about the local situation”, in Christine van den Wyngaert, ‘Victims 
before International Criminal Courts: Some Views and Concerns of an ICC Trial Judge’ (21 
November 2011) lecture in the Klatsky seminar in Human Rights, Case Western Reserve 
University, 10. 
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 Donat-Cattin (Article 68) (n 162), at 1284. See also Cohen (n 2), at.373. 
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purpose of article 68(3)…is to provide victims with a meaningful role in criminal 
proceedings before the Court…so that they can have a substantial impact in the 
proceedings” [emphasis added].242  Further, in the Lubanga case, the Appeals Chamber, in 
considering the appeals of both the Prosecutor and Defence against the Trial Chamber’s 
decision on the modalities of victims’ participation, and again, with specific reference to 
the ability of victim participants to introduce evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence 
of the Defendant, indicated that participation would be “meaningful” where any evidence 
provided by participants was relevant to the Court’s enquiry.243  
The rationale for the victim participation endeavour was also considered by Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of the Court in its decision, in relation to the situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, on the application for participation of six prospective victim-
participants.
244
 In concluding that victims had a right to participate at the investigation 
stage, the Chamber went on to indicate that “the participation of victims…can serve to 
clarify the facts [and] to punish the perpetrators of crimes”.245  
The Pre-Trial Chamber articulated a similar view later the same year in its decision 
concerning the request for participation of three victims in the Confirmation of Charges 
Hearing in the Lubanga case.
246
 The Pre-Trial Chamber in that case noted that the purpose 
of the hearing was to “determine whether there is sufficient evidence providing substantial 
grounds for believing that [Lubanga] committed each of the crimes presented by the 
Prosecutor”.247 Having identified the purpose of the hearing, the Chamber goes on to 
directly ally the participation of victims to that function, noting that “as a 
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 Katanga and Ngudjolo (13 May 2008)  163) [157].   
243
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consequence…victims may participate…by presenting their views and concerns in order 
to contribute to the prosecution of the crimes from which they allegedly have suffered”.248  
The approach was replicated by the Pre-Trial Chamber in its determination on the issue of 
procedural rights for victim participants in the Katanga and Ngudjolo case.
249
  In that 
case, in considering the ability of participating victims either to discuss evidence or 
question witnesses in relation to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant,
250
 the Chamber 
directly allied the personal interests of the victims to the determination of a narrow, 
forensic truth in relation to the charges brought and the pursuit of a retributive notion of 
justice against those responsible for the crimes.
251
 The explicit correlation of victims’ 
interests to the Court’s truth-seeking and punitive functions arose again in the same case, 
this time in the Court’s consideration of the appropriate modalities of participation at the 
trial stage of the proceedings.
 252
 In particular, in observing the need for victims’ personal 
interests to be directly engaged by the proceedings,
253
 and in considering the potential 
interest of the participant in bringing information before the Court, the Chamber observed 
that “the only legitimate interest the victims may invoke when seeking to establish the 
facts which are the subject of the proceedings is that of contributing to the determination 
of the truth by helping the Chamber to establish what exactly happened.”254 The decision 
therefore operates to align the roll of victim participation with the retributive function and 
thereby to position the Court itself as beneficiary of the endeavour.  
Allied to any contribution of participating victims to the Court’s search for the truth is a 
perceived role for victims in assisting the Court to better understand the specific social 
and cultural context of the alleged abuses. In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, for 
example, the Court, in considering directions for the conduct of trial proceedings, and in 
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the specific context of its determination of the extent to which Victims’ Legal 
Representatives could question witnesses, indicated that victim participants had a role in 
enabling the judges to “better understand the contentious issues of the case in light of their 
local knowledge and socio-cultural background”.255 The position was reiterated in a 
subsequent hearing in the same case, this time concerning an application by four 
participating victims to appear in person before the Court to give evidence.
256
 In its 
deliberations as to whether or not to allow the application, the Court noted that any 
personal appearance was permitted only where it would contribute to the Court’s 
determination of the truth in relation to the charges brought,
257
 and went on to indicate that 
the testimony could provide “a clearer picture of the existing family ethnic and social 
networks there”.258 
Finally, where there is recognition of the potentially restorative role of the Rome Statute’s 
victim participation endeavour in the writings of expert legal commentators, it is included 
in a number of instances as an afterthought, signifying a limited realisation or lack of 
prioritisation of the role in the minds of those writing on the subject or otherwise 
responsible for its practical implementation. Jorda and Hemptinne, for example, note that 
“[l]astly, the participation of the victims in the proceedings and the award to them of 
compensation are matters which are in the direct interests of the international community, 
in that they enable victims to regain a certain equanimity, thereby helping to restore the 
peace”.259 
Again, while it is undoubtedly true that the Court itself can gain specific benefit from the 
participation of victims in its proceedings, its approach in directly allying the rationale for 
the provision to the furtherance of its truth-seeking mandate is problematic for a number 
of reasons.  
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Notably, while victims also have a keen, restorative interest in ascertaining the truth about 
the perpetration of serious violations of humanitarian law, it would be a mistake to assume 
that the truth needs of victims and those of the Court are necessarily aligned. In particular, 
victims’ needs are likely to include specific information concerning the fate and 
whereabouts of loved ones, the reasons for and causes of victimisation as well as the 
broader, prevailing context which facilitated or otherwise enabled the perpetration of 
gross violations. The International Criminal Court, however, remains responsible for the 
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and its truth-seeking activities are 
therefore likely to be allied to that goal, and hence significantly narrower in ambit than 
that required by victims.
260
 As a result, the realisation of its truth-seeking function is likely 
to be of limited restorative potential for victim participants, and may in fact become a 
source of frustration for them. 
Further, a corollary of the Court’s tendency to subsume the restorative function of the 
victim participation regime into its broader retributive function is the seeming inability of 
the Court to distinguish the discreet victim roles of participant and witness in practice, 
essentially subsuming the former under the rationale for the latter.
 261
  
In its decision on victim participation in the Lubanga case, for example, the Trial 
Chamber, in its consideration of the appropriate criteria for permitting participation by 
victims in the proceedings, indicated the need for victim participants to establish an 
“evidential link” between themselves and the evidence which the Court was 
considering,
262
 thereby openly favouring victim applicants who would also qualify, at 
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least, as witnesses.
263
 As previously noted, however, the criticism of the ad hoc Tribunals 
was centred upon the treatment of victims simply as sources of information, and the 
Court’s victim participation endeavour was an attempt by the drafters of the Rome Statute 
to liberate victims from the constraints which the ad hoc Tribunals imposed. The role of 
the victim as information provider was therefore “not a significant concern in the drafting 
of the victim participation scheme”.264   
Notably, from around 2010 onwards the focus of the Court’s caselaw appears to shift 
away from any attempt to engage with the rationale for victims’ participation to the 
practical matter of how to physically manage the substantial number of victims seeking to 
participate in proceedings before the Court, including the consideration and introduction 
of collective approaches to application. As a result, it has been relatively silent on the 
intended purpose of victim participation per se. In her determination of the applications of 
982 victims to participate in the Confirmation of Charges hearing and related proceedings 
in the Ntaganda case,
265
 for example, the Single Judge, while providing both a full and 
detailed explication of the necessary requirements for victim participant status in 
accordance with Rule 85 RPE
266
 and a consideration of the potential modalities of 
participation in that case,
267
 was silent on the rationale for participation itself, and made no 
reference even to the need for participation to be in any way effective or meaningful. The 
Court was similarly silent on the purpose of the endeavour in its determination of the 
participant status of 19 applicants in the Banda case,
268
 and in a subsequent decision in the 
same case the Court, in seeking to clarify its approach to allowing victim participants to 
express their views and concerns,
269
 and in identifying modalities of participation, 
indicates only that participation may enable victims to contribute towards the Court’s 
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determination of the truth during the trial.
270
 The continuing tendency for the Court to 
allow Victims’ Legal Representatives to introduce evidence, as a modality of 
participation, is, however, consistent with the pursuit and enhancement of its truth-seeking 
function,
271
 and suggests that even though the Court is no longer making express 
pronouncements concerning the purpose of participation, it’s practical operation of the 
endeavour remains aligned to its retributive function. 
While the various bases for the incorporation in the Rome Statute of victims’ participatory 
rights suggested by commentators and the Court alike undoubtedly relate to legitimate and 
important Court functions, they reveal little recognition of the original restorative 
rationale for the endeavour. Without proper recognition of the appropriate basis for the 
victim participation endeavour, it is unlikely that the Court will proceed in a restorative 
direction. Without such recognition, any restorative impact is likely to be incidental to, or 
a happy by-product of, a victim’s participation, rather than central to it.   
Finally, at a more fundamental level, in seeking to ally victims’ participation to the 
realisation of a forensic truth or the achievement of greater clarity in respect of the socio-
cultural context in which abuses occurred, the focus of the endeavour becomes the crime 
which has allegedly been perpetrated rather than the harm suffered by the victims, and 
hence is inconsistent with a restorative rationale, thereby limiting the potential for the 
achievement of effective and meaningful participation. 
(ii) Losing sight of the intended beneficiary? The emergence of collective and 
representative approaches 
As noted, the participatory right was drafted as a right vesting in the individual. It is 
therefore appropriate to examine the Court’s approach to interpreting the notions of 
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“harm”, “personal interests” and “victim” in order to assess the extent to which the 
individual nature of the right is retained in practice.  
Harm has been interpreted to include physical and emotional suffering, together with 
economic loss.
272
 The issue of collective harm and, by implication, collective victimhood, 
was touched upon by the Trial Chamber in its deliberations on the criteria for victims’ 
participation in the Lubanga case.
273
 The Chamber in that case noted that:  
“a victim may suffer, either individually or collectively, from harm in a variety of 
different ways such as physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic 
loss or substantial impairment of his or her fundamental rights”. [emphasis 
added]
274
  
Significantly for the interpretation of the individual as beneficiary of the Court’s 
participatory rights, the Appeals Chamber added clarification to the Trial Chamber’s 
statement, noting in particular that: 
“[t]he fact that harm is collective does not mandate its inclusion or exclusion in 
the establishment of whether the harm is personal to the individual victim. The 
notion of harm suffered by a collective is not, as such, relevant or determinative”. 
275
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While, therefore, harm might be incurred collectively, the Chamber determined that this 
was not a relevant factor in the consideration of whether an individual fell within the 
definition of victim contained in Rule 85(a), emphasising instead that the significant 
criteria is that the harm experienced was personal to the individual, and thereby 
reinforcing the individual dimension of victimhood.
276
  
 
In relation to the issue of “personal interests”, the Court has adopted a two-step process 
for determining whether a victim is able to participate in accordance with the terms of the 
Statute. The first step concerns a general determination of status, and hence the 
recognition of an individual’s right to participate, in principal, in a situation or case. The 
second step concerns the practical application of the right through the Court’s 
consideration of a specific request to participate at a given stage of the proceedings.
277
 The 
participating victim is required to establish that their personal interests are affected at each 
of the steps.
278
 In addition, personal interests must be linked to the specific charges against 
the defendant.
279
   
The Court’s jurisprudence on the issue of “personal interests” reveals a wide and diverse 
array of potential interests which might satisfy the provision. These in turn range from 
broad, general and overarching factors to those which are specific in nature. 
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In an application before the Appeals Chamber in the Lubanga case, for example, the 
Court, in considering an application from victims to participate in an appeal from the 
Defendant in relation to the confirmation of charges against him, observed that “[c]lear 
examples of where the personal interests of victims are affected are when their protection 
is in issue and in relation to proceedings for reparations”. 280 In a later decision in the same 
case concerning the criteria for participation in the trial proceedings, the Trial Chamber, in 
acknowledging the “multiple and varied” interests of victims, went on to note that these 
might include a general need to express views and concerns, to receive reparations, to 
establish the truth and to protect their dignity and safety during the trial process.
 281
  
Cryer et al observe that the interpretation of the “personal interests” requirement should 
be linked to the rationale for the participation scheme.
282
 Notably, while the nature of the 
interests identified by the Court are diverse and varied, they share common features in that 
they are all personal and specific to the individual victim participant, and hence are 
supportive of the individual goal of reparative engagement.  
In addition, through the identification of qualifying personal interests, the approach of the 
Court has served to further delineate the discrete role of the victim as a legal actor in 
proceedings before the ICC. In particular, the Court has refused to accept as “personal 
interests” those which it considers to be too broad or lacking in specificity, including a 
general interest in the outcome of the case, thereby distinguishing the interests of 
participating victims from those of society more generally.
283
 Moreover, the Court has 
also sought to distinguish between the personal interests of participating victims and those 
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of the Prosecutor, noting that “an assessment will need to be made in each case as to 
whether the interests asserted by victims do not, in fact, fall outside their personal interests 
and belong instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor”.284 Again, the approach is 
supportive of the notion of the individual as beneficiary,
285
 and hence, in this respect at 
least, and at first sight, consistent with the restorative underpinnings of the endeavour.  
Where, however, the Court has considered the personal interest requirement in those 
cases, it has failed to explicitly recognise the intended individually restorative basis for the 
endeavour or to otherwise seek to base its decision on any underlying theory, restorative 
or otherwise. While, therefore, it has found its way to identifying interests which are 
personal and specific to the individual participating victim, it has seemingly done so 
without any clear recognition of the rationale underpinning the provision. As a result, it is 
not clear whether the Court in those cases proceeded with any specific restorative intent in 
mind, or whether the identification of individual components of the participative right was 
simply coincidental to the Court’s considerations, where, for example, the approach was 
adopted as a means of limiting the nature and extent of participation in a given case. 
Significantly in this regard, the approach of the Court to the issue of victim participation 
more generally suggests that the latter is the case, and that the Court is, indeed, losing 
sight of the individual as beneficiary of the right. 
In particular, in addition to the Court’s encroachment upon the victims’ participatory right 
through the furtherance of its retributive function, the views of commentators and judges 
alike indicate a potential erosion of the notion of the individual as beneficiary of the right 
to participate in favour of a more communal or collective approach which seeks to situate 
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the victim in a representative capacity or which otherwise suggests a rationale for the 
endeavour based more upon societal peace and cohesion.  
Jorda and Hemptinne, for example, suggest that victim participation enables proceedings 
to become more representative, and so contribute to national reconciliation,
286
 a view 
which is echoed by Donat-Cattin.
287
 Cohen argues that the participation of a victim in the 
process serves to “bring a voice to the entire community who suffered”,288 while Morris 
writes that, at a practical level, the consideration of victims’ views is an essential 
component in the struggle to prevent individuals from taking justice in to their own hands, 
and “particularly relevant in the context of the most serious crimes that so often involve 
societal cycles of violence and revenge”.289 Finally, the Court itself is coming under 
pressure from State parties to introduce a system which adopts a representative approach 
to the issue of victim participation,
290
  a factor that was realised in the Ruto and Sang case 
and the deliberations of Trial Chamber V on a tiered approach to applications for victim 
participant status.
291
 In that instance, the Court, in considering the appropriate procedures 
and modalities of participation for victims, observed in relation to any request from a 
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victim to appear in person before the Court that they should indicated why they should be 
considered “best placed to reflect the interests of the victims”.292   
As already noted, there are clear advantages that flow from victims’ participation in 
addition to those which are intended to accrue to the individual participant, and the need 
for the Court to connect with the affected community, and thereby to gain legitimacy in its 
eyes, was undoubtedly a motivating factor in the enactment of the participation 
endeavour. It is essential to the realisation of effective and meaningful participation for 
participating victims, however, that in recognising the potential to achieve these additional 
benefits, the Court and commentators alike do not lose sight of the individual as subject of 
the participatory right and the individually restorative rationale that underpins it. 
While traditional international restorative justice practices recognise the need to address 
societal healing, this is not done at the expense of individual restoration, but rather, 
through efforts to strike a balance between individual and societal needs.
293
 By contrast, 
the approaches identified above essentially seek to vest the right to participate in either the 
affected community, as represented by the individual victim, or in society and the 
international community more generally. The first approach is seemingly based on the 
problematic assumption that an affected community experiences international crimes as an 
homogenous group, and that the thoughts, concerns and experiences of the many can be 
extrapolated from those of an individual.
294
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The second approach erroneously conflates the interests of the victim with those of 
society or the international community.  In contrast, these latter interests are represented 
by the Prosecutor.
295
 Significantly, while the Court and commentators alike have been at 
pains to point out  the separate and divergent roles and interests of victim participants and 
the Office of the Prosecutor,
 296
 an approach which vests the participatory right in society 
or the international community rather than the individual victim serves instead to align the 
victim participation function to that of the Prosecutor, thereby risking heightening, rather 
than quelling concerns that the endeavour has introduced a second Prosecutor to the 
obvious detriment of the Defendant and their right to a fair trial. As a result, while such an 
approach is damaging to the potential of the victim to realise restorative benefit in the 
proceedings, it is also not in the wider interests of the Court. 
 
While it is clear that, as drafted, the intended beneficiary of the victim participation 
provision is the individual victim, it is also clear that, at a practical level, and as a result of 
the very significant number of victim participants potentially engaged in any one case, the 
adoption of a facilitative, collective component is inevitable. Recourse to collective 
approaches is unsurprising given that collective elements already appear in the Rome 
Statute in other areas,
297
 and a partly collective application process was introduced by the 
Single Judge in her consideration of victim applications in the Gbagbo case,
298
 while a 
tiered collective application procedure was introduced by Trial Chamber V in both the 
Muthaura & Kenyatta and Ruto & Sang cases.
299
  Significantly, however, the collective 
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application and participation practices being trialled by the Court retain a recognition of 
the individual basis of participation and so arguably remain consistent with the Statute. In 
particular, despite the group dynamic introduced by these approaches, the individual 
victim is still required to establish their eligibility as an individual victim within the terms 
of the Rome Statute and to show that they personally fall within the specific scope of the 
case,
300
 and in both approaches, collective application and representation remains 
optional, rather than compulsory, for the victim.
301
   
That said, however, while there has been some preliminary assessment of the partly 
collective process introduced in Gbagbo, at least, consideration of the extent to which the 
new, collective element has or may affect the potential of victims to achieve effective and 
meaningful participation has been conspicuously absent.
302
 Instead, focus has been largely 
on time and cost efficiencies, and the benefit of the process to the Court in terms of the 
physical handling of a substantial number of applicants.
303
 The development of practical 
and efficient processes of dealing with very substantial victims is, of course, vital for the 
physical operation of the endeavour, but those processes must also operate in a way that is 
sensitive to the rationale for the endeavour itself, and as such, any reform of the system 
should be conducted in light of the need to ensure that participation is effective and 
meaningful to the individual victim.  
Collective approaches to participation are therefore not necessarily inconsistent with the 
achievement of individually restorative benefit in the victim. They do, however, require 
the Court to maintain its focus on the individual as the intended beneficiary of the 
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provision. Instead, the current approach of the Court would appear to be to recognise the 
individual and personal aspect as a precondition to participation, whilst simultaneously 
viewing the affected community or society in general as beneficiaries of the endeavour.  
An approach which recognises the individual nature of participation yet fails to correctly 
attribute the ensuing benefit which was intended to flow by virtue of that participation 
simply lacks coherence, and is unlikely to provide or otherwise maximise the potential for 
the achievement of effective and meaningful participation. 
 (iii) Losing sight of the restorative rationale? Usurped by a procedural goal 
As noted previously,
304
 the notion of “effective and meaningful” participation has 
developed as the common language for any discussion or exploration of the Court’s 
victim participation endeavour. While there may well be some advantage in the adoption 
of a working language that might appear, at least, to be more accessible and practically 
tangible to victim participants, lay activists and, to some extent, the politically-minded 
State representative community, however, there is also the danger that, in the absence of a 
definition or common understanding, the term will develop a meaning of its own that is 
divorced from the underlying object and purpose of the provision, to the detriment of 
participating victims.  
Notably, a perusal of the literature reveals that this common term in fact conceals not only 
a highly fractured and disparate understanding of what effective and meaningful 
participation entails in practice, but also a clear divergence from the restorative object and 
purpose of the provision in its application.  
The propensity of the Court to consider victim participation to be meaningful where it 
impacts upon, or has the potential to impact upon, the judicial proceedings, including the 
Court’s search for the truth, is discussed above. In addition, and perhaps as a natural 
corollary to this, available literature indicates that the Court’s restorative goal for victim 
participants is in danger of being usurped by a less ambitious, purely procedural goal. 
In particular, where authors of both academic and expert practitioner literature have 
ventured to explore, rather than simply refer to the need for participation to be effective 
and meaningful, they have largely exhibited a tendency to focus on the physical 
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achievement of participation per se. The extent to which participation is considered 
meaningful is thereby described largely in terms simply of its practical facilitation, rather 
than by reference to the quality and nature of participation once access to the endeavour 
has been achieved. As a result, the emphasis of the literature in relation to the notion of 
effective and meaningful participation is upon those processes and practices of the Court 
requiring revision in order to better enable the physical access of victims as participants. 
Any notion of effective and meaningful participation has thereby become allied to the 
realisation of a number of concrete, process-related elements in the Court’s practice, and 
hence, to the achievement of elements of procedural justice for victim participants.
305
  
Moreover, there is a danger that within the Court itself, and despite its express 
acknowledgment of its restorative mandate, the concept of effective and meaningful 
participation is similarly in danger of being allied instead to the achievement of 
procedural justice for victims. In particular, in its report into the implementation of its 
revised victims’ strategy,306 the Court, in referring to a study of victims’ perceptions of 
participation currently being conducted by a team of researchers from Berkeley 
University, notes that “[i]t is foreseen that this study will provide very useful information 
to the Court regarding the question of whether victims’ participation is meaningful”.307 
Significantly, the study in question does not seek to assess the quality and nature of 
participation per se, but instead is confined to an assessment of the achievement or 
otherwise of procedural justice for participating victims, and in particular, victims’ 
assessment of the services provided by the VPRS of the Court throughout the participation 
process.
308
  
Finally, the recent discussions of members of the Victims’ Rights Working Group to the 
Coalition for the International Criminal Court on the wording of a paper specifically on 
the issue of effective and meaningful victim participation revealed a wide and disparate 
range of views and understandings of the term amongst engaging group members. The 
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Group itself comprises over 300 civil society groups, independent expert practitioners and 
academics, and its significant, broad, expert and representative base enables it to occupy a 
persuasive and potentially influential position in relation to the development and conduct 
of victim-focussed measures at the Court. 
In the course of the discussions, the opportunity to develop and propose a definition of 
“effective and meaningful” participation arose.309 Significantly, while the need for victim 
participation to be effective and meaningful was unquestioned by all members engaging in 
the debate, discussion of a definition of the term revealed a multitude of understandings 
and approaches, variously allied to the achievement of procedural, restorative or 
rehabilitative elements. Retributive advantages to the Court of participation were also 
emphasised and there was a clear disparity as to what restorative and/or reparative justice 
comprised in general, and in the specific context in particular. Finally, there was an 
express reluctance, particularly on the part of a number of expert practitioner groups, to 
engage with, and in particular, to ally any resulting definition to, any theory of justice.
310
  
The result was a compromise position wherein constituent, practical elements of effective 
and meaningful participation were identified in the absence of any specific definition and 
without reference to any justice theory. According to the resulting paper,
311
 effective and 
meaningful participation is described in the following terms: 
“To exercise their rights in Article 68(3) effectively the Court must ensure that 
victims are: informed about their rights; informed about the ICC’s proceedings; 
enabled to access the participation process, and enabled to present their views and 
concerns to the Court. Effective systems must therefore be put in place, in 
particular: a clear and accessible application process; an effective system of legal 
representation and comprehensive outreach programmes. The system must be able 
to deal effectively with all victims falling within the mandate of the Court, 
regardless of the number or location of victims who may be affected by particular 
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proceedings. The Court should also be able to accommodate the cultural factors 
and particular sensitivities at play in local contexts. 
“The system of participation is likely to have meaning for victims if: they 
understand the process, including its limitations; they are treated at all times with 
humanity and respect for their dignity and human rights; appropriate measures are 
taken to ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as 
well as those of their families; they are able to follow the proceedings 
substantively; they feel properly consulted and represented by their legal 
representative; and they can see how their views are presented and actively 
considered by the Court”.312 
The outcome is somewhat unsatisfactory. Notably, the list combines elements which are 
focussed on the issue of victims’ access to the endeavour or more appropriately allied to 
procedural justice components, with little focus on the nature and quality of the 
participation experience itself, and with no reference to the underlying object and purpose 
of the participation endeavour. Moreover, without express recourse to restorative justice 
theory and in particular, its specific parameters in the context of international criminal 
justice, the list is incomplete, situates the participant in a relatively passive position and is 
arguably less ambitious for victims than the restorative mandate of the Court might 
otherwise suggest.    
Recourse to an alternative, working language for discussion of the victim participation 
endeavour, particularly in the absence of any common understanding or definition of the 
term linking it to the underlying object and purpose of the provision, therefore threatens to 
divorce the endeavour from its theoretical underpinnings in practice. Instead the 
endeavour is in danger not only of being subsumed by the Court’s retributive function, but 
also of being supplanted by a quest for procedural, as opposed to restorative justice for 
victims. Such an approach would significantly damage the potential of victims to achieve 
effective and meaningful, restorative participation, relegating them from right-bearers in 
the system to effective service-evaluators of the Court’s process.313  
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1.4. Concluding comments: a system lacking in conceptual clarity and victim focus 
This chapter argues that the victim participation provision of the Rome Statute was 
drafted with the specific purpose of incorporating a restorative, victim-focussed measure 
into the procedure and practice of the International Criminal Court. As drafted, at least, 
Article 68(3) appears to offer the potential to provide participation that could be 
experienced by individual victim participants as effective and meaningful, and hence is a 
system with promise for the victim. The drafting of the provision itself, however, is 
problematic in its failure to reflect the specific context of mass victimisation, and in 
particular, the substantive number of victims that such crimes engender, and the Rome 
Statute provides nothing further to the Court in the way of guidance as to how the 
participation endeavour might be rendered physically operational where significant 
numbers of victims seek to participate in its proceedings. 
While the Court itself remains an ostensibly retributive judicial mechanisms, where 
elements of the Court’s practice are expressly designed with primarily victim-centric 
aims, it is not unreasonable for victim participants to expect to be the specific focus of 
these. To this extent, the ability of the Court to acknowledge, adhere to, and apply such 
measures in accordance with their underlying restorative aim is, it is argued, instrumental 
both to the establishment or maintenance of survivor trust in the institution more widely 
and the achievement of effective and meaningful participation for victims. 
An examination of available Court literature, together with the writings of expert legal 
commentators, however, indicates that there are difficulties in how the restorative basis of 
the endeavour has been interpreted and applied in practice, significantly limiting the 
potential for the achievement of restorative engagement in victim participants.  
In particular, while the restorative basis and rationale for the provision is expressly 
acknowledged by the Court at a theoretical level, recognition of the provision’s restorative 
object and purpose is conspicuously absent from the jurisprudence of the Court, indicative 
of a disconnect between the theoretical discussion of the endeavour within the Court and 
the practical interpretation and application of the endeavour in practice. 
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Instead, it is apparent that the restorative endeavour is in danger of being subsumed by the 
Court’s retributive function, indicating an encroachment by the Court on the victim as 
subject of the participatory right. In addition, in realigning the endeavour to the 
furtherance of its prosecutorial role, the goal of participation becomes the investigation of 
the crime allegedly perpetrated, rather than the acknowledgment and rectification of harm 
suffered, and hence runs counter to restorative justice approaches.  
The research also indicates an erosion of the notion of the individual as beneficiary of the 
right in favour of a more collective approach to participation or one which situates the 
victim in a representative capacity vis-à-vis the affected community or society more 
generally. In light of the numbers of victims seeking to participate in proceedings before 
the Court, more collective approaches to participation are inevitable. At the same time, it 
is clear that survivors of crimes of mass victimisation are likely to have needs that are 
both individual and societal in nature, responding in turn to the form(s) of harm suffered 
and the various capacities within which victims approach the Court. Victims, however, are 
required to engage with the Court as discrete individuals rather than as a collective, 
comprising an ‘entry condition’ to the participation regime. In seeking to position the 
victim solely in a representative capacity or otherwise operating the right for the benefit of 
a broader collective or society more generally, the Court divorces the individual 
requirement of participation from the proposed benefit intended to flow by virtue of that 
participation. Moreover, in doing so it displays no obvious or explicit recognition of the 
complex and interrelated needs of individuals and affected communities in the aftermath 
of mass victimisation, thereby adopting an approach which both lacks coherence and 
operates to the detriment of victims and their potential to realise some or all of their 
justice aims in the specific context.   
Finally, the adoption of an alternative, working language for the discussion of victim 
participation issues without any recourse or reference to the express object and purpose of 
the provision risks divorcing Article 68(3) from its underlying rationale. In particular, it is 
evident that the Court’s innovative, restorative mandate for victims is in danger of being 
usurped by a less ambitious quest for procedural justice, to the detriment of the potential 
of victims to achieve effective and meaningful participation.  
 
At a more fundamental level, while restorative justice approaches are wide-ranging and 
diverse in their application, the concept of restorative justice remains relatively novel in 
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the context of international criminal law, and as such, it is as yet undeveloped in relation 
to the specific judicial forum. In particular, the Court has neither sought to identify an 
overarching guiding restorative principle or aim for victim-focussed action within the 
ICC, nor attempted to delineate restorative justice by its specific parameters (or 
constituent elements) in the context. As a result, and as demonstrated above, current 
approaches to victim participation fail to directly respond to the Court’s restorative 
mandate, and instead are diverse and lacking in unity, consistency and certainty for 
participants.  
The exploration and articulation of an overarching restorative aim with direct and specific 
relevance to the ICC, together with the consideration and amplification of the parameters 
of restorative justice in respect of that overarching aim, would provide a clear and 
identifiable focus for future victim-centred action at the Court. Moreover, the elaboration 
of clear restorative justice parameters which are directly tailored to the Court will enable 
the development of a dedicated assessment tool for the monitoring and evaluation of the 
Court’s progress in its pursuit and achievement of its restorative mandate.  
In Chapter 2 of this research, the author seeks to identify and describe an appropriate aim 
for the pursuit of victim-focussed action at the Court, with specific reference to the victim 
participation endeavour. The constituent parameters of restorative justice allied to the 
identified aim are also explored and identified. The parameters and framework for an 
appropriate assessment tool are considered and developed in Chapter 3. 
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2. Identifying and delineating an appropriate restorative aim for victim participation 
at the ICC: the application of clinical theory 
2.1. Introduction: the need for a restorative aim and delineated parameters for victim 
participation at the ICC – a clinical comparison 
The previous chapter demonstrates that there is an apparent disconnect between the 
Court’s formal recognition, at a theoretical level, of a restorative rationale for its victim 
participation endeavour and its application in practice. This disconnect is due, it is 
suggested, to the Court’s failure to consider what restorative justice means within the 
specific context, including what that would look like in terms of the practical aim and 
focus of its victim-centred activities.  
 
A brief comparison of the differing approaches between clinical and legal disciplines in 
their pursuit and evaluation of victims’ engagement with therapeutic and judicial 
mechanisms respectively highlights in stark terms the current shortfall in the legal context. 
Notably, therapeutic work with survivors of international crimes entails the pursuit of a 
clear, specific and widely-understood aim which in turn serves as the direct and targeted 
focus of all victim engagement: the rehabilitation of the victim.
314
 Rehabilitation itself has 
clear and recognised parameters in the particular context, enabling specific therapeutic 
work that is aimed at the achievement of those various constituent elements.
315
 Moreover, 
the existence of parameters allows clinicians to monitor the progress and success of 
therapeutic activities, as well as to organise and target limited resources accordingly. 
Clinicians therefore know exactly what it is they are trying to achieve for the victims they 
work with, the particular components of that broader goal, and how, in practice, they can 
pursue that goal.  
                                                          
314
 The meaning of rehabilitation in the specific clinical context of survivors of international crimes 
is explored in detail in Ellie Smith, Nimisha Patel and Leanne MacMillan, ‘A Remedy for Torture 
Survivors in International Law: Interpreting Rehabilitation’ (December 2010) Medical Foundation 
for the Care of Victims of Torture,12 – 13. The interpretation has since been accepted and 
incorporated into General Comment 3 of the UN Committee Against Torture, Implementation of 
article 14 by States parties (19 November 2012) U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3. 
315
 Various clinical tools are available, and the choice of which to use may depend upon the form 
and nature of psychological services offered by a clinical provider. The issue is explored 
substantively, and the advantages and disadvantages of various instruments discussed, in James M. 
Jaranson and José Quiroga, ‘Evaluating the services of torture rehabilitation programmes: History 
and recommendations’ (2011) Vo. 21 No. 2 Torture 98. 
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By contrast, the pursuit of a restorative goal for victims engaging with international 
criminal justice mechanisms is in its relative infancy. While the clinical concept of 
rehabilitation is clearly defined and widely accepted, the notion of restorative justice in 
the context of international criminal law, including in relation to the Court’s victim 
participation endeavour, remains an under-developed, vague concept lacking both a 
specific overarching aim and delineated parameters. As a relatively intangible goal, it is 
difficult to pursue, and the absence of identified parameters means that monitoring is 
problematic.
316
 Moreover, there is, at present, no assessment tool by which the Court’s 
progress in the pursuit of its restorative endeavour can be evaluated. 
In the absence of a specific restorative goal and associated assessment framework, legal 
approaches to both the pursuit and evaluation of victims’ participation experiences are, at 
present, ill-equipped for the quest for, or the achievement, monitoring and assessment of 
any specific restorative element within the international criminal justice context, 
indicating a significant gap both in knowledge and practice.  
The development and clear articulation of the specific theoretical aims of the Court’s 
restorative endeavour would not only maximise the potential of participating victims to 
achieve effective and meaningful participation, but would also serve as a focal-point for 
victim-centred action within the Court, leading in turn to the development of consistent 
Court practices and the efficient, targeted use of resources.
317
 In this chapter, the author 
identifies, develops and describes an appropriate aim for the pursuit of restorative justice 
through the victim participation endeavour of the International Criminal Court. In the 
following chapter, a detailed framework for the assessment of the Court’s progress in 
respect of its restorative mandate is identified, thereby addressing current gaps in both 
knowledge and practice.  
                                                          
316
 Notably, studies conducted by legal experts in to victims’ experiences of engaging with 
international criminal justice tribunals, including those mechanisms which provide an enhanced 
participative and potentially restorative role for victims, do not adopt a restorative framework for 
the purpose of their assessment. In addition to the ICC, victim-focussed measures providing for a 
greater, restorative role for victims in proceedings are included in the case of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Rule 23(1), ECCC Internal Rules (Rev 9)(16 January 2015), 
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UNSC Res 
1757 (30 May 2007) S/RES/1757(2007), Annex, Article 17. The legal assessment of victims’ 
experiences in relation to international criminal justice tribunals is explored further below, at para 
2.3.2.(iii)(b). 
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 Specific, hypothetical examples of possible targeted, victim-focussed measures are given in the 
following chapter, at paras 3.4.2, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, 3.4.7(ii)(a) and 3.7. 
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In Part I of this chapter, an appropriate overarching aim is identified. Part I begins with a 
brief examination of the nature of any restorative goal, and in particular, the psychological 
component incorporated within it. It goes on to acknowledge and explore challenges to the 
consideration and identification of a restorative aim for the ICC and/or assessment of the 
restorative endeavour posed by current approaches to the evaluation of psychological 
impacts in victims engaging with international transitional justice mechanisms. The 
chapter then examines the potential psychological goals of restorative action within the 
specific context of the ICC. Part II of this chapter includes a consideration of how an 
appropriate psychological concept, as a goal of restorative action at the ICC, might be 
rendered applicable and operational within the legal forum. It concludes with an 
examination of specific parameters of that goal for the practical pursuit of restoratively 
beneficial action at the Court. 
Notably, the application of restorative elements at the ICC is novel in the context of 
international criminal justice mechanisms, and as a result, there is no specific guidance 
within the international criminal law field on an appropriate overarching restorative goal 
for application and pursuit in the specific context. Reference is therefore made on this 
issue to identified overarching restorative aims within traditional international restorative 
justice mechanisms with a view to assessing the extent to which they are appropriate for 
application and pursuit in the Court. Recourse to international restorative justice literature 
and practice is particularly apposite in this regard since, like the victim-focused measures 
of the ICC, mechanisms are intended to be responsive to the restorative needs of victims 
of international crimes, perpetrated on a wide scale. Victims appearing before restorative 
mechanisms are therefore likely to have suffered comparable harm and have similar 
restorative needs to victims seeking to participate in proceedings before the Court. In light 
of the psychological component in this research, recourse is also had to psychological 
literature involving victims of international crimes and their experiences of engaging with 
international transitional justice mechanisms to the extent it is able to inform and develop 
legal theory and fill gaps in current legal practice. 
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Part I    
2.2 A restorative aim for the ICC’s victim participation endeavour 
2.2.1. The nature of a restorative goal: a psychological component in the judicial process 
As argued in the previous chapter, the right to participate in proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court vests in the individual victim, and the benefit intended to 
ensue by virtue of that participation must therefore also accrue to the individual.
318
 The 
fulfilment by the Court of its restorative mandate in relation to its victim participation 
endeavour therefore entails the accrual or achievement of a positive restorative benefit, or 
impact, in victim participants.  
Restorative impacts in the victim can be assessed in accordance with the extent to which 
participation is experienced by the victim as effective and meaningful, and hence entails 
an appraisal of the subjective and personal perceptions of victims in relation to their 
participation experiences. Survivors will measure the extent to which restorative impacts 
have been realised within the participative process in psychological terms,
319
 and it is 
therefore reasonable to expect some form of positive psychological response or benefit 
when restorative aims are met, either in whole or in part. To this extent, the aim of the 
Court’s victims participation endeavour can be understood as the achievement of a 
positive psychological impact in the victim. 
Notably, the range of potential psychological impacts which might accrue to the 
individual victim participant during the course of their engagement with the Court is wide 
and varied. Victims may, for example, feel satisfied that the judicial process itself has 
been a fair one, pleased that they have been treated politely and with respect by Court 
staff, relieved to have arrived safely at the Court, or grateful to particularly supportive or 
helpful members of staff or legal counsel. While many of these positive impacts may 
enhance the participation experience, however, they do not necessarily mean that 
participation has been restorative for the victim. 
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 At para 1.3.3.(ii). 
319
 See, for example, Bruce Feldthusen, Olena Hankivsky and Lorraine Greaves, ‘Therapeutic 
consequences of civil actions of damages and compensation claims by victims of sexual abuse’ 
(1999) 12 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 66, 101. 
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To this end, the aim of the victim participation endeavour should be understood not 
simply as the pursuit of a broad and amorphous, psychologically positive impact in the 
victim, but instead, as the pursuit of a specific and targeted impact that in turn is both 
restorative and apposite to the particular judicial context. The achievement of such an 
impact would thereby operate as an overarching and unifying goal for victim-focused 
action within the Court.   
The pursuit of a victim-focused, psychological goal is not wholly novel to the legal 
context in general or to the ICC in particular. The pursuit and assessment of procedural 
justice, for example, entails the achievement not only of objectively fair and respectful 
judicial processes, but also of a subjective perception of fairness in victims, and to that 
end, the views of victims and witnesses are typically sought in order to assess the degree 
of satisfaction with the process concerned.
320
 That said, however, clinical research and 
practice is understandably more developed and sophisticated in its approach to the pursuit 
and evaluation of psychological impacts than its legal counterpart. As a result, recourse to 
clinical practice and theory, as a means of informing and developing legal approaches in 
this area, is appropriate.   
Notably, the failure of the Court to identify a specific and targeted goal, psychological or 
otherwise, for its participation endeavour occurs against the backdrop of a relatively 
limited understanding of the psychological aims and impacts of victim engagement within 
the international transitional justice environment more generally. Notably, despite a 
heightened awareness of the needs of victims in legal proceedings, little systematic 
research has been conducted into victims’ experiences of engaging with transitional 
justice mechanisms, and as a result, we know relatively little about the psychological 
impact on victims of their interactions with international justice processes.
321
 Available 
research indicates at best only that victim engagement has the potential to be 
psychologically beneficial for some.
322
 While, however, it is clear that some victims have 
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 The assessment of victims’ experiences of procedural justice is considered in more detail below, 
at para 2.2.2.(iv). The role of procedural justice in the achievement of a restorative benefit in the 
victim is considered at para 3.4.8.(i). 
321
 The neglect of research in this area, including the relative dearth of systematic studies conducted 
in to victims’ experiences, is noted, for example, in Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16) 
507; Brouneus (The Trauma of Truth Telling) (n 31) 409; Mendeloff (n 16) 595, 601.  
322
 This rather nuanced approach is evident, for example, in Stover and others (Confronting Duch) 
(n 16); and see also Jamie O’Connell, ‘Gambling with the Psyche: Does Prosecuting Human Rights 
Violators Console Their Victims?’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 295, 300-301; 
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positive experiences of testifying and/or gain psychological benefit from judicial 
engagement more broadly, we do not know why or under what circumstances that positive 
benefit is achieved, or why for others, the achievement of positive psychological benefit 
remains illusory, thereby comprising a considerable knowledge gap.
323
  
The current state of knowledge in respect of specific potential psychological impacts is 
discussed in detail below, in the context of the identification of an appropriate restorative 
aim for victim-focussed action at the ICC.
324
 It should be acknowledged here, however, 
that in addition to the relative dearth of empirical evidence in this area, limitations or 
challenges to the interpretation of empirical findings may derive from approach(es) taken 
to a study, either as a result of the emerging multidisciplinary interest in victims’ 
experiences or as an inevitable consequence of the study design. Before exploring and 
identifying a suitable aim for the Court, it is therefore appropriate to consider these 
further.  
These limitations and challenges may include difficulties in discerning the nature of 
psychological benefit and the retrospective nature of studies. In addition, the nature and 
focus of existing studies may operate, to some extent, to limit our ability to glean 
information of direct relevance and transferability to the ICC’s innovative participation 
experiment. In particular, many of the studies arise in contexts tangibly different to that of 
the Court, and an appreciation of those contextual differences is therefore essential in 
considering the degree of applicability of study findings to the Court’s victim participation 
endeavour. The testimony focus of existing studies – both legal and clinical –  together 
with an emphasis on procedural justice in the case of legal studies, are of particular 
relevance in this regard.  
Significantly, difficulties in the realisation of the Court’s restorative mandate itself may be 
engendered by the application of assessment focuses and approaches traditionally 
employed to evaluate victims’ experiences within a purely retributive context to a 
                                                                                                                                                                
Judith Herman, ‘The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention’ (April 2003) 
Vol. 16, No. 2 Journal of Traumatic Stress 159, and is apparent from the limited empirical 
literature on the issue, explored in more detail below, at para 2.3. 
323
 This issue is dealt with substantively in Chapter 3 in the specific context of the ICC, where 
recommendations are made concerning how that knowledge gap might be addressed through 
monitoring and assessment with victim participants.  
324
 At para 2.3. 
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consideration of victims’ participatory experiences at the Court. To this end, it should be 
noted that while the focus of earlier studies may be appropriate to the issue and/or tribunal 
under examination, there is evidence that approaches taken to those studies have been 
applied directly to the ICC context, and so operate to potentially define and confine the 
aim of the victim participation endeavour without any further investigation as to their 
direct transferability or appropriateness to the forum. Specific consideration of this is 
included in the discussion of limitations arising from the available literature below. 
2.2.2. Assessment approach and focus of the literature: recognising challenges in its 
application to the ICC 
(i) Challenges in discerning the nature of psychological benefit from 
available literature  
 
Victim engagement with transitional justice processes is broadly ascribed one or both of 
two potential psychological benefits for the victim: the generation of a positive therapeutic 
impact and the achievement of a sense of justice.
325
 
 
Notably, however, the nature of any identified psychological impact is not always 
indicated or otherwise evident either from the available research or the academic literature 
more broadly. Moreover, while researchers in both legal and clinical fields seek to gauge 
or otherwise indicate the psychological impact of judicial engagement and legal 
procedures on the individual victim, expert practitioners and academics do not employ 
any common terminology to describe the nature of any psychological impact identified.  
 
A reading of the literature reveals three discernible approaches:  
 
 Experts clearly distinguish between positive psychological outcomes, recognising 
both a therapeutic impact in terms of the healing of psychological harm or 
lessening of psychological symptoms, and a psychological sense of justice.
326
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 The two potential psychological impacts are explored substantively below, at para 2.3, in the 
specific context of the identification of an appropriate restorative aim for victim participation in 
proceedings before the ICC.  
326
 These discrete elements are expressly recognised, for example, by Mendeloff (n 16), see in 
general 593 – 600; see also Brouneus (The Trauma of Truth Telling) (n 31) at 412; and see also 
Metin Basoglu and others, ‘Psychiatric and Cognitive Effects of War in Former Yugoslavia: 
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 In the alternative, clinical experts adopt a broad-brush approach which simply 
recognises a notion of psychological well-being, or otherwise describe a non-
specific, psychologically positive experience, hence potentially encompassing 
both therapeutic and justice elements without distinction.
327
 The approach is 
replicated to some extent by legal experts who refer to psychologically positive 
impacts, without distinction between healing and justice.
328
  
 
 Legal experts use the term “healing” to refer to a range of positive psychological 
impacts, some of which may not be typically or exclusively therapeutic in a 
clinical sense.
329
 
To some extent, these differences in terminology may be a reflection of the 
multidisciplinary interest in victims’ experiences with international process within a field 
that is still in its relative infancy, and is certainly not intended as a criticism of the 
approaches taken. Moreover, the notion of a sense of justice is wholly undeveloped in the 
legal context,
330
 and hence renders ascription of psychological impacts problematic for 
legal researchers. The absence of a common language between and, to some extent, within 
academic disciplines does, however, mean that it is difficult to share and compare results 
across disciplines in a meaningful way, thereby limiting any contribution to the broader 
knowledge base by the research in question.  
                                                                                                                                                                
Association of Lack of Redress for Trauma and Posttraumatic Stress Reactions’ (3 August 2005) 
Vol. 294, No. 5 Journal of the American Medical Association 580. 
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 Herman (The Mental Health of Crime Victims) (n 322); Judith Herman Trauma and Recovery: 
The aftermath of violence – from domestic abuse to political terror, (2nd edn, Basic Books 1997) 
212; Feldthusen and others (n 318) at 70, adopting a broad definition of “therapeutic” to encompass  
“psychological or physical well-being”; Rebecca Horn, Simon Charters and Saleem Vahidy, 
‘Testifying in an International War Crimes Tribunal: Experiences of Witnesses in the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone’ (2009) Vol.3 International Journal of Transitional Justice 135. 
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 Used, for example, by Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16) 535, where they are 
described instead as “transformative”; see also Haslam (n 7), 315 – 6.  
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 See, for example, Van Camp and Wemmers (n 294), at 123. 
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 Discussed substantively below, at para 2.3.2. 
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(ii) A shortage of prospective studies 
 
At present, systematic studies in both the clinical and legal fields concerning the 
psychological impact on victims of their engagement with international transitional justice 
mechanisms are retrospective in nature.  
 
While it is clearly the case that any study in this somewhat neglected area is better than 
none, the retrospective nature of these studies also poses difficulties for the interpretation 
of substantive findings. In particular, it is by no means certain that survivors are able both 
to recall and accurately describe their attitudes towards the justice mechanism in question 
or their hopes in approaching it retrospectively, and in some cases, years after the event. It 
is certainly conceivable that victims’ memories are mediated or polarised to a greater or 
lesser extent by intervening events, including their personal experiences of engagement 
with the mechanism, any prevailing insecurity or instability in the home environment, 
ongoing trauma at a societal level and broader conceptions within the local, domestic and 
international arenas of the institution’s success. 
 
Within the clinical context, retrospective studies do not assess and compare psychological 
symptoms prior to and following testimony. As a result, while it is possible to gauge the 
psychological health of survivors in the aftermath of testimony, in the absence of an initial 
baseline study, it is impossible to tell whether testifying served either to reduce or 
exacerbate symptoms, a factor which was explicitly recognised in one such study as a 
limiting factor in the interpretation of the study’s substantive findings.331  
 
Notably, studies into victims’ experiences are currently underway at the ICC, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Criminal Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) and the Special 
Tribunal for the Lebanon (“STL”).332 In the case of the ECCC, at least, the study is a 
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 Debra Kaminer and others, ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa: relation 
to psychiatric status and forgiveness among survivors of human rights abuses’ (2001) 178 British 
Journal of Psychiatry 373. 
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 In the case of the ICC, a study is being conducted by a team of researchers at the Human Rights 
Centre, University of California, Berkeley School of Law, led by Eric Stover. A team of 
researchers from Harvard University and the Cambodian Human Rights and Development 
Association are assessing the experiences of civil parties appearing before the ECCC in its second 
case. A study of the STL’s participation endeavour is being conducted by Rianne Letschert, 
INTERVICT, Tilburg University. 
114 
 
prospective one, and baseline standards have been obtained and published, providing a 
more promising basis for reliable data concerning the impact of participation on 
victims.
333
  
 
(iii) A focus on testimony 
A preponderance of both legal and clinical literature concerning the experiences and 
perceptions of victims engaging with international transitional justice mechanisms relates 
to the issue of survivor testimony within the justice process, including the extent to which 
victims have been able to narrate their personal trauma stories.
334
 The focus by researchers 
on the testimony experience is understandable: in the context of the traditional, retributive 
international criminal tribunal, a victim’s sole source of engagement with the court is as a 
witness, while the role of individual truth-telling has been a prominent feature of the 
modern truth commission.
335
 The nature of a victim’s engagement with the ICC as a 
participant, however, is tangibly different to that both of a witness in a retributive process 
or a participant before a truth commission, and while in many respects the role of victims 
within the Court is considerably more expansive than in a purely retributive process,
336
 the 
opportunities for personal testimony are very limited.
337
 As a result, the direct 
transferability of study findings to the ICC project is limited. 
In addition, it should be noted that evidence concerning victims’ experiences of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission indicates that the psychological impact of 
their engagement is mediated by their ability to narrate their experiences far less than the 
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 It is unclear whether baseline standards have been sought and obtained in studies at either the 
ICC or STL. 
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 Testimony, for example, forms the basis of Stover’s enquiries into victims’ experiences of both 
the ICTY and ECCC: Stover (Witnesses) (n 164); Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16). 
See also Brouneus (The Trauma of Truth Telling) (n 31); Kaminer and others (n 331), 373; and see 
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 Moreover, clinical arguments have suggested a possible therapeutic basis for victim narrative in 
the judicial context, an issue which is considered further below, in the context of the consideration 
of a therapeutic aim for the Court’s restorative endeavour, para 2.3.1.(i). 
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 Outlined, for example, above, at para 1.1. 
337
 Victims’ limited prospects of achieving testimony at the Court are discussed subsequently, at 
para 3.4.5.(i). 
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legal literature might otherwise suggest,
338
 indicating the need for a broader approach to 
assessment. In particular, whilst the desire amongst victims of international crimes to tell 
their stories is a recognised need, it is by no means their only need in the justice 
process,
339
 and research which seeks to assess the psychological impact of testimony 
without also considering whether the remaining needs of the individual have been realised 
is incomplete. Moreover, in the absence of any consideration of the realisation or 
otherwise of victims other needs, any findings concerning a positive or negative 
psychological impact cannot be properly ascribed to victim testimony.   
 
(iv) A procedural justice emphasis 
To date, systematic assessment of victims’ experiences within the field of international 
law has ostensibly been conducted on the basis of a procedural justice model,
340
 and as a 
result, provides little directly applicable and transferable data for consideration of the 
Court’s restorative project.341 
Significantly for the pursuit of a restorative justice aim at the Court, however, and as 
indicated above, a study into the experiences of victims participating in proceedings 
before the ICC is currently underway,
342
 and despite the Court’s express acknowledgment 
of its innovative restorative function in relation to the victim participation endeavour,
343
 
the study itself is allied solely to the assessment of procedural justice in participants.
344
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 See David Backer, ‘The Human Face of Justice: Victims' Responses to South Africa's Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Process’ (2004) (Ph.D. thesis), available online at 
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 The broad range of survivor justice needs in approaching an international justice mechanism is 
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 Para 2.2.2.(ii). 
343
 See para 1.2.2. 
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 November, 2014. 
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Moreover, it is clear that the Court has high hopes for the study, indicating that “[i]t is 
foreseen that this study will provide very useful information to the Court regarding the 
question of whether victims’ participation is meaningful and how it can be improved”.345 
With this in mind, it is appropriate to consider both the transferability of similar study 
findings to the consideration of an appropriate restorative aim for the Court’s innovative 
endeavour, and the suitability of the current study approach to the assessment of the 
Court’s restorative mandate in respect of victims. 
According to procedural justice theory, the key determinants of survivor perceptions of 
procedural fairness include the perceived neutrality of the Court and the decision-makers 
within it, the extent to which individuals feel they have been treated with dignity and 
respect by those they come into contact with, perceptions of trust relating to the motives 
of the Court, including the exercise of any discretions, and voice, which in turn includes 
the opportunity to participate in the process and to present their concerns within that 
context. Perceptions of fairness also relate to the extent to which victims are kept 
informed about their case and are provided with information about their role within the 
legal process.
 346
 Procedural justice theory is underpinned by a normative justice model, 
by which the fairness of proceedings is perceived as reflecting the victim’s standing 
within a group,
 347
 thereby affording an element of acknowledgment and recognition of 
status that is also evident in restorative justice theory.
348
   
Within a traditionally retributive judicial process, an assessment based upon the 
realisation or otherwise of the tenets of procedural justice theory is unproblematic, since it 
fully reflects the extent of the victim’s intended engagement with the tribunal in question. 
As indicated,
349
 however, the new breed of international criminal justice mechanism was 
designed to achieve something more for the victim than a simple satisfaction with a 
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retributive process. As a result, an approach to the assessment of victims’ participative 
experiences that is based solely on procedural justice is, it is argued, incomplete.  
Again, an analogy with clinical practice best illustrates the point being made. For the 
purpose of this example, rehabilitation, as the overarching goal of engagement with 
victims, is employed as the clinical equivalent of a restorative justice goal for victim 
participation at the ICC. The example assumes a purely procedural approach to the 
evaluation of victims’ experiences is being taken:  
The victim may be satisfied with the directions they received to get to the 
treatment centre, happy that they were greeted politely and with respect at the 
reception desk, pleased that the interpreter came to find them and introduced 
themselves in advance of the therapy session, satisfied that their appointment 
started on time and that the therapist was polite to them, pleased with the extent to 
which they were informed about the nature and time-frame of the therapeutic 
process, content that the therapist listened to and responded to any of their 
concerns or views relating to the therapeutic process and grateful that their travel 
expenses were paid promptly. 
These elements relate to the procedure of accessing and using the therapeutic services of a 
clinical centre, and are equivalent to aspects of procedural justice in the judicial context. 
Moreover, assessment in relation to them provides vital information to the treatment 
centre about the quality of its interaction with victims, as well as the success of many of 
the practical services it operates. Significantly, however, it tells us nothing about whether 
or not the survivor has made clinical progress in relation to their rehabilitation, the 
substantive goal of both the centre and of the survivor in approaching it. As a result, on its 
own it cannot provide meaningful data concerning the pursuit or achievement of the 
overarching aim of either the centre or the victim. In the same way, while an assessment 
that is confined to victims’ subjective perceptions of the procedures and services that 
facilitate participation may provide important information to the Court about the nature 
and quality of those services and interactions, it tells the Court, and us, nothing about 
whether its restorative remit is being met.  
Procedural justice, of course, is a legitimate aim of the Court’s victims’ mandate. The 
procedural aim is, however, ancillary to the achievement of a restorative goal, and relates 
to the way in which the restorative goal should be achieved, rather than comprising an end 
point in itself. As such, the aim of the Court in respect of victims should be understood as 
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the achievement of a restorative goal (substantive justice for the participant in this 
regard)
350
 within a process that is perceived by the victim to be fair and which treats them 
with dignity (procedural justice for the victim).
351
  
In practice, of course, the situation is complicated by the fact that the precise 
interrelationship between procedural and restorative justice remains unclear, although 
recent research in the domestic field suggests that restorative practice might incorporate 
the constituent elements of procedural justice, in addition to other broader, pro-social and 
expressive elements.
352
  While the hypothesis remains untested in the context of survivors 
of international crimes participating in transitional justice processes, it is clear, at least, 
that the achievement of procedural justice may be a relevant factor in the realisation of a 
broader, positive psychological response in victims to judicial engagement.
353
  
The evaluation of victims’ participation experiences at the Court is therefore currently 
incomplete, and a detailed assessment of victims’ participation by reference to a 
restorative justice tool is clearly required. This is examined substantively in the following 
chapter. In the meantime, a focus on the procedural component of justice to the exclusion 
of restorative elements risks positioning victims solely as recipients and evaluators of 
Court services, rather than as actors and right bearers in the judicial process. Moreover, in 
the absence of a clear and dedicated restorative focus in the monitoring of victims’ 
experiences, participation once again is in danger of simply becoming aligned to the 
Court’s retributive function.  
2.2.3. In summary: the lack of a restorative aim at the ICC 
 
A comparison with the clinical pursuit and assessment of therapeutic impacts in victims of 
international crimes highlights, in stark terms, shortfalls in the judicial context occasioned 
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  Van Camp and Wemmers (n 294) from 128. 
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by the lack of any overarching aim or delineated parameters of restorative justice in the 
particular context of the International Criminal Court, and in international criminal law 
more generally. Moreover, while restorative justice can be understood as the pursuit of a 
psychological goal through a legal mechanisms, we still know relatively little about the 
psychological impacts of engagement by victims with international transitional justice 
bodies, indicating a significant gap in both legal and clinical knowledge. 
In the absence of an identified aim encapsulating what it is that the Court hopes to achieve 
for victims by virtue of its participation endeavour, it is difficult to see how the scheme 
might be rendered effective and meaningful for participants, and instead, is in danger of 
being usurped, or at least confined, by a procedural justice model. In the same way that 
the goal of rehabilitation acts as a guiding paradigm of therapeutic engagement, the 
identification and delineation of an appropriate restorative aim would serve to focus and 
guide victim-centred action within the Court at all levels and to provide the basis upon 
which the Court could gauge its progress or success in the realisation of its restorative 
mandate, an issue that is considered further in the following chapter.
354
 This in turn would 
not only maximise the potential for restorative engagement by victims, but also enable the 
Court to better manage and target its limited resources for victim-focused action, thereby 
enabling the development of an appropriate, targeted and efficient victim service.  
A restorative goal, it is argued, must not only be consistent with the underlying restorative 
rationale of the endeavour, but also appropriate and responsive to the specific context of 
the ICC, realistically achievable in light of the Court’s primarily retributive function and 
practically realisable in terms of the Court’s financial, time and skills resources. With this 
in mind, the chapter goes on to explore and identify an appropriate goal for victim-
focussed, restorative action at the ICC.  
2.3. Exploring and identifying an appropriate goal for restorative action at the ICC 
As indicate above, international transitional justice processes are typically attributed the 
potential to achieve one or both of two psychological goals for victims: the generation of a 
positive therapeutic impact, and the achievement of a sense of justice.
355
 The two 
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identified goals are particularly apposite to this research and the functioning of the Court’s 
participation endeavour in that they relate to desired impacts in victims of mass 
victimisation within a justice mechanism that in turn is intended to accommodate 
substantial numbers of affected victims. These two overarching restorative goals are 
therefore explored as potential guiding aims for the Court’s participation endeavour. 
2.3.1. The achievement of healing: a therapeutic goal for restorative action at the ICC? 
 (i) Introduction 
While transitional justice recognises two possible psychological goals for victim 
engagement, a great preponderance of the literature assessing the experiences of victim 
testimony in particular, or participation more broadly, focuses on the potential for 
engagement to produce a measureable therapeutic impact.
356
  
In many ways the emphasis on therapeutic impact is unsurprising. Clinicians have been 
engaged in the psychological assessment of victims’ participation experiences for some 
time, and it is, of course, natural that experts concerned with the therapeutic rehabilitation 
of survivors would have a specific interest in how engagement with judicial mechanisms 
might affect the victims’ therapeutic journey. In addition, the nature of abuses suffered by 
victims of international crimes generate clear and obvious physical and psychological 
rehabilitative needs which require redress, and this may also be a contributory factor in 
the tendency for international transitional justice bodies to champion therapeutic goals for 
victim participation.  
Finally, the therapeutic pursuit of victim narrative and storytelling in the clinical recovery 
environment has been thought to provide a basis upon which to pursue rehabilitative 
testimony in the judicial context, again providing possible support for a specific 
                                                                                                                                                                
findings and implications for analysts and practitioners’ (2008) Centre for International Policy 
Studies, University of Ottowa, 4, conflating in that case a sense of justice in the survivor and 
reconciliation. The assumed relationship between a sense of justice, reconciliation and peace is 
considered in Mendeloff in light of current empirical evidence, 597 – 8. 
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 This tendency is noted, for example, in Brouneus (The Trauma of Truth Telling) (n 31) at 409. 
See also in Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking 
the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573; Mendeloff 
(n 16) at 605. See also South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, Vol. 1 chapter 
5, noting that the act establishing the Commission “explicitly recognised the healing potential of 
telling stories”.  
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therapeutic focus. In particular, rehabilitative services are predicated on the ascertainment 
and delivery of a full narrative of the survivor’s abuse experiences. While this narrative 
emerges within the private context of the therapy room, many clinical experts have argued 
that survivor articulation of abuse experiences within a public setting represents “a 
potential tool for ‘rehumanizing’ the victims/survivors in their societies, where they may 
have been stigmatised and criminalized”.357 The giving of public testimony is deemed to 
have the potential effect of repositioning the trauma from the private to the public sphere,
 
358
 reaffirming the locus of the traumatic event(s) as lying in the actions of the individual 
perpetrator, State or armed group responsible for the violation(s) and thereby contributing 
to the liberation of the survivor from feelings of self-blame and guilt,
359
 as well as 
generating feelings of empowerment and personal strength.
360
  Testimony is also viewed 
as a means of regaining status as a social actor and participant, and hence standing within 
a broader group,
361
 as well as role transformation from victim to survivor.
362
 Moreover, 
there is, albeit limited, primary evidence of the achievement of a therapeutic benefit in 
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victims of international crimes where public articulation of abuse experiences has been 
employed within a purely clinical, therapeutically-driven context.
363
 
Notably, however, the direct transferability of this therapeutic benefit to a judicial context 
is debatable, particularly in the absence of any adjustment or accommodation to take 
account of the differing settings and the exigencies of the respective environments in 
which therapeutic benefit is anticipated.
364
 Moreover, the assumption that survivor 
testimony and engagement with international transitional justice mechanisms is 
rehabilitative for participating victims in such circumstances is largely untested,
365
 and 
instead, seemingly constitutes an expression of aspiration or hope, rather than of fact.
366
  
It is therefore appropriate to consider whether the positive therapeutic benefit which is 
often ascribed to survivor engagement with a judicial forum constitutes an appropriate 
restorative aim for victim participation at the ICC. The examination considers the extent 
to which a therapeutic basis for victim-focussed action at the Court is both sustainable in 
the light of current clinical knowledge, and appropriate in the context of the ICC. 
(ii) Is a therapeutic goal for victim participation sustainable at the ICC? 
Evidence v. aspiration 
There are relatively few studies which seek to expressly examine the impact of testifying 
in particular, or participation more broadly, on victims’ psychological health. Where 
studies exist, many are based upon the impressionistic accounts or observations of clinical 
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staff working with survivors within a justice context, such as South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.
367
 As such, while they provide anecdotal evidence of a 
therapeutic benefit for a relatively limited number of victims, the findings have not been 
systematically sought or assessed and so, for the purpose of offering a basis for an 
appropriate restorative aim at the ICC, are problematic. In other instances, while study 
findings may have been systematically sought, they are based upon very small study 
samples, and as such, their findings are of limited broader applicability.
368
  
There are, however, three empirical, systematic studies which seek to examine the 
therapeutic impact of judicial engagement on victims and which involve significant study 
populations, and their findings therefore merit further consideration here. 
Firstly, an epidemiological study of 134 survivors of South Africa’s apartheid era 
considered and compared the psychological health of two distinct groups of individuals: 
those who had given testimony before the country’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and those who had chosen not to speak.
369
 The study revealed no significant 
difference in health impacts and outcomes between the two groups in the aftermath of 
giving evidence, indicating that testifying before the Truth Commission had neither a 
positive nor negative impact on the therapeutic wellbeing of survivors.  
Notably, however, the findings should be treated with a degree of caution, and the authors 
themselves acknowledge the limits of their study. In particular, the study sample was non-
random, and at 134, was still relatively small. In addition, the psychological assessment 
tool employed for the purpose of the study had not been validated on non-Western 
samples, raising the possibility that culturally-specific indicators of psychological health 
might have been missed. As a result, and as the authors themselves acknowledge, the 
broader applicability of the study findings is limited.
370
 Moreover, the potential 
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transferability of the findings to the specific context of the ICC is questionable in light of 
the very different nature of the respective fora, the role of victim narrative within them 
and the particular ways in which victims are integrated into their practices.   
Secondly, in a study conducted by a team of researchers lead by Professor Metin Basoglu, 
the authors investigated the therapeutic impact of victims’ perceptions of retributive 
justice in the Former Yugoslavia.
 371
  The study considered the views of 1,358 victims, 
and found that issues of perpetrator prosecution or impunity did not significantly affect 
clinical symptoms of PTSD and depression,
372
 indicating that the scope for a purely 
retributive judicial process to provide therapeutic benefit in the survivor is limited.  
A relatively small number of respondents  - 219 and 224 survivors - told their trauma 
story to the authorities and/or to an NGO respectively. In just 11 and 16% of cases, study 
respondents reported satisfaction with this experience, with almost half of the respondents 
being ambivalent about its potential benefits.  According to Mendeloff, the study 
“strongly suggests that in the case of the former Yugoslavia, truth-telling has had neither 
the positive, nor the negative psychological effects that are claimed”.373   
Notably, the transferability of the study findings to the ICC context is limited. In 
particular, the study does not relate directly to the experiences of individuals who gave 
testimony before the International Criminal Tribunal or even within a domestic judicial 
forum. In addition, while the authors conclude from their findings that “justice for 
survivors is much more than criminal trials”, the findings themselves are confined to a 
purely retributive notion of justice, and so of limited relevance to the ICC’s restorative 
experiment.  
Finally, a more recent study in to the experiences of 1,200 Rwandans of witnessing in the 
country’s gacacas found that those who spoke about their experiences suffered higher 
levels of depression and PTSD symptoms than those who did not testify, and this was the 
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case even when controlling for predictors of poor psychological health such as cumulative 
experiences of trauma, leading the author of the study to conclude that witnessing at the 
tribunals was anti-therapeutic.
374
 The findings thereby directly challenge the assumption 
that truth-telling in a formal judicial context for survivors of gross violations is healing. 
Again, however, the extent to which the findings can be deemed directly applicable to the 
ICC context is debateable. The conclusions relate to the very specific exigencies of the 
Rwandan project, which itself constitutes a unique experiment in victims’ justice. In 
particular, while gacaca hearings, as with most transitional justice hearings, are held in 
public, the study author notes that the situation in Rwanda is “sharply accentuated”, where 
the minority Tutsi survivors are surrounded by the Hutu  majority when testifying, 
producing a potentially intimidating atmosphere. Moreover, there is evidence from a 
much smaller study conducted by the same author that witnesses appearing before the 
gacacas have been subjected to threats and reprisals,
375
 and the author speculates that the 
prospect of insecurity and personal danger may exacerbate negative psychological 
reactions to testifying.
376
 Significantly, and in contrast to the ICC’s victim participation 
endeavour, participation in the gacacas, including witnessing, is mandatory for all 
Rwandan citizens, and it may therefore be the case that the negative findings of the study 
are due to the unwillingness and fear of witnesses which would not necessarily be 
replicated in the ICC. While the findings of the study are not, however, of direct 
transferability to the ICC context, they are of interest and relevance to any consideration 
by the Court of in situ hearings within the territory of an affected State. 
 
The results of the limited systematic scientific literature on the issue  are therefore 
inconclusive, leading Mendeloff, in a review of available research, to conclude that 
although there was little evidence that survivor testimony dramatically harmed those 
concerned, the notion that it provided a positive therapeutic benefit was also “highly 
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dubious”.377 Moreover, the direct transferability of the findings to the ICC’s restorative 
justice project is limited due to the differing nature of the tribunals in question and the 
manner in which victims are accommodated within them.  
Further substantive clinical research in to the area is clearly required. In particular, the 
specific victim participation components of both the STL and the ECCC are yet to be 
clinically evaluated. Both tribunals incorporate victim-focused measures that are 
comparable to that of the ICC, and an assessment of the therapeutic impact of 
participation in those fora, together with an assessment of the ICC’s own practice, would 
provide a clearer picture of the impact of participation in international criminal processes. 
At present, however, the disparate research findings and the consequential questionability 
of the possibility of achieving a positive therapeutic impact through participation do not, 
on their own, justify the pursuit of a rehabilitative goal for the ICC’s victim participation 
endeavour.   
 
Having examined the primary evidence relating to the therapeutic impact of testimony and 
participation in international transitional justice processes, it is appropriate to consider 
whether the pursuit of a therapeutic goal would be appropriate to the international 
criminal justice context. 
(iii) Is a therapeutic goal appropriate to an international criminal justice context? 
The pursuit of therapeutic goals within international transitional justice processes is based 
upon a number of problematic assumptions. In particular, the approach assumes not only 
that all participants are ill and in need of therapeutic help, but also that survivors are 
unable to distinguish between justice and rehabilitative services, and thereby look to the 
Court as an appropriate vehicle for the delivery of therapeutic benefit.  
These assumptions however are not borne out by available evidence. It is clear, for 
example, that while a significant minority of participating victims will likely be 
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experiencing ongoing trauma symptoms, not all will be suffering from trauma.
378
 
Moreover, although a substantial number of survivors may have suffered a trauma 
response at the time of the event(s) concerned, for many survivors, natural recovery 
responses, which arise spontaneously in the aftermath of a stressful and upsetting event, 
will mean that psychological recovery will arise naturally.
379
 
 
In addition, any approach based upon therapeutic need is inconsistent with what we now 
know about why victims of gross violations seek to engage with international criminal 
justice mechanisms. Notably, while we know relatively little about the psychological 
impact of participation, available research with participants and victim witnesses has 
identified what it is that survivors seek to achieve by virtue of their engagement.  
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Victims’ aims include:380 
- A formal public acknowledgment of the crime(s) committed; 
- The moral denunciation of the crimes committed (validation); 
- The public acknowledgment of the pain suffered; 
- Telling their story; 
- Educating the world and bearing witness to the abuses that occurred; 
- Publically denouncing the wrongs committed against them; 
- Confronting the accused; 
- Achieving justice for loved ones and bearing witness on behalf of those who did not 
survive;  
- Discovering the truth about the crimes committed and the fate of loved ones; 
- Preventing the perpetration of further abuse; 
- Contributing to broader peace goals; 
- Receiving reparations; 
- Receiving an apology;  
- Healing mental harm; 
- Contributing towards accountability; and 
- Exacting revenge on the perpetrator(s). 
Notably, the identified aims are wide-ranging, and specific reference to a need for the 
healing of mental harm emerged in only one study.
381
 In addition, a second study refers to 
a broader, non-specific notion of psychological easing which would encompass mental 
health as well as other psychological impacts not necessarily directly allied to therapeutic 
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healing.
382
 Significantly, the reporting rate was very low in both instances, at just 1.7% in 
the first study
383
 and 6% in the second, indicating that survivors of international crimes do 
not, in general, look to an international criminal justice mechanism to provide therapeutic 
support and recovery.  
Instead, far from signalling a need for clinical recovery, or at least, recovery through the 
medium of the judicial process, the particular rationales identified by victims as their 
reasons for witnessing or participation indicate the desires of well individuals seeking an 
appropriate social response to a traumatic event,
384
 indicating that a therapeutic aim is not 
appropriate for the Court’s victim participation endeavour.  
Notwithstanding the above, the fundamental question of whether the Court comprises an 
appropriate forum for the pursuit of a therapeutic goal in any event is debatable. It has 
been suggested that purely retributive criminal processes are not designed to attend to the 
specific needs of victims, and lack the resources to do so.
385
  The issue, however, is less 
clear in the case of the International Criminal Court, which was designed not only to 
punish perpetrators but also to meet and accommodate, where possible, the reparative 
needs of victims. Moreover, it is resourced to provide psychological support for those 
engaging with the Court.
386
  
Significantly for the purpose of the assessment of any therapeutic aim, the Court indicates 
in its Revised Victims Strategy
387
 that victims’ interaction with the Court should be 
mutually “positive and beneficial”.388 While it does not say in what respect the 
engagement should be experienced as positive, the Revised Strategy goes on to note that 
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“no action of the Court should do harm”, and this, combined with subsequent reference to 
the need to provide for and protect the psychological welfare of victims,
389
 would indicate 
that, at the very least, the Court has an obligation to ensure that survivors do not 
experiences their engagement with it as anti-therapeutic.
390
 The effect of the Revised 
Strategy is therefore to incorporate a therapeutic aim in to the practice of the Court, albeit 
a relatively limited aim that requires the Court to ensure that its impact on victims is at 
least neutral in therapeutic terms.  
Notably, however, while the Revised Strategy evidences a therapeutic aim for the Court, it 
also indicates that this does not operate as a guiding paradigm for restorative action, but 
instead, regulates the conduct and interaction of the Court vis-à-vis victims in the pursuit 
of its retributive and restorative goals. As such, and in common with the need for 
procedural justice, it constitutes an ancillary aim which relates to the way in which the 
Court’s broader justice goals should be achieved, rather than a specific and overarching 
goal in its own right. 
(iv) In summary: a therapeutic aim for the ICC’s restorative endeavour? 
Available evidence indicates that the probity of pursuing a therapeutic goal as an 
overarching restorative aim for the Court’s victim participation endeavour is questionable. 
Primary evidence indicates that the possibility of achieving therapeutic benefit through 
judicial testimony in particular and participation more generally is, at best, doubtful. 
Moreover, it is clear that the victims themselves do not seek therapeutic benefit when 
approaching international criminal justice mechanisms.  
 
It is therefore appropriate to consider the achievement of a sense of justice in victims as an 
alternative and potentially more fitting aim as a goal for restorative participation at the 
ICC.  
                                                          
389
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 While the wording of the Strategy leaves some scope for interpretation in relation to the extent 
of the Court’s therapeutic obligation here, an interpretation which puts the duty of the Court at a 
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2.3.2. A sense of justice as an overarching restorative aim for victim participation?
391
 
 (i) Introduction 
In addition to the pursuit or achievement of any therapeutic benefit, psychological 
literature recognises the achievement of a sense of justice in victims as a potential impact 
of their engagement with international transitional justice mechanisms.
392
  
This section therefore includes an examination of whether the pursuit of a sense of justice, 
as an overall restorative aim for the ICC, is both feasible in light of available primary 
evidence and appropriate to the specific context. It begins with a brief consideration of a 
sense of justice as a discrete psychological impact in victims of international crimes. 
(ii) A sense of justice as a discrete psychological aim for international 
transitional justice processes 
Notably, while the findings of the study by Basoglu and others, cited above,
393
 do not 
support the pursuit of a therapeutic goal, they are of interest in another respect. In 
particular, the authors of the study found that symptoms of PTSD and depression arose 
independently of any sense of justice or injustice experienced by study participants. As a 
result, the study not only differentiates between the two notions of a sense of justice and a 
therapeutic benefit in the survivor, it indicates that the two can operate independently of 
one another. The degree of independence and/or interdependence between the two is 
unclear, and it is conceivable, at least, that some level of pre-existing psychological ill-
                                                          
391
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health in the victim participant may affect their ability to achieve a psychologically 
positive sense of justice, an issue which is returned to in the following chapter.
394
 The 
study does, however, provide evidence that it is theoretically possible to achieve a sense 
of justice goal in circumstances within which testimony or participation more broadly was 
simultaneously experienced by the victim as anti-therapeutic, or at least, therapeutically 
neutral.
395
 
It is therefore appropriate to examine the evidence in order to consider whether the pursuit 
of a sense of justice comprises a sustainable restorative goal in the specific context of the 
ICC. 
(iii) Is a sense of justice goal feasible? - A review of primary evidence 
(a) Assessment in the clinical arena 
When compared to the concept of therapeutic impact, the notion of a sense of justice in 
victims of international crimes is relatively undeveloped in psychological literature. 
Moreover, while there is some explicit recognition in the clinical literature of a 
psychological sense of justice in victims of international crimes, there is little systematic 
empirical assessment and analysis of victims’ judicial experiences in relation to any sense 
of justice notion, and existing assessment is not allied to a particular legal or judicial 
notion of justice – restorative or otherwise.396   
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 There is clinical evidence from the domestic criminal law arena which provides some support 
for this. Feldthusen and others, in a study of rape victims who chose to testify in civil actions in the 
domestic Canadian courts, found that while many found the experience of testifying to be 
therapeutically negative, a significant number of those indicated that the overall experience had 
provided a distinct, positive psychological benefit, including a “sense of closure, validation, 
empowerment or relief”. Notably, the researchers do not go on to ally the identified psychological 
benefit to any notion of justice in the victims. Aspects such as validation and empowerment, 
however, comprise specific aims of restorative justice, an issue which is returned to substantively 
later, at para 2.4.3. Feldthusen and others (n 318), 101. See also Stover and others (Confronting 
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victims of international crimes in her study of 1,200 Rwandans and their experiences of witnessing 
before the court’s gacacas, her study focuses purely on the therapeutic impact of testifying. 
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In a number of cases, the described impacts of judicial engagement consist of anecdotal 
accounts based on the professional experience of clinicians working with victims in a 
transitional justice setting.
397
  While, however, these studies may suggest glimpses of 
elements which might comprise a sense of justice in the victim,
398
 their unsystematic 
nature means that they are also ultimately unsatisfying in terms of providing a sound 
evidential basis for the adoption of a sense of justice aim to guide restorative, victim-
focussed action at the Court. 
Notably, while there is little systematic assessment directly in relation to a sense of justice 
in the victim, a number of clinical studies have systematically sought and assessed 
victims’ experiences of testifying or participating more broadly on the basis of a non-
clinical model. While the nature of the impact – therapeutic or sense of justice – is not 
thereby specifically evident from the study findings, researchers have identified 
psychological impacts that are not exclusively or primarily therapeutic in nature. 
Moreover, in some cases, victims have couched their responses in language more akin to a 
sense of justice (or injustice) than to any rehabilitative impact. In a study conducted by 
Hamber, Nageng and O’Malley, for example,399 victims reported relief at their ability to 
raise public awareness and knowledge in respect of the abuses perpetrated,
400
 while in a 
study conducted by Catherine Byrne,
401
 victims report a sense of closure in learning the 
fate of missing relatives.
402
 Both studies, however, are very small, encompassing the 
views of 20 and 30 victims respectively, and while they provide indications of 
psychological impacts which might be associated with a sense of justice, or elements of it, 
the size of the study samples mean that findings are of limited broader applicability.  
Finally, however, while the study by Basoglu and others, described above,
403
 does not 
provide a promising basis for the pursuit of a therapeutic goal at the ICC, the picture is a 
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little more optimistic for the pursuit by the Court of a sense of justice in victim 
participants. In the course of their study, the researchers asked the study participant 
population if they felt that justice had been served by the ICTY in their case.
404
 The results 
of their enquiry were not overwhelmingly positive, with just 15% of victims indicating 
that they had achieved a sense of justice, and a further 6% being undecided in this respect. 
At first sight, therefore, the findings are not wholly encouraging in terms of the 
identification of an appropriate overarching restorative aim to guide the Court’s victim-
focussed actions. Notably, however, as a purely retributive mechanism, the ICTY is 
tangibly different to the ICC, and as indicated in the previous chapter,
405
 victim 
dissatisfaction with it was a motivating factor in the decision of drafters to incorporate 
victim-focussed, restorative elements into the Rome Statute. While, therefore, the results 
of the study are not positive in themselves, they do at least indicate that the achievement 
of a sense of justice goal is feasible for a court engaging with victims of international 
crimes and, given the inclusion of victim-centred measures in the practices of the Court, 
the potential for achieving greater levels of victim satisfaction in this regard may 
foreseeably be higher. 
Clinical literature therefore provides (limited) concrete evidence of the feasibility of 
achieving a sense of justice goal in victims of international crimes. In addition, a number 
of clinical studies provide glimpses of positive, non-clinical impacts in victims that go 
beyond simple procedural satisfaction, where the terminology employed by victims to 
describe their experiences is broadly consistent with a sense of justice, discussed further 
below.
406
 As a result, clinical evidence provides a somewhat tentative basis for the pursuit 
by the Court of a sense of justice impact in victims. 
It is therefore appropriate to consider how the achievement of a sense of justice has been 
assessed in the legal arena. 
                                                          
404
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(b) Assessment in the legal arena 
There has been very little systematic, empirical investigation within the legal field of the 
experiences of victims of international crimes in engaging with transitional justice 
mechanisms. Moreover. while the notion of a sense of justice is less developed than its 
therapeutic counterpart in psychological literature, it remains a wholly undefined and 
undeveloped concept within the legal arena of transitional justice, and there is no readily 
available, standard legal measuring tool for the assessment of victims’ sense of justice in 
the specific and distinct context of international criminal justice. As a result, the few legal 
studies that consider either victims’ testimony or their participative experiences more 
broadly are not directly allied to any notion of a sense of justice in victims, and so do not 
systematically seek or investigate information in relation to it. As a result, any research 
findings in relation to the achievement of any sense of justice in victims are typically 
peripheral or tangential to the given research focus, and tend instead to be impressionistic 
and/or observational.
407
  
That said, however, and in common with clinical literature, a number of studies provide 
promising glimpses of a sense of justice in victims alongside their more systematically 
assessed findings. With this in mind, it is appropriate to examine the available legal 
empirical studies with a view to assessing the feasibility of achieving a sense of justice in 
victims of international crimes: 
In a study of victims’ perceptions of justice at the ICTY, Sanja Ivkovic conducted semi-
structured interviews with two samples of victims from the territory of the Former 
Yugolsavia in order to assess, amongst other things, whether victims felt that the ICTY 
was fair, that its judgments were just and its punishments adequate. The two study 
samples comprised, in turn, 263 displaced persons who had fled areas of Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina affected by war, and 299 citizens of Sarajevo.
408
 Notably, the study 
found that respondents were largely positive about the procedural fairness of the tribunal, 
with well over 90% of those victims who had chosen to approach the ICTY instead of a 
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domestic court being satisfied that the ICTY process was fair.
409
 While, however, the vast 
majority of study participants felt that the decisions reached by the tribunal in respect of 
the charges before it were just,
410
 respondents were widely dissatisfied with the sentences 
imposed by the court, believing them to be inadequate relative to the crimes committed.
411
 
The extent of dissatisfaction with the ICTY’s substantive justice outcomes would 
therefore suggest that the pursuit of a sense of justice in victims of international crimes is 
problematic. Notably, however, broader aspects of justice for victims were not included in 
the study, and observations in respect of them are not recorded in the findings. Instead, 
victims’ justice experiences are considered from a purely retributive basis. Like the 
Basoglu study, the retributive focus of the ICTY and the limited role afforded to victims 
within it limits the transferability of the findings to the ICC’s restorative endeavour, and 
the study findings should therefore be treated with caution.  
Significantly, less pessimistic findings concerning the potential achievement of a sense of 
justice in victims are evident in other studies in this area, albeit as observational glimpses. 
In his enquiry into the experiences of 87 victims and witnesses who testified before the 
same tribunal, Stover observes that, for some victims at least, the experience of witnessing 
at the ICTY was reported to have been a positive one.
412
 Although Stover does not 
systematically seek or assess victims’ experiences in relation to any sense of justice in the 
victim, he describes a number of positive, psychological impacts in victim-witnesses that 
would not necessarily be (solely) associated with a therapeutic effect, and which would 
not be accounted for by a purely procedural justice model, including feelings of 
unburdening, and elements of acknowledgment and validation. Moreover, while Stover 
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does not ally his findings to any notion of justice, he observes through his interviews that 
victims engaging with the ICTY did not speak about justice in purely retributive terms.
413
   
Inevitably, the direct transferability of the study findings to the ICC context is again 
limited. In particular, the purely retributive focus of the ICTY means that it was not 
designed to furnish or otherwise facilitate any restorative sense of justice in victims 
appearing before it, so rendering the study findings of limited relevance to the ICC’s 
experiment and the more expansive role it has created for victims in its process. The study 
does, however, provide some initial evidence of a positive psychological benefit in victim-
witnesses, and while the specific nature of that benefit is not directly discernible from the 
study, it provides, at least, some encouragement for the pursuit of a sense of justice goal 
for victim participants at the ICC. 
In a later study lead by the same author in to the experiences of twenty-one of the twenty-
two civil parties who testified in the first trial before the ECCC, many victims reported 
that testifying had been in some way “transformative” for them,414 describing feelings that 
their participation had liberated them from the past and enabled them to move on.
415
  
Notably, where any notion of substantive justice for victims is discussed in the study, this 
is done in the abstract and there is no attempt to ally the study’s empirical findings to it. 
Moreover, while the authors purport to situate their findings in the specific context of a 
“sense of justice”,416 the notion of justice identified to this end is one of procedural justice, 
rather than any concept of substantive justice in the victim.
417
 Significantly for the purpose 
of this research, however, in recording the “transformative” experiences of many victims, 
including a sense of liberation from the past and an ability to move forward, the study 
identifies positive psychological elements in the victim that are not necessarily indicative 
of the achievement of a therapeutic impact and which cannot otherwise be accounted for 
by a purely procedural justice focus.  
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Finally, Stover lead a team of researchers investigating the testimony experiences of 109 
witnesses appearing before the ICC in its first two cases.
418
 The aim of the research was to 
assess the extent to which the ICC was meeting the diverse needs of witnesses appearing 
before the Court. Notably, the study is expressly allied to the notion of procedural 
justice,
419
 and the survey instrument employed in the study is based upon that used in the 
earlier ICTY study.
420
 While the study assesses systematically-recovered data relating to 
witnesses’ perceptions of process, however, the study report also contains more 
impressionistic or observational comments concerning the psychological impact of 
testimony on witnesses. In particular, many victims reported experiencing testifying as 
personally beneficial,
421
 with one witness quoted as saying that it “felt like letting go of 
something I had been holding on to”.422  While the nature of the identified positive 
psychological benefit is not explored in the research, the described impacts again go 
beyond purely procedural notions of justice.  
While therefore the three studies outlined immediately above pursue and assess a 
procedural notion of justice, they also give more anecdotal glimpses of positive, non-
clinical psychological impacts which go beyond victim satisfaction with the processes and 
procedures surrounding their engagement, and which therefore cannot be accounted for by 
a purely procedural justice model. Moreover, in describing positive impacts, the authors 
adopt terminology that is broadly descriptive of a sense of justice in victims, an issue 
which is revisited later in this research,
423
 and while the studies do not seek to determine 
why some victims were able to achieve this while others were not, the findings are at least 
promising in so far as they provide preliminary evidence that the achievement of a sense 
of justice in victims is, at least, feasible in the specific context of international criminal 
justice processes, including the ICC.  
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A review of systematic evidence from the clinical and legal fields therefore provides a 
tentative basis for the pursuit of a sense of justice goal as an overarching aim for the 
Court’s victim participation endeavour. In light, however, both of the shortage of 
empirical evidence in those fields, and the somewhat inconclusive nature of the findings, 
it is appropriate to look further afield. 
(c) Assessment beyond the legal and clinical field 
While there has been very little consideration and assessment of the psychological aspects 
of victims’ justice experiences beyond the legal and clinical arenas, one study provides 
systematically sourced, empirical evidence of the justice perceptions of a substantive 
number of victims of international crimes, and so merits attention. 
David Backer, a political scientist, conducted a study in to survivor responses to the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
424
 The study itself is based upon 
data collected by survey from over 400 victims of political violence in Johannesburg and 
Cape Town, and examines the experiences of all victims: those who gave testimony 
before the Commission’s Human Rights Violations Committee, those who participated 
solely through the submission of a written statement, and those who chose not to 
participate at all.
425
  
In addition to assessing victims’ perceptions of the TRC process, Backer also examined 
survivors’ perceptions of substantive justice as an independent outcome. His findings 
justify this initial distinction: while respondents generally felt positively about procedural 
aspects of their engagement with the TRC, their feelings about the achievement of what, 
for them, would constitute substantive justice were considerably more nuanced.
426
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Backer assessed victims’ sense of justice in relation to eight justice parameters which he 
develops, in turn, through the course of his research and by reference to the mandate of 
the Truth Commission. They are acknowledgment, voice, truth, accountability, apology, 
punishment, reparation and systemic change.
427
 Victims’ perceptions of justice varied in 
the study across the parameters, and while, for example, victims produced an aggregated, 
average score of 3.07 in respect of acknowledgment and 2.43 in relation to voice (where 
scores are out of 5, thereby indicating a relative level of satisfaction in relation to the 
specific parameters), aggregate scores for perpetrator apology and the award of 
reparations was significantly lower, at 1.74 and 1.69 respectively.  
Notably, the study and associated tool developed and employed by Backer are not perfect: 
by his own admission, the questions in his victim survey are skewed towards negative 
answers.
428
 Moreover, societal dimensions of the tool such as the achievement of systemic 
                                                                                                                                                                
loved ones. In light of what we know about victims’ needs in approaching international transitional 
justice mechanisms, including their need for information and truth, Backer’s posited explanation 
would seem plausible. In any event, the study suggests that victims’ thoughts on perpetrator 
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Yugoslavia’ (2009) Medica Mondiale, where the authors found that all of the interviewed victims 
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specific to the circumstances of the case, providing a possible explanation for a research finding so 
otherwise out of kilter with available evidence.  
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change are somewhat intangible, and potentially difficult for individual victims to assess. 
The study is, however, hugely significant in that it provides clear primary evidence that 
victims’ sense of justice is potentially realisable within a transitional justice forum, and 
can be rendered tangible and concrete in terms of content for the purpose of pursuit and 
measurement.  
 
Research findings, albeit some at a rather preliminary level, therefore suggest that the 
achievement of a sense of justice in victims engaging with international transitional justice 
mechanisms, including international criminal justice processes, is both feasible and 
measureable. It is therefore appropriate to consider the suitability of the aim to the ICC 
and its participation endeavour. 
(iv) Appropriate to the ICC context 
The recognition and pursuit of a sense of justice aim for the Court’s restorative endeavour 
is, it is argued, compatible with the aims of the ICC.  
In incorporating elements of restorative justice in to its mandate, the Court has introduced 
an additional concept of justice in to its practice, with differing justice aims to those of a 
retributive justice model, where both understandings of justice are legitimately at play 
within the judicial process.
429
 As indicated in the previous chapter,
430
 the Rome Statute 
situates the victim participant as the intended beneficiary of those differing justice aims, 
thereby recognising that, to victims, the meaning and substantive content of justice may 
be tangibly different to those of society and the international community under a purely 
retributive justice model.
431
 The Statute therefore not only recognises the role of the Court 
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in providing justice to victims, but also indicates the form of justice it is mandated to 
provide to them. The logical corollary of the realisation of that mandate would therefore 
be the generation in the victim of a sense that justice, in the form intended, had been done, 
and the pursuit of a sense of justice in victims that is allied to the Court’s restorative aims 
is therefore, it is suggested, consistent with, and a natural consequence of, the Court’s 
innovative role.   
(v)       In summary: a sense of justice aim for the Court’s restorative endeavour? 
While there is very little assessment in either the legal or clinical arena of victims’ 
participatory experiences by reference to their achievement or otherwise of a sense of 
justice, empirical studies provide glimpses of positive, non-clinical psychological impacts 
that cannot be accounted for purely on the basis of the victim’s satisfaction with process. 
In addition, the language employed by victims to describe impacts in those studies is 
broadly reflective of a sense of justice, an issue which is explored substantively in Part II 
of this chapter. Moreover, Backer’s systematic and methodically sound study of victims’ 
sense of justice in relation to their engagement with the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission provides evidence that a sense of justice in victims of crime is 
realisable and measureable.  
Further, the pursuit of a sense of justice is compatible with the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and, in contrast to its therapeutic counterpart, its specific justice focus renders it 
apposite for application within the context of a judicial tribunal. The achievement of a 
sense of justice in victim participants, where that sense of justice is restorative in nature, 
therefore comprises a feasible, suitable and potentially measureable overarching aim for 
restorative action at the International Criminal Court.  
 
At present, however, the concept remains undefined and lacking in identifiable parameters 
in the specific context of international criminal justice. With this is mind, it is appropriate 
to consider how a sense of justice can be defined and operationalized in practice within 
the specific legal context. Part II of this chapter considers how a sense of justice is 
understood and defined within psychological literature with particular reference to 
survivors of international crimes. It goes on to explore some of the difficulties of 
achieving a psychological sense of justice in the given context, before considering how, in 
light of these difficulties, a psychological notion of justice can be rendered operational 
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within a judicial forum. The chapter then seeks to disaggregate the notion of a sense of 
justice in this context with a view to identifying clear parameters for the practical 
implementation and pursuit of the goal at the International Criminal Court. 
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Part II  
2.4. Delineating the psychological notion of a sense of justice for legal pursuit and 
application at the ICC 
2.4.1. Defining a sense of justice for application at the ICC 
“[W]e need to be very careful about how we define the term 
‘justice’. For many survivors, justice may not mean trials but a much 
more personal sense of what they need in order to move on with their 
lives”.432 
While the achievement of a sense of justice is recognised as a victim-centred goal in a 
number of traditional international restorative justice mechanisms designed to deal with 
victims of gross human rights violations,
433
 the notion itself is wholly undeveloped in 
legal literature, and is presently defined solely in clinical terms.
434
  It is therefore 
appropriate to take the psychological construct of a sense of justice as the starting point 
for the development and articulation of the notion for potential application in the specific 
judicial context of the ICC, thereby utilising psychological literature to address a gap in 
legal knowledge. 
Brandon Hamber, a psychologist who has worked extensively with survivors of South 
Africa’s apartheid regime, describes the notion of justice in reference to restorative 
outcomes, noting that “[a]t the individual level the victim is generally seeking…some sort 
of reparation, that is, a psychological state in which they will feel that adequate amends 
have been made for a wrong committed”.435 As a victim-focussed, harm-centred approach, 
the definition is consistent with the broader theoretical underpinnings of restorative justice 
                                                          
432
 Mikos Biro, Dean Ajdukovic, Dinka Corkalo and others, ‘Attitudes towards justice and social 
reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia’ in Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein 
(eds), My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 201. 
433
 See, for example, Stephen Ellis, ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, 
Volumes 1-5. Pretoria: Government Printer, October 1998, Review Essay’ (2000) 42 
Transformation 57, 61-62. 
434
 Notably, there is very little research involving survivors themselves which seeks to explore and 
define the concept of justice from a more subjective and personally restorative sense. 
435
 Hamber, (Narrowing the Micro) (n 392) at 564.  
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and hence, it is argued, an appropriate theoretical basis upon which to manifest and pursue 
restorative action at the ICC.  
While the notion of a sense of justice is relatively unproblematic within a psychological 
context, however, its manifestation and realisation within a legal process is not without its 
difficulties and limitations,
436
 and the concept itself requires some further exploration and 
development in order to render it practically applicable within a judicial forum.  It is 
therefore appropriate to consider the challenges which the Court would face in seeking to 
achieve a sense of justice in victim participants as a specific restorative aim, and, by 
reference to clinical theory, to examine how those challenges might be met in practice. 
2.4.2. Operationalising a sense of justice goal at the Court: incorporating objective criteria 
“When I was tortured, I felt as if the world had stopped turning. 
Justice brings confidence, it comes with happiness.  It would 
mean the world would start turning again for me.”437 
As already noted, the ability of the Court to achieve a sense of justice in survivor 
participants is dependent upon victims’ own subjective assessment of their experiences of 
engaging with the Court,
438
 and this subjective component, together with the nature of 
offences under consideration by the ICC, may present some difficulties in the 
implementation and pursuit of a sense of justice in victims. 
Notably, while the aim of international reparative efforts is to restore the individual and/or 
the affected community to the position existing prior to the abuse,
439
 full restoration, 
including full clinical rehabilitation in the aftermath of gross violations, is generally not 
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 Hamber, ibid. 
437
 “Tata”, survivor of torture, interviewed by E Smith for a pilot study of survivor perceptions of 
justice, University of East London, 19
th
 July, 2011. Tata is not his real name.  
438
 At para 2.2.1. 
439
 Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland) (Merits) [1928] PCIJ, Series A., No. 17, the Court in 
that case noting that international reparations should seek to “…wipe out all the consequences of 
the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed”, at 47. 
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achievable.
440
 In addition, in many cases what has been lost simply cannot be replaced, 
and hence to some extent, reparation can only ever be nominal and symbolic. Difficulties 
in achieving a sense of justice in victims may be exacerbated where the acceptance of 
justice is perceived by the survivor as an act of betrayal or otherwise interpreted as a 
means of buying silence.
441
 While the context and environment within which justice is 
framed may be of particular relevance to survivor perceptions of justice,
442
 in some cases 
nothing will be enough to satisfy the individual that justice has been done,
443
 and in that 
respect, and from the perspective of victims, at least, justice in the aftermath of 
widespread human rights abuses can never be perfect. 
In light of the limitations identified, an objective, qualifying component which attends to 
more legalistic notions of reasonableness should also be incorporated before the notion 
can be practically operationalised. Again, such elements are contained in clinical 
literature. In recognition of the limits noted above, Hamber proposes a more qualified 
psychological approach to the achievement of reparations, suggesting instead that the 
relevant tribunal should seek to achieve a level of psychological satisfaction that is “good 
enough” for a “substantial number” of victims.444  
The concept of “good enough” reparation is described as a position wherein “the victim 
feels subjectively satisfied that sufficient actions have been taken to make amends for 
their suffering and a psychological state is achieved in which some sort of mental 
resolution concerning past trauma is reached”.445 To this end, the “mental resolution” 
referred to comprises a situation within which “the trauma is no longer seen as unfinished 
                                                          
440
 See, for example, Ellie Smith and others (n 314), at 12. See also Committee against Torture, 
General Comment 3 (n 314). 
441
 See, for example, Brandon Hamber, ‘Repairing the Irreparable: dealing with the double-binds of 
making reparations for crimes of the past’ (2000) 5 3/4 Ethnicity and Health 215, 220. 
442
 Discussed below, at para 3.4.8.(i) and (ii). 
443
 See Hamber (Narrowing the Micro) (n 392), at 568. Hamber in turn borrows the concept of 
“good enough” from the work of psychoanalyst, Donald W. Winnicott, who employs the concept in 
relation to parenting. Hamber goes on to note in addition that the context within which reparations 
are delivered is essential.  
444
 Hamber, ibid, at 569, 582. 
445
 Ibid, at 569. 
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business”.446 Significantly, such a situation would not necessarily require that the 
individual concerned had made a clinical recovery in respect of the grief and trauma 
suffered, thereby distinguishing the notion from any therapeutic goal.
447
  
Reference to a “substantial number” of victims in turn seeks to address the problem that, 
for some survivors, nothing will ever constitute justice for the trauma(s) and loss(es) 
suffered. The approach is a pragmatic one, and while Hamber is referring specifically to 
reparations as an outcome, the notion of “good enough” reparation could equally be 
applied to both the procedural and outcome components of restorative practice.  
That being said, in order to operationalise the clinical notion of “good enough” justice 
within a legal context, the term requires further explanation and delineation. 
Notably, while the qualified notion of ‘good enough’ justice is expressed in psychological 
terms, the application of qualifying criteria is common in legal practice, and in particular, 
in relation to the reparations provisions of international human rights law instruments.
448
 
Article 14 of the UN Convention Against Torture, for example, refers to compensation 
that is “fair and adequate”,449 Article 10 of the Inter-American Convention450 makes 
reference to “adequate compensation”, and Article 41 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights
451
 speaks of “just satisfaction”. Article 6 of the International Convention on 
                                                          
446
 Ibid. 
447
 Moreover, the nature of mental resolution described above chimes in particular with the notion 
of “closure and catharsis”, articulated by Edwards as the underlying theoretical aim for 
participatory aspects of restorative justice, indicating a potential area of common ground between 
legal and clinical approaches; Edwards (n 220). 
448
 Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute provides that the interpretation of the instrument should be 
consistent with internationally recognised human rights standards. The provision has been used by 
the Court in relation to the fair trial rights of the accused; see Lubanga (Judgment on the Appeal of 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the 
Court Pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3
 
October 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 
December 2006) [37]. There is no reason why the rule would not equally apply to victims’ rights; 
see, for example, Schabas (n 1) 198. 
449
 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 2 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85. 
450
 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 
July 18, 1978) 1144 UNTS 123. 
451
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 
4 November 1950, entered into force September 3 1953) 213 UNTS 222.  
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the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
452
 refers to “just and adequate 
reparation or satisfaction”, while Article 21(2) of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights453 makes reference to “adequate compensation”.454 
The preponderance of human rights provisions cited above incorporate the qualifying 
notion that reparations be “adequate”, a term which, it is suggested, ostensibly mirrors the 
psychological concept of “good enough”. Significantly, the notion of adequacy is 
expressly adopted by the Court in its own principles on reparations,
455
 and hence, it is 
argued, constitutes an appropriate qualifying notion for the application and pursuit of a 
sense of justice in victims participating in proceedings before the ICC.  
 
The overarching restorative goal of the Court’s victim participation endeavour should 
therefore be understood as the pursuit of a sense of justice that is considered by a 
substantial number of victim participants to be adequate. An adequate sense of justice 
would, in turn, comprise a position wherein, while perhaps neither perfect nor complete 
for some victims, their experience(s) of abuse are no longer seen by them as unfinished 
business, but instead, they are able to look and move forward.
456
 
                                                          
452
 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 
January 1969, 660 UNTS 195. 
453
 Adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, 1520 UNTS 217. 
454
 Discussion of how these various provisions have been interpreted and applied in practice within 
their respective judicial fora is beyond the scope of this research. Moreover, the award of adequate 
reparations in the context of widespread and/or systematic abuse, in situations where there are 
many victims, has its own challenges. Again, discussion of these challenges is beyond the scope of 
this research. 
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 Lubanga  (Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to the Applied to Reparations) 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2904 (7 August 2012) [242]. The Trial Chamber's decision was amended 
somewhat on appeal, although the need for reparations to be adequate was not in issue, Lubanga 
(Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with Amended order for reparations (Annex A) and 
public annexes 1 and 2) ICC-01/04-01/06-3129 (3 March 2015). While the principles were 
promulgated in the specific context of the Lubanga case, they broadly reflect established human 
rights reparations principles, and are unlikely to vary appreciatively between cases. 
456
 Notably, the notion of an adequate sense of justice chimes with the language used by victims to 
describe their feelings in the aftermath of testimony in the three studies lead by Eric Stover, 
described above, at para 2.3.2(iii)(b), and in particular, of being in some way unburdened, liberated 
from the past and able to move on as a result of their engagement. 
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It is unclear what would comprise a “substantial number” for the purpose of implementing 
Hamber’s clinical aim, and it may be that an appropriate percentage would emerge and 
evolve through Court monitoring activities, and in conjunction with clinical experts 
engaging with participating survivors. Moreover, it is foreseeable that where victim-
focussed actions at the Court are adapted in response to the findings of monitoring 
activities, the number of victim participants who experience a sense of justice would rise, 
and Court goals could be adjusted upwards accordingly. In any event, it is suggested that 
in order to avoid survivor disillusionment with and disengagement from the Court, a 
“substantial number” should, in the first instance at least, comprise more than a simple 
majority of victim participants.  
 
An appropriate overarching aim for the Court’s restorative mandate has therefore been 
identified and described. Notably, however, in the absence of any explication of the 
practical components, or parameters, of a restorative sense of justice in the context of 
victims of international crimes, the aim remains relatively abstract, and its physical 
implementation is therefore problematic. It is therefore appropriate to disaggregate the 
aim into its constituent elements to better enable its practical application in the given 
context. 
2.4.3. Identifying constituent elements: parameters of restorative justice for victims of 
international crimes 
 (i) Introduction 
The elucidation of the parameters of a restorative sense of justice in victims of 
international crimes for pursuit at the ICC is a three-step process: (1) the identification of 
the parameters of a sense of justice in victims of international crimes; (2) the correlation 
of those parameters to restorative justice theory, with a view to identifying those elements 
which are theoretically compatible with the Court’s restorative mandate; and (3) the 
practical translation of those restorative parameters into concrete aspects of the Court’s 
practices, procedures and multi-level interactions with victim participants. 
Steps 1 and 2 are explored substantively below. The identification of the component 
elements of a restorative sense of justice in victims of international crimes will provide a 
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guide for victim-centred action within the Court, and hence, it is argued, heighten the 
potential for the effective and meaningful participation of victims.  
Notably, step 3 requires a detailed audit of all Court activities and functions involving 
victim participant engagement, including an assessment not only of how specific aspects 
might be practically operationalised but also, at a more fundamental level, the extent to 
which individual identified restorative components are compatible with the criminal 
judicial forum, and hence appropriate to the given context. This step is beyond the scope 
of this research. Notably, however, some thoughts are offered both throughout this chapter 
and the next on areas of Court processes and activities of particular relevance to such a 
consideration. Moreover, the identification of the parameters of restorative justice for 
victims of international crimes, considered below,
457
 provides the basis for such an audit.  
(ii) Step 1: Identifying parameters of a sense of justice in victims of international 
crimes 
Victims’ perceptions of what, for them, would comprise substantive justice in response to 
their experience(s) of international crimes are key determinants for the pursuit and 
achievement of a sense of justice in victims participating in proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court.   
As already seen, the rationales for victims’ engagement with international criminal justice 
mechanisms have been expressly sought and obtained in a number of empirical studies.
458
 
They are documented above, and repeated here for ease of reference. In particular, in 
approaching an international criminal justice tribunal, victims may hope: 
- To receive formal public acknowledgment of the crime(s) committed; 
- To obtain public moral denunciation of the crimes committed (validation); 
- To receive public acknowledgment of the pain suffered; 
- To tell their story; 
- To educate the world and bear witness to the abuses that occurred; 
- To publically denounce the wrongs committed against them; 
- To confront the accused; 
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 Step II of the process, at para 2.4.3.(iii) 
458
 See para 2.3.1.(iii). 
151 
 
- To achieve justice for loved ones and to bear witness on behalf of those who did not 
survive;  
- To discover the truth about the crimes committed and the fate of loved ones; 
- To prevent the perpetration of further abuse; 
- To contribute to broader peace goals; 
- To receive reparations; 
- To receive an apology;  
- To heal mental harm; 
- To contribute towards accountability; and 
- To exact revenge on the perpetrator(s). 
The aims themselves are reflective of the interrelated individual and collective impacts 
and resulting justice needs of survivors of crimes of mass victimisation, and evidence the 
multiple capacities within which victims experience international crimes. In particular, 
while aims such as the need to discover the fate of loved ones or to heal mental harm are 
inherently primarily personal to the individual, aims such as the desire to contribute to 
broader peace goals or to prevent the perpetration of further abuse seemingly correspond 
to the victim’s position as a member of an affected society, or, in the case of, for example,  
the need for societal recognition and acknowledgement of the crime(s) committed and 
pain suffered, likely arise as a result of the need of the individual to (re)integrate within 
their community context. Significantly, as indicators of victims’ aims of judicial 
engagement, it is reasonable to assume that the achievement of a sense of justice in 
victims might come with the realisation of some or all of their aims, within a process that 
they perceive to be fair and which is not anti-therapeutic.
459
 The aims thereby comprise 
the constituent elements of a broad, disaggregated sense of justice in victims of 
international crimes. 
That is not to say, however, that all of the constituent elements identified above represent 
the discrete components of a restorative sense of justice in victims of international crimes, 
consistent with the specific mandate of the ICC. It is therefore necessary to consider the 
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 Subject to a number of additional variables which have the potential to affect the achievement of 
a sense of justice in practice, discussed further in the following chapter, para 3.3. 
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extent to which victims’ broad justice aims in engaging with international criminal justice 
mechanisms, identified above, correlate with restorative justice theory.
460
  
 (iii) Step 2: Victims’ justice needs and restorative justice theory - allying 
parameters to the Court’s restorative mandate 
While the concept of restorative justice itself remains relatively elusive and fluid, the aims 
of restorative justice in terms of what it seeks to achieve for victims remain consistent 
throughout its diverse operation and range of practices, and despite the varying modes by 
which those aims are practically operationalised in their given contexts.
461
 These aims in 
turn are both widely documented and ostensibly uncontroversial, thereby providing a 
suitable basis upon which to assess and compare victims’ justice aims in the international 
criminal justice context. These aims are described in the previous chapter,
462
 and are 
explored further here in the specific context of victims of international crimes.  
In seeking to do justice for the victim, the principal aim of restorative justice is the 
reparation of harm done. With this broad goal in mind, the component aims of restorative 
justice practices comprise some or all of the following:
463
 
- Formal acknowledgment and validation in respect of the crimes committed; 
- The recognition and acknowledgment of the mental and physical pain suffered by the 
victim(s) as a result of the crime(s); 
- The provision of an opportunity for victims to testify; 
- The provision of support; 
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 Significantly, there are distinct advantages to the victims in their identified justice aims being 
allied to the mandate of the Court. In particular, victims’ aims move from simply being needs to 
legitimate expectations with a basis in the constituent documents or articulated goals of the judicial 
body. Moreover, assessment of these legitimate expectations becomes not only an examination of 
the realisation or otherwise of justice from the perspective of the victim, but also an evaluation of 
the institution itself in the delivery of its victim-specific mandate. 
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 These practices can include, for example, victim-offender mediation; conferencing (akin to 
victim-offender mediation, but involving family and community members); victim-offender groups 
and family group conferencing (which focuses on the offender’s family and the development of 
reparative strategies); see Marian Liebmann, (n 92) 
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 At para 1.2.2. 
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 Notably, not every restorative process will necessarily incorporate all of these aims, and this 
may be influenced, to some extent, by the nature and exigencies of the forum.  For example, a 
particular tribunal may not have the power to award reparations to victims: see para 1.2.3.(i). 
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- The achievement of a sense of personal safety in the victim; 
- The deterrence of future crimes; 
- The provision of information about the offence(s) committed; 
- The provision of information about the judicial process; 
- The achievement of reparations; and  
- Healing in respect of harm suffered. 
It is therefore necessary to consider the degree of congruence between the aims of victims 
in approaching an international criminal justice tribunal and the aims of restorative justice 
theory, with a view to identifying the discrete components of a restorative sense of justice 
in victims of international crimes. The results of that examination are presented in 
summary format in Table 1, immediately below. The examination of individual justice 
aims and their respective degrees of consistency with the aims of restorative justice, as the 
basis for the findings indicated in the table, follows subsequently. 
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Table 1: Consistency of Victims’ justice aims with restorative justice aims 
 
Aim in approaching international 
criminal justice tribunal 
 
Consistent with 
Restorative 
Justice 
 
Not consistent 
with Restorative 
Justice 
(a) To receive formal public 
acknowledgment of the crime(s) 
committed 
X  
(b) To obtain public moral 
denunciation of the crimes committed 
(validation) 
X  
(c) To receive public acknowledgment 
of the pain suffered; 
X  
(d) To tell their story X  
(e) To educate the world and bear 
witness to the abuses that occurred 
X  
(f) To publically denounce the wrongs 
committed against them 
X  
(g) To confront the accused X  
(h) To achieve justice for loved ones 
and to bear witness on behalf of those 
who did not survive 
X  
(viii) (i) To discover the truth about the 
crimes committed and the fate of 
loved ones 
X  
(j) To prevent the perpetration of 
further abuse 
X  
(k) To contribute to broader peace 
goals 
X  
(l) To receive reparations X  
(m) To receive an apology X  
(n) To heal mental harm X  
(o) To contribute towards 
accountability 
 X 
(p) To exact revenge on the 
perpetrator(s) 
 X 
 
Taking victims’ individual justice aims in turn: 
(a) Public acknowledgment of the crime(s) committed 
The recognition and acknowledgment of the factual perpetration of crimes by a formal, 
objective judicial body may be of particular significance to victims where there is some 
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level of ongoing dispute, denial or suppression in relation to the events either in the 
victims’ community or within the broader national setting.464 Acknowledgment may also 
be of relevance where abuses were committed in a private setting or are otherwise 
shrouded secrecy, such as the perpetration of sexual violence.
465
 Notably, the 
acknowledgement of crimes is a feature of both the aims of victims in approaching an 
international criminal justice tribunal and of restorative justice theory. 
(b) Public moral denunciation of the crimes committed (validation) 
Allied to the need of victims for the acknowledgment of crimes committed is the need for 
the public denunciation of those acts as legally and morally reprehensible, thereby 
“legitimising” victims’ feelings in respect of them and effectively “exhonorating” the 
victim from any public sense that they were in some way deserving or otherwise complicit 
in the acts committed against them.
466
 Validation may, in turn, begin to address victims’ 
feelings of stigmatisation, victimisation and isolation through the provision of a sense of 
connection and support.
467
 Again, the aim also features as a practical aspect of restorative 
justice theory. 
(c) Public acknowledgment of the pain suffered 
In addition to the need of victims for public acknowledgment of the crimes committed 
against them is the need for public recognition of the harm suffered as a result of those 
crimes. Acknowledgment of pain and suffering is identified as a significant need in 
empirical studies seeking to assess victims’ aims in approaching an international criminal 
                                                          
464
 See, for example, Danieli, who refers to the “conspiracy of silence” in respect of human rights 
abuses and the impact of this on victims, Yael Danieli, ‘Introduction: History and Conceptual 
Framework’, in Danieli (ed) International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma 
(Plenum Press, New York, 1998) 1 - 20; Nora Sveaas and Nils Johan Lavik, ‘Psychological 
Aspects of Human Rights Violations: The Importance of Justice and Reconciliation’ (2000) 69 
Nordic Journal of International Law 35, 43, exploring the impact of silence and denial in respect of 
abuses on a sense of justice in the victim.  
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 Observed in victims in Binaifer Nowrojee, ‘“Your Justice Is Too Slow”: Will the ICTR Fail 
Rwanda’s Rape Victims?’ (2005) UN Research Institute for Social Development Occasional Paper 
10, 4. 
466
 Zehr (n 95) 191. 
467
 Explored, for example, in Backer (n 338) 201-202. 
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justice mechanism,
468
 and like the need for moral denunciation of the crimes themselves, 
may be seen by victims as a means of overcoming feelings of isolation and societal 
disconnection.
469
 Given that the harm suffered by the victim is the starting point and focus 
of restorative justice, it is unsurprising that the need for acknowledgment of pain and 
suffering is also a feature of restorative justice theory.   
(d) To tell their story 
The desire for victims of international crimes to narrate their personal experiences of 
abuse is widely recognised. Primo Levi, for example, notes that “[t]he need to tell our 
story to ‘the rest’, to make ‘the rest’ participate in it, had taken on for us … the character 
of an immediate and violent impulse, to the point of competing with our most elementary 
needs”.470  Laub, too, notes in relation to survivors of the Holocaust that “survivors did not 
only need to survive so that they could tell their story; they also needed to tell their story 
in order to survive”.471  
In all of the studies concerning victims’ justice aims in approaching an international 
criminal justice mechanism, the need for victims to tell their stories was evident.
472
 Victim 
narrative also comprises a component of restorative justice theory, and so constitutes an 
aspect of the victims’ restorative sense of justice in the context of international crimes.   
                                                          
468
 In the case of the baseline study conducted with civil parties engaging with the ECCC, for 
example, nearly half of the respondents - 40.8% of civil parties and 47.6% of civil party 
representatives - reported a need for societal acknowledgment of their pain and suffering; see 
Kirchenbauer and othes (n 15) at 19 – 20; see also Clark and Palmer (n 380), 9 – 10; discussed also 
in Stepakoff and others (n 380) 9 – 10. 
469
 See, for example, Stepakoff and others (n 380) 9 – 10; Clark and Palmer (n 380), at 9. 
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 Primo Levi, If This is a Man: The Truce (Abacus Press, 1979), 15 – 16. See also Ronnie Janoff-
Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (The Free Press 1992) 
108. 
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 In Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, 
Psychoanalysis, and History (Routledge, New York, 1992) 78. See also Hamber, (Do Sleeping 
Dogs Lie?) (n 361). 
472
 See Stepakoff and others (n 380), where 18.5% of victims expressed this as an aim of their 
testimony before the SCSL, 17; the figure was significantly higher in the case of civil parties in the 
ECCC’s second case, although the parameter is considered in combination with the need for 
acknowledgment of pain and suffering, and hence comparisons are difficult, Kirchenbauer and 
others (n 15), 19 – 20. See also Clark and Palmer (n 380), 9; Stover and others (Confronting Duch) 
(n 16) 521 – 523. 
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(e) To educate the world and to bear witness to the abuses that occurred 
The desire of victims to contribute towards the establishment of a public, perhaps 
internationally-recognised truth about the events that occurred is allied to the need for 
public acknowledgment of the crimes committed and pain suffered, and may again be 
particularly significant where disputed accounts of events exist or where there is a 
prevailing state of denial or repression in the home State.
473
 Where, however, 
acknowledgment both of the crime(s) committed and pain suffered are aims centred on the 
individual, the desire in some victims to educate the world about the abuses that took 
place arguably represents a more externally-focussed motivation.
474
  
The need is widely recognised in studies which explore victims’ aims in approaching 
international criminal justice mechanisms,
475
 and while it is not expressly indicated as a 
component of restorative justice theory, its realisation is responsive to the harm 
experienced by the victim, and likely represents the practical operation of restorative 
principles within the context of widespread violations. Moreover, where victims seek to 
realise the aim through judicial testimony, the aim is directly aligned to the restorative 
goal of providing victims with an opportunity to testify, such that testimony can be 
understood as a vehicle for the achievement of specific restorative aims, rather than as an 
aim in itself. The aim of victims to educate the world and to bear witness to the abuses 
that occurred is therefore, it is argued, consistent with restorative justice principles.
476
  
(f) Publically denounce the wrongs committed against them 
This aim is allied to the desire of victims for public validation in respect of the abuses 
committed, but instead of arising out of a need for connectivity and community support, it 
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 Discussed in Stepakoff and others (n 380), at 6. 
474
 Stepakoff and others (n 380), 25. The external focus chimes with the “pro-social”, restorative 
motivations identified by Van Camp and Wemmers in their research with victims of violent crime, 
Van Camp and Wemmers (n 294) 129, 132 – 134. 
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 See, for example, Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16) 523; Clark and Palmer (n 380) 
10; Stover (Witnesses) (n 164) 127. 
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 Notably, there may be other opportunities for victims to contribute towards the establishment of 
a public, internationally-recognised truth by, for example, engagement with the Office of the 
Prosecutor and the provision of evidence. The focus of this section, however, is on the victim 
participation endeavour of the Court. 
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is primarily based on the victim’s need to re-establish personal agency and empowerment. 
The need of victims to personally denounce violations committed them is evident in the 
studies of victim motivations in approaching criminal justice mechanisms, and was the 
principal aim of victims appearing as witnesses before the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“SCSL”).477 Again, while the aim is not expressly indicated in restorative justice theory, 
it responds directly to the restorative goal of victim empowerment,
478
 and is aligned to the 
restorative goal of providing victims with an opportunity to testify.  
(g) To confront the accused 
The desire for victims to confront the accused was reported in several of the studies into 
victims’ aims in engaging with a criminal justice tribunal.479 In seeking to come face-to-
face with the alleged perpetrator, the victim may be motivated by a number of goals, 
including a wish to look the accused in the eye and describe the impact of the crimes 
committed,
480
 to show that they had not been beaten by the experience,
481
 and to receive 
specific information about the crime (considered further below). Again, while not an 
explicit aim of restorative justice theory, potential motivations in seeking to confront the 
accused are consistent with express restorative goals, including the acknowledgment of 
harm suffered, perpetrator contrition, victim empowerment and the receipt of 
information. Moreover, the need is ostensibly encompassed by the restorative goal of 
testimony.  
(h) To achieve justice for loved ones and to bear witness on behalf of those 
who did not survive 
The desire of victims to achieve justice for those who did not survive, and to bear witness 
on their behalf, is reported as a significant aim in approaching a criminal tribunal in all of 
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 Stepakoff and others (n 380) 17, comprising 33.5% of respondents. 
478
 Discussed above, at para. 1.2.2. 
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 See Stepakoff and others (n 380) 17. The number of participants reporting this need was not 
substantial, at just 1.5%. See also Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16) 522. 
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 See, for example, Stover and others (Confronting Duch), ibid. 
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 ibid, 527. 
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the available studies.
482
 It is unclear from the literature what “justice” for loved ones 
would comprise in this context, although it is fair to assume that it would not be dissimilar 
to the victims’ justice needs in respect of themselves. In the specific context of testimony, 
bearing witness in relation to those who did not survive may be seen as a way of 
honouring the dead and ensuring that their experiences and identities are retained both in 
the minds of the listening court, as well as in the official court records.
483
  
Notably, while there is no explicit recognition in domestic restorative justice theory of 
victims seeking justice for others or any notion of third-party commemoration during the 
judicial process, the aim is consistent with the broader goals of restorative justice theory, 
including the need for processes to respond to the harm suffered – in this case, the grief of 
the surviving victims – in respect of the crimes perpetrated. Moreover, the nature of 
international crimes means that there are likely to be a significant number of victims who 
died as a result of the crimes perpetrated, and to that extent, the international context of 
restorative justice can be differentiated from its domestic counterpart. As a result, bearing 
witness on behalf of others likely represents a practical application of restorative justice 
theory in the specific context of international crimes and the harms they typically 
engender.  
(i) To discover the truth about the crimes committed and the fate of loved 
ones 
The desire amongst victims to discover the truth about the crimes committed, including 
the fate of loved ones, was reported in several of the studies,
484
 and is reflected in the 
emerging right to truth of victims of gross violations.
485
 In particular, in the aftermath of 
international crimes, victims have recognised needs for information about the reasons for 
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 Ibid, 520 – 521; see Kirchenbauer and others (n 15), in which 70.1% of civil parties and 89.2% 
of civil party representatives report the aim, at 19; in the case of the SCSL the figure was lower but 
not insubstantial, at 23.5%, Stepakoff and others (n 380), 17. 
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 A detailed exploration of the right to truth in general, and in the specific context of the ICC, is 
beyond the scope of this research. The issue is developed substantively in Klinkner and Smith (n 
260). 
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and causes of victimisation, the broader prevailing circumstances which lead to or 
otherwise facilitated the abuse, details of specific violations and, in the event of 
disappearance or death, the fate and whereabouts of loved ones. The aim corresponds 
directly with the restorative goal of providing the victim with information about the 
offence(s) committed. 
(j) To prevent the perpetration of further abuse 
Victims throughout the studies reported, to a greater or lesser degree, a desire to prevent 
the perpetration of further abuses.
486
 Notably, these aims correlate to the restorative justice 
aim of providing a sense of safety for the victim, as well as, it is suggested, and in light of 
the specific context of application, for the wider community. Moreover, the aim chimes 
with the “pro-social” aims of restorative justice described by Van Camp and Wemmers in 
their work with victims of violent crime.  
(k) To contribute to broader peace goals 
The desire of victims to contribute to broader peace goals is allied to the issue of the 
prevention of further abuse, and serves similar pro-social goals. It is reported by victims in 
a number of studies,
487
 and, like the desire to prevent further abuses, is consistent with the 
application of restorative justice theory in the specific context. 
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 Seventeen percent of victims appearing before the SCSL, for example, hoped that their 
testimony would serve to prevent the perpetration of further abuses; Stepakoff and others (n 380) 
17. In the case of the baseline study conducted with civil parties engaged with proceedings before 
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17. 
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(l) To receive reparations 
In the majority of those empirical studies which examine victims’ motivations for 
testifying, a monetary aim is conspicuously absent,
488
 and in Stepakoff’s study of 200 
witnesses who appeared before the SCSL, just 2% indicated that their decision to give 
evidence had been financially motivated. In the only published empirical study to date 
which seeks to assess victims’ aims in participating more broadly with an international 
criminal justice mechanisms, however, more than a third of civil parties indicated that 
they had been motivated by a wish to achieve an individual form of reparation in respect 
of the crimes charged.
489
  
The award of reparations is a key feature of restorative justice theory, and hence 
comprises a restorative aim in the context of victims of international crimes. 
(m) To receive an apology 
A number of civil parties questioned for the baseline study of victims’ hopes in engaging 
with the ECCC indicated that their decision to engage with the tribunal was motivated, in 
whole or in part, by a wish to receive an apology from the accused in respect of the harm 
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 No desire for material benefits is indicated, for example, in the victims’ motivations for 
testifying reported by Stover in relation to witnesses appearing before the ICTY, Stover 
(Witnesses) (n 164), or by Stover and others in relation to civil parties appearing before the ECCC, 
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suffered.
490
 An apology comprises an aspect of victims’ reparations for international 
crimes
491
 and is therefore consistent with restorative justice theory. 
(n) To heal mental harm 
As already seen,
492
 while the majority of victims do not approach an international criminal 
justice mechanism with the aim of achieving some element of therapeutic benefit, for 
some, psychological healing remains a goal. The achievement of therapeutic benefit 
comprises an aspect of restorative justice theory, and as such, constitutes a restorative 
justice aim in the specific context of victims of international crimes.
493
 
(o) To contribute towards accountability 
The desire of some victims to contribute to the quest for accountability and punishment of 
the perpetrator in respect of the crimes charged is reported to varying degrees in a number 
of the studies, and is discussed above in relation to the differentiation between retributive 
justice outcomes and a sense of justice in the victim.
494
 The aim is not evident in 
restorative justice theory, and instead is better allied to victims’ interests in the Court’s 
retributive function, evidencing the multi-faceted ways in which victims approach justice.   
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 Kirchenbauer and others (n 15) 17. Notably, it is clear from the study conducted by Stover and 
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(p) To exact revenge on the perpetrator 
There is some evidence in the studies of a desire for revenge amongst a (limited) number 
of victims, including victims who would like the accused, if convicted, to be tortured or 
killed.
495
 Personal forms of revenge do not, of course, respond to any legitimate aim of an 
international tribunal, and have no basis in restorative justice theory.  
(iv) In summary: the parameters of a restorative sense of justice in victims of 
international crimes 
There is a high degree of congruence between the aims of restorative justice theory and 
the justice aims of victims of international crimes, and a comparison of the two enables 
the identification of discrete components, or parameters, of a restorative sense of justice in 
the specific context. In particular, these comprise the following: 
- The formal, public acknowledgment of the crime(s) committed; 
- The public moral denunciation of the crimes committed (validation); 
- The public acknowledgment of the pain suffered; 
- The ability of victims to tell their story; 
- To educate the world and bear witness to the abuses that occurred; 
- To publically denounce the wrongs committed against them; 
- To confront the accused; 
- To achieve justice for loved ones and to bear witness on behalf of those who did not 
survive;  
- To discover the truth about the crimes committed and the fate of loved ones; 
- To prevent the perpetration of further abuse; 
- To contribute to broader peace goals; 
- To receive reparations; 
- To receive an apology; and 
- To heal mental harm; 
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 In their study of 21 civil parties appear before the ECCC, for example, Stover and others found 
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The identified parameters thereby provide clear, tangible and evidence-based indicators of 
what would comprise restorative justice for victims of international crimes, responding to 
the current knowledge gap in this area.  
That is not to say, of course, that all of the parameters reflect appropriate targets for 
victim-focussed, restorative action at the International Criminal Court. As indicated in the 
previous chapter,
496
 the Court is not a restorative justice mechanism per se, but rather, 
should be understood as a retributive mechanism that has incorporated elements of 
restorative justice into its mandate. It has, however, yet to indicate what it means by 
restorative justice within its specific context, including which specific elements of 
restorative justice it is seeking to operationalise and realise within its practices, and what, 
as a consequence, it is hoping to achieve for victims in terms of the fulfilment of specific 
restorative aims. In the absence of any attempt by the Court to define what restorative 
justice means within the specific field of application, victim participants are likely to 
approach the Court with restorative expectations that are both legitimate and unachievable 
in the context, thereby increasing the prospect for victim disillusionment and 
disengagement. 
As indicated above,
497
 the Court must give serious consideration to the extent to which the 
various restorative parameters are appropriate for application within the forum, including 
whether they can operate within the confines of the Rome Statute and the Defendant’s 
right to a fair and expeditious trial. As indicated, this assessment is beyond the scope of 
this research, and requires a substantive and detailed audit of Court processes and 
practices with a view to identifying those aims that are feasibly realisable within the 
boundaries of the mechanism. The identification of concrete restorative parameters does, 
however, mean that such an examination is now possible and provides a tangible basis for 
the Court’s assessment.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that while the list of restorative parameters developed in 
this chapter represents the constituent elements of restorative justice for victims of 
international crimes, the achievement of a positive psychological impact in this regard 
will inevitably also be affected, to a lesser or greater degree, by various factors both 
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within and beyond the operation of the Court. These aspects are considered in the 
following chapter in relation to the assessment of the achievement of restorative impacts 
in victim participants.
498
  
2.5 Conclusion 
The concept of restorative justice is under-developed in international criminal law, and the 
Court has failed either to identify an overarching restorative aim for its victim-focussed 
action, or sought to examine and elucidate the specific parameters, or constituent features, 
of restorative justice in the particular context of its intended application, indicating a 
significant gap in knowledge and practice. The identification and articulation of an 
overarching restorative aim, together with the amplification of the constituent elements of 
that aim, would, it is argued, not only maximise the potential for victim participants to 
achieve effective and meaningful participation, but it would also provide a clear focus for 
victim-centred action at the Court, leading in turn to the development of consistent Court 
practices and enabling the cost-efficient, targeted deployment of limited resources.   
In this chapter, the author has identified and described an appropriate aim for the pursuit 
of restorative justice through the victim participation endeavour of the International 
Criminal Court, thereby providing a contribution to theory and practice in the field.  
In particular, the research demonstrates that while much of the international transitional 
justice literature advocates the pursuit of a therapeutic goal for victims’ engagement with 
restorative mechanisms in the aftermath of gross violations and international crimes of 
mass victimisation, empirical evidence calls into question the feasibility of achieving a 
positive, clinical benefit in victims in practice. In addition, a therapeutic goal is shown to 
be problematic because it is premised upon the assumption that all victims are 
psychologically ill, a premise that, as the research indicates, is not borne out by available 
evidence. Moreover, primary evidence indicates that few victims of international crimes 
look to a criminal justice institution to provide them with a therapeutic benefit, indicating 
that a clinical goal is not appropriate for restorative action at the ICC.  
Instead, this research argues that the pursuit of a restorative sense of justice in victim 
participants comprises a more appropriate aim for the Court’s restorative endeavour. In 
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contrast to its therapeutic counterpart, however, the psychological notion of a sense of 
justice in victims of international crimes is under-developed in the clinical context and 
wholly undeveloped in the legal context. In the course of this research, and by reference to 
clinical theory, the notion of a sense of justice is elaborated and described in the particular 
context of victims of international crimes. The parameters of a restorative sense of justice 
in victims of international crimes are indicated through a disaggregation of the concept of 
a sense of justice in the specific context, providing the basis for their practical application 
in to the practices and procedures of the Court. In doing so, the research provides concrete 
indicators of what restorative justice comprises for victims of international crimes, 
including crimes of mass victimisation. To this end, the research evidences the complex 
and interrelated justice needs of victims as both direct and indirect victims, as well as 
members of an affected community or ethnic group. The research thereby responds to the 
current gap in knowledge in this area and so provides a contribution to theory.  
In order for the Court to ensure that it is meeting its restorative mandate in respect of 
victim participants, however, it is essential not only that it identifies and pursues clearly 
elaborated restorative parameters through its interactions with victims, but also that it 
monitors its progress in relation to its innovative endeavour. Significantly, there is, at 
present, no evaluation of the Court’s progress in the pursuit and achievement of its 
restorative aims in respect of victims. With this in mind, the following chapter seeks to 
respond to the lack of any monitoring of the Court’s restorative endeavour through the 
development of the framework for an assessment tool. 
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3. Evaluating the Court’s restorative endeavour: a Victims’ Justice Index for the 
ICC? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Monitoring of the Court’s progress in its pursuit of effective and meaningful participation 
for victims with specific reference to the Court’s innovative victims mandate will enable 
the adoption of a clear, coherent and targeted, evidence-based and cost-effective approach 
to the development and refinement of victim-focussed actions and services within the 
Court, thereby maximising the potential for restoratively beneficial victim engagement, 
whilst operating in a resource-sensitive manner.
499
 
Despite this, however, there is, at present, no evaluation of victims’ experiences of the 
innovative endeavour by reference to any restorative impacts or by the application of any 
dedicated assessment model,
500
 indicating a significant gap in practice. Moreover, and at a 
more fundamental level, there is no available assessment tool – psychological or legal, 
validated or otherwise – to evaluate the substantive justice perceptions of victims 
engaging with international criminal justice mechanisms, and there has been little 
investigation of this area in the broader, traditional international transitional justice 
literature, indicating a significant gap in knowledge. 
In this chapter, the thesis seeks to respond to this gap through the identification and 
development of a detailed framework for an assessment tool for the monitoring and 
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evaluation of the achievement of a sense of justice for victims of international crimes with 
specific reference to the Court’s victim participation endeavour and its restorative 
mandate. 
 
Any assessment of the Court’s participation endeavour should indicate not only whether 
and the extent to which the Court is meeting its mandate, but should also identify those 
areas in respect of which there is any restorative shortfall, together with the reason(s) for 
that shortfall, thereby enabling the Court to assess and attend to specific areas of its 
practice with the targeted allocation of resources. Without wishing to pre-empt the results 
of the assessment, a number of areas where the specific and targeted application of 
resources might be applied are indicated in the chapter, providing concrete, albeit 
hypothetical examples of how the findings of the assessment might be used to enhance the 
prospect for effective and meaningful participation for victims. The examples given are  
illustrative of the type of adjustment or refocusing that might be considered in the light of 
assessment findings, and are not intended to be construed as in any way exhaustive.  
 
The assessment process therefore encompasses two discrete aspects - the exploration of 
the extent to which the remit has been met (including any specific areas of shortfall), and 
the consideration and identification of the reasons for any shortfall. As discrete aspects of 
the assessment process, and for the purpose of examining their respective components 
below, these aspects are considered separately in this chapter, and are described as Phase I 
and Phase II of the assessment respectively. Notably, however, the two assessment Phases 
will run concurrently in practice, and will be reflected in the combined elements of a 
single assessment tool.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the appropriate form and nature of Phase I of the 
assessment, before going on to consider how evidence might be gathered in practice for 
the purpose of Phase I evaluation within the specific context of the ICC. To this end, the 
features of an appropriate assessment model are identified and specific parameters for 
incorporation in to the assessment tool are indicated. 
 
For the purpose of Phase II of the assessment, the chapter goes on to consider specific 
variables which have the potential to impact upon the ability of the victim to experience 
participation as effective and meaningful, thereby seeking to respond to the question of 
why some victims experience judicial engagement positively while others do not. Gaps in 
current knowledge in this regard are identified, and a number of alternative variables with 
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the potential to affect victims’ experiences of participation are explored. Notably, these 
alternative potential variables also introduce challenges in terms of data collection, and 
the chapter therefore includes practical recommendations in respect of those variables, 
including the need for cross-Court engagement with the assessment process.  
 
The chapter goes on to consider some additional, broader issues which relate to 
assessment in the specific context, including the need for interdisciplinary development of 
the assessment tool and the production of defined terminology.  
The proposed assessment framework for Phase I is illustrated diagrammatically at 3.2.3. 
(figure 3.1) and the various stages within the proposed assessment process indicated and 
numbered. Notably, the same stages are replicated in the diagrammatic representation of 
the proposed framework for a combined Phase I and Phase II assessment process, at 3.5 
(figure 3.2). Throughout this chapter, reference is made to the various stages in the 
process in order to indicate the position of the particular assessment aspect under 
consideration within the broader assessment framework. 
 
3.2 Developing the framework for Phase I assessment 
3.2.1 The nature and form of Phase I assessment 
 
The aim of Phase I of the assessment is to examine whether and in what respects the Court 
is providing effective and meaningful participation with particular reference to the 
achievement of a restorative sense of justice in participating victims.  
 
While such an assessment has not been conducted to date, either at the ICC or within the 
context of any other international criminal justice mechanism, the basic process and 
approach to the assessment is relatively straightforward, and utilises what we already 
know about victims engaging with international tribunals.  
 
In particular, evidence indicates that victims of international crimes have high hopes that 
they will achieve both procedural and substantive justice through their engagement with 
international transitional justice mechanisms,
501
 and thanks to the study of victims’ 
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aspirations in approaching international criminal justice tribunals, examined in the 
previous chapter, we know what substantive justice for victims of international crimes 
comprises.
502
 As already indicated,
503
 it is reasonable to assume that the realisation of 
some or all of victims’ justice aims will provide them with a sense of justice. Moreover, 
the realisation of victims’ aims is likely to produce a psychological impact in the victim in 
the form of a subjective degree of satisfaction in relation to the specific parameter, or 
articulated justice aim, in question. The extent to which a sense of justice has been 
achieved in victims of international crimes can therefore be measured by an evaluation of 
the degree of victims’ satisfaction in relation to the realisation of justice goals in 
approaching an international criminal tribunal.  
 
Having identified the nature of Phase I assessment, it is appropriate to examine how 
assessment might be approached and evidence gathered in practice within the specific 
context of the ICC. 
3.2.2. Phase I: approach to assessment and gathering the evidence 
While there is no assessment tool for the evaluation of victims’ perceptions of substantive 
justice in the context of their engagement with international criminal justice tribunals, 
there has been one attempt to evaluate and quantify victims’ sense of justice within the 
broader context of international transitional justice. As indicated in the previous 
chapter,
504
 the study in question was conducted by David Backer, and concerned an 
evaluation of the experiences and views of over 400 victims of the South African 
apartheid regime of engaging with the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.505 
Although the study relates to a markedly different context to that of the ICC, as the only 
study to date which seeks to assess the subjective perceptions and experiences of victims 
of international crimes from a sense of justice perspective, the study, and in particular, 
Backer’s approach to assessment, warrants further attention here.  
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Notably, in seeking to ascertain and quantify the views of apartheid victims, Backer 
employs a victims’ survey which adopts, as its framework, eight individual components, 
or “dimensions” of justice: acknowledgment, voice, truth, accountability, apology, 
punishment, reparation and systemic change.
506
 These justice dimensions were identified 
in turn through the course of Backer’s research, and while they were not specifically 
sought and obtained from the victims participating in the study, they were subsequently 
validated with victim groups prior to the evaluation.
507
  
Backer then assesses the extent to which victims felt that each individual justice 
dimensions had been successfully realised by their engagement with the Truth 
Commission. To this end, victims indicated their satisfaction in relation to each dimension 
on a five-point Likert Scale, whereby a lower score correlates to a lower sense of justice 
in respect of the particular justice dimension, while a higher score indicates a greater 
sense that justice in respect of the particular dimension has been achieved.  
Having obtained victims’ scores in respect of the various justice dimensions, Backer then 
produces an average score for each dimension. The average scores of all of the justice 
dimensions are then combined and averaged, producing an aggregate “justice index” for 
the TRC.
508
 
Notably, the model developed and employed by Backer in his study is not directly 
transferable to the ICC context for a number of reasons. In particular, the notion of 
victims’ justice adopted in the study, including the specific identified parameters of that 
notion, was not aligned to any justice model, restorative or otherwise,
509
 and as such, 
cannot be assumed to correlate to the restorative justice goals of victims approaching the 
International Criminal Court.
510
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Moreover, the institution under consideration in Backer’s study had tangibly different 
aims and objects to that of a criminal justice mechanism, and the model employed reflects 
the broader, societal aspects of justice which the Commission was intended to address. 
Finally, it should be noted that the approach taken by Backer is not itself without its 
shortcomings, and before a similar approach could be deployed at the ICC, adjustments 
and refinements to the assessment approach would certainly be required. 
As an approach which is shown to be functional with the victim community, is relatively 
straightforward and capable of producing meaningful and readily-understandable data, 
however, the model has much to recommend it, and while it cannot be directly transferred 
to the ICC, its unique position as a tool for evaluating perceptions of substantive justice in 
survivors of international crimes means that it provides a useful basis upon which to 
consider the constituent features of an assessment tool that is appropriate to the specific 
forum of the Court.    
With this in mind, and with a view to identifying the features of an assessment tool 
appropriate for application both with the victim participant community and within the 
specific context of the ICC, this sections goes on to examine (i) appropriate assessment 
parameters against which to measure victim participants’ justice perceptions, (ii) how data 
might be collected, (iii) how to accommodate the need to correlate justice goals with 
victim outcomes, and (iv) an appropriate approach to the analysis, quantification and 
presentation of findings. Examination is conducted here by particular reference to 
Backer’s assessment model. Notably, while Backer’s study was relatively substantial in 
terms of participants, the number of victims engaging with the ICC is significantly higher. 
As a result, and with a view to rendering assessment functional in practice, proposal are 
made in respect of (v) operating assessment with a substantial research population. The 
issue of the proposed timing for assessment at the ICC is considered at (vi), and 
consideration of the need for a longitudinal assessment is contained in (vii). Reference is 
made throughout this section to the various stages of assessment indicated in figures 3.1 
and 3.2.
511
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(i) The adoption of appropriate assessment parameters 
 
As indicated, assessment will necessarily be conducted in relation to the specific 
parameters of a sense of justice in victims of international crimes.
512
  
 
Restorative justice parameters are identified in the previous chapter in relation to the 
consideration of the constituent elements of a restorative sense of justice in victims of 
international crimes, and these constituent elements also provide the basis for the 
identification of parameters for the purpose of a dedicated assessment tool. Evaluation is 
therefore required in respect of the following parameters (reframed here with a view to 
their inclusion in a dedicated assessment tool): 
- The extent to which victims are satisfied that they have been able to tell their story; 
- The extent to which victims are satisfied that they have been able to contribute to 
public knowledge about the abuses that occurred; 
- The extent to which victims are satisfied that they have been able to publically 
denounce the wrongs committed against them and others; 
- The extent to which victims are satisfied that they have been able to confront the 
accused;  
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that there has been public acknowledgment 
and recognition of the crimes committed; 
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that there has been public moral 
denunciation of the crimes committed (validation); 
- The extent to which victims are satisfied that there has been public acknowledgment 
and recognition of the pain suffered; 
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that they have been able to pursue or 
achieve justice for loved ones and to bear witness on behalf of those who did not 
survive;  
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- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that they have discovered the truth about 
the fate of loved ones; 
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that their participation has contributed to 
the prevention of further abuse;  
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that their participation has contributed to 
broader peace goals;  
- The extent to which victims are satisfied with reparations (including the receipt of an 
apology); and 
 
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that their participation has in some way 
eased their psychological pain. 
 
 (ii) How to collect the data: a victim survey and Likert scale? 
Assessment is therefore proposed in respect of the attitudes and perceptions of 
participating victims in relation to their justice goals in approaching the ICC and their 
personal evaluations in respect of the achievement or otherwise of those goals. Recourse 
to psychological approaches to the assessment of attitudes is therefore appropriate. In 
identifying an apposite data collection approach, particular reference is also had to the 
need of the resulting assessment tool to be responsive to a potentially substantial research 
population and the suitability of any method for application with victims of international 
crimes. 
Within psychological research, self-report methods (by which participants are asked to 
report upon themselves) include questionnaires, psychological or attitude scales and 
interviews.
513
 There are distinct advantages and disadvantages to each method, and 
particular thought is given to these in the identification of an appropriate method for the 
current proposed assessment project. 
The use of questionnaires enables the collection of data from a substantial research 
population, and provides a means of assessing and quantifying a relatively new area, 
including the frequency of a particular phenomenon such as the varying justice goals of 
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victims approaching the ICC.
514
 Questionnaires also enable researchers to identify 
attitudes and opinions in the research population, and to gain an insight into people’s 
motivations and reasons for acting in a certain way.
515
 They provide a relatively cost-
efficient and resource-sensitive means of data collection,
516
 and because they employ 
ostensibly closed questions, they are less arduous to complete for research participants,
517
 
less susceptible to subjective interpretative error on the part of the researcher relative to 
interviews, and are readily amenable to statistical analysis.
518
 
Questionnaires alone, however, may not enable the researcher to look at an issue in depth. 
Greater sensitivity to the research population can be achieved through the use of attitude 
scales, such as the Likert scale, by which respondents are able to indicate the degree  to 
which a certain opinion is held, or the extent to which they agree or disagree with any 
given statement.
519
 According to Hayes, consideration of combined responses to a Likert-
type scale assessment enables researchers “to obtain a measure of attitude which is often 
quite thorough”.520 In addition, while questionnaires are less susceptible to problems of 
social desirability bias than interviews, they remain susceptible to some level of response 
bias, and thus require careful design and planning.
521
 Moreover, there is a risk of 
“questionnaire fallacy”, by which researchers assume that the finite list of choices 
presented to the research participant within, say, a tick-box exercise, represents the full 
picture or range of options, with the result that they may fail to elicit data which properly 
represents the true experiences, motivations or attitudes of those engaged in the study.
522
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As a result, particular efforts are required to fully validate the instrument with selected 
groups of the intended research population, through, for example, the conduct of focus 
groups and piloting, prior to the finalisation and full administration of the questionnaire. 
The conduct of interviews, on the other hand, enables researchers to elicit potentially 
broader information beyond the specific scope of any questionnaire and which may be 
more reflective of the individual’s position. Even when an interview is structured around 
the completion of a questionnaire, it enables the researcher to clarify any questions for the 
participant where necessary, react to any additional information that the participant 
provides that is of potential relevance to the research itself, and to ensure that the 
questionnaire is completed as required.
523
 The reliability of data generated within the 
interview may, however, be affected by the interpersonal dimensions and dynamics of the 
interview itself, including the levels of trust/mistrust between the research participant and 
the interviewer, and participants may find the completion of anonymous questionnaires a 
less threatening experience. Moreover, problems of social desirability bias are heightened 
relative to the conduct of questionnaires, while interviews are relatively time-consuming 
and resource-heavy to carry out, potentially limiting the size of the intended research 
population and hence the extent to which the findings are representative of the victim 
participant community as a whole.  
In light of the need for the intended assessment tool to be both responsive to a substantial 
research population and efficient in terms of cost and resources, the adoption of a 
questionnaire/survey, which in turn incorporates an attitude scale, is favoured in this 
instance.  
Although the process is used within a different context to the ICC, Backer’s employment 
of a five-point Likert scale victim survey has much to recommend it to an assessment of 
participating victims’ justice perceptions at the ICC. The use of a Likert scale is common 
in psychological research,
524
 including that involving victims of international crimes who 
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are engaging with a criminal justice tribunal.
525
 Significantly, the assessment approach is 
already familiar to staff at the International Criminal Court, since the study undertaken by 
researchers from Berkeley University into witnesses’ experiences of the processes and 
services of the Court similarly employs a five-point Likert Scale survey.  Further, the 
Berkeley, Backer and Horn studies all indicated that it is an effective means of assessing 
the views of victims of international crimes.   
Finally, as a simple and straightforward means of assessment, the approach can be 
understood by both victims and those engaged in the physical collection of the 
information required, whilst providing clear and relevant information to the Court and 
States Parties.  
As indicated above, however, the approach is not without its shortfalls. The problem of 
questionnaire fallacy can be reduced through the prior exploration with groups of 
participating victims of justice parameters contained in the instrument, in order to ensure 
that the list is complete (validation),
526
 discussed further below, at para. 3.6.1.(iii). The 
issue of social desirability bias is also considered further, at para. 3.6.3.  
In addition, the adoption of a questionnaire or survey as a data collection technique 
presupposes capacity in the victim to understand and complete the instrument with no or 
little assistance. Participating victims will, of course, approach the Court with varying 
levels of education and degrees of literacy. Careful drafting, piloting and redrafting of the 
questions to be included in the survey can reduce these difficulties,
527
 but will inevitably 
increase the lead-in time prior to the full administration of the instrument, discussed below 
at para. 3.6.1.(iii).  Particular care is also required in this regard in order to ensure that any 
measure employed in the intended attitude scale is meaningful within the cultural 
population, a factor that is considered in more detail below, at para. 3.6.1.(iii). It is, 
however, feasible that full administration of the questionnaire will require the presence of 
an interviewer (such that the tool is effectively completed as an oral questionnaire within 
the context of a structured or semi-structured interview) or otherwise require additional 
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input through, for example, engagement with intermediaries involved in assisting in the 
completion of participation applications, or, for example, through interaction with relief 
agency staff operational within the affected area.
528
 Such a position is likely to become 
apparent on piloting the instrument, and may impact upon the size of the research 
population under investigation. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that there is some debate in the literature as to whether 
attitudes can be quantified or whether qualitative approaches to psychological research are 
solely appropriate to evaluation of human experience. It is beyond the scope of this 
research to engage in depth with this debate.
529
 It should be noted, however, that while the 
approach adopted here is quantitative in nature, its content is informed by prior qualitative 
study, and it is envisaged, through the process of validation and piloting, that the content 
of the instrument will be refined to best reflect the victim participant experience as far as 
possible through a more limited qualitative approach. Moreover, it is likely that the 
findings of the research may themselves give rise to further and more in-depth qualitative 
study. 
Any additional limitations of the proposed assessment tool are considered broadly below 
at para.3.6.3.   
The identified assessment approach is indicated in figures 3.1 and 3.2 at Stages 2 and 3. 
(iii) Correlating individual aims to outcomes 
As an unavoidable consequence of the retrospective nature of Backer’s study, the survey 
does not include an initial assessment of victims’ justice goals in approaching the Truth 
Commission, and as a result, there is no prospect for any subsequent correlation of 
victims’ psychological outcomes to the realisation or otherwise of specific justice goals. 
In order to respond to this problem in the specific context of the ICC project, the 
assessment of victims’ justice perceptions at the ICC would require a modification to 
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Backer’s model to include an additional data collection stage involving the ascertainment 
of participants’ specific justice aims in approaching the Court, [Stage 2]. This would 
ideally take place at an early stage of victims’ participation, and data could be gathered by 
reference to a checklist of possible justice goals, indicated in (a), above, and might be 
sought either via the Court’s application form for participation or during the early stages 
of communication with the victim’s legal representative. Subsequent assessment in 
respect of the achievement of the various elements of a restorative sense of justice could 
then be confined to the specific aims identified by the victim during the initial stages of 
their participation, [Stage 3]. 
(iv) Analysing, quantifying and presenting findings: a Victims’ Justice Index 
for the ICC? 
The development of justice scores as indicators of the degree of participants’ satisfaction 
in respect of the various individual justice parameters would provide clear, unambiguous 
and readily-comprehensible data in relation not only to the achievement or otherwise of 
the Court’s restorative mandate, but the various respects in which there is any restorative 
shortfall. Such an approach would therefore be consistent with, and appropriate to, the 
proposed assessment of victims’ justice perceptions at the ICC. With this in mind, it is 
necessary to consider how a “Victims’ Justice Index” might be approached and produced 
in the specific context. (Stages 4 and 5) 
Again, the approach adopted by Backer provides the basis for this consideration.  Specific 
modifications to Backer’s model are proposed to respond to the differing assessment 
contexts and in light of the features of an ICC assessment model indicated so far. 
Refinements are also suggested to accommodate specific findings emanating from clinical 
research relating to victims’ justice aims for judicial engagement, as well as to enhance 
the potential for accuracy in the assessment results. 
Notably, in the absence of identified initial justice aims in victims, Backer proceeds on the 
basis that each of the justice dimensions identified in the survey applies to all of the 
victims. This assumption is not, however, borne out by psychological research into the 
justice goals of victims of international crimes. Stepakoff, for example, in her examination 
of the justice needs of victims appearing before the SCSL, notes that while about three-
180 
 
quarters of respondents approached the Court with more than one justice aim, the majority 
of victims had only between two and four aims in total.
530
  
A failure to accommodate this factor in the ICC assessment may skew the findings, such 
that any resulting justice score might not necessarily reflect the justice perceptions of 
participating victims. Where, for example, a victim felt that the Court had failed to realise 
a particular justice dimension, if the dimension in question did not reflect a need of the 
individual concerned, its non-achievement, it is suggested, would have little or no bearing 
on the victim’s perception of the achievement or otherwise of a sense of justice in relation 
to the Court more broadly. As a result, and as indicated above, evaluation of participation 
experiences in the context of the ICC should be conducted only in relation to those justice 
aims expressly identified by victim participants as their motivation for engagement with 
the Court. A justice score in respect of the individual justice parameter can therefore be 
achieved by the production of a simple average, wherein the composite score for a 
specific parameter is divided by the number of participants for whom that parameter 
comprised a justice need. 
While confining assessment to those justice aims specifically identified by victims 
provides an efficient and more reliable means of evaluating the achievement of a sense of 
justice in participants, however, it also impacts upon the subsequent production of an 
aggregate justice index for the Court.  
Notably, Backer proposes the establishment of an aggregate justice index by a simple 
averaging of the scores in the case of each justice dimension. Given his approach, the 
group size of victims responding to the assessment in respect of each justice dimension is 
equal, and hence a simple averaging approach is not problematic. Where, however, 
assessment has been sought only in relation to those justice aims identified by the victim 
during the initial data collection stage, it is highly likely that the resulting scores in respect 
of the various justice parameters will represent varying numbers of victim participants, 
with the possibility that a substantial number of participants are represented by some 
parameters, while relatively few are represented by another. In such a case, the production 
of an aggregate “Victims’ Justice Index” for the Court by simply averaging the various 
scores is inappropriate, since it would fail to reflect the varying group sizes as between the 
parameters. In order for the resulting victims’ justice index to more accurately reflect the 
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experiences and views of participants, it is therefore appropriate to apply weighting to the 
various scores prior to the production of an aggregate average. This, in turn, can be done 
by multiplying each score by the proportion of participants, as a fraction of the study 
sample, in respect of whom the parameter constituted a justice need. An aggregate 
Victims Justice Index can then be produced by adding the resulting weighted scores for 
each parameter. 
In addition to the assumption that all dimensions apply to all victims, in assessing victims’ 
perceptions of their achievement of justice before the TRC, Backer apportions equal 
weight to each of the justice dimensions. It is likely, however, that within the range of 
justice aims identified by a victim, some are more pressing or important to the participant 
than others, with the result that, while the non-realisation of some aims may be no more 
than a disappointment to the victim, producing a limited effect on the overall achievement 
of a sense of justice, a failure to achieve others may be catastrophic for any perception in 
the victim of justice having been done. Notably, while the weighting of scores to better 
reflect the respondent base in relation to specific parameters, discussed above, is relatively 
straight forward, the introduction of further weighting to reflect justice priorities is more 
complicated, and practical development of the assessment tool in this regard will require 
the input of a statistician to inform the appropriate approach. It is likely, at least, however, 
that during the initial data collection stage victims will need to indicate, where possible, 
any justice priorities amongst the identified aims, or to rate their aims. These priorities 
could then form the basis of weighting, thereby improving the ability of the resulting 
scores to accurately represent victims’ justice perceptions.   
(v) Operating an assessment with a substantial research population 
It should be acknowledged that in light of the very substantial number of victims 
participating in proceedings before the ICC, a full assessment of all participants is 
unlikely to be feasible. Recourse to sampling would therefore be appropriate. The sample 
must, of course, be carefully constructed in order to maximise the applicability of the 
assessment findings to the victim participant population as a whole. In order to ensure that 
the sample is as representative as possible, a cross-sectional, random approach would be 
appropriate. Moreover, greater transferability of findings might be ensured by the prior 
breakdown of the victim participant community by the demographics of the population, 
and potential subjects randomly identified from within those strata, [Stage 1]. 
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Notably, the use of a sample also introduces the possibility for sampling error, due to 
possible random differences between the selected sample and the victim participant 
population more broadly, although the scale of this error can be minimised by ensuring 
that the sample used is itself substantial. To this end, a sample of at least 1,000 victim 
participants would, it is suggested, be appropriate in the first instance,
531
 although notably, 
a rolling recruitment to the study would be ideal in terms of ensuring adequate victim 
participant representation within the study sample in respect of the various cases before 
the Court, as well as to enable year-on-year review, considered below. Sampling may 
also, however, introduce the potential for systematic error, where, for example, response 
rates in participants vary and the sample becomes, to some extent, self-selecting. It may 
be, for example, that participants with certain types of justice needs are more inclined to 
respond to an approach to become engaged in the assessment. Where it is not possible to 
establish whether there is or is not a relevant difference between participants who chose to 
engage with the assessment and those who do not, and where any active encouragement of 
greater engagement proves unsuccessful, this systematic error must be formally 
acknowledged as a limitation to the interpretation of assessment findings 
(vi) Timing of Assessment 
The timing of the assessment of victims’ justice experiences in relation to their initial 
justice aims and the production of parameter-specific scores [Stages 3 and 4] determines 
the point at which information becomes available to the Court concerning its progress in 
the realisation of its victims’ mandate, and hence dictates when it is in a position to make 
adjustments and refinements to its victim-focussed actions. There are three options in this 
regard: (1) assessment is directly allied to the specific case in which participating victims 
are engaged, and occurs at an appropriate stage of the case; (2) assessment is conducted 
on a rolling basis, and specific evaluation in relation to initial justice aims occurs at a 
regular, predetermined time; and (3) a combination of (1) and (2). These options are 
considered further below.  
Option 1: In terms of the physical assessment process itself, allying assessment to a 
specific case has its advantages, and is relatively straightforward. Recruitment to the 
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assessment would ideally take place when or soon after victims have been granted 
participant status, and their specific justice hopes identified at that stage, [Stages 1 and 2]. 
Assessment of victims’ experiences in relation to those justice aims [Stage 3] would then 
naturally arise at the close of trial proceedings, and follow-up could be conducted, for 
example, when the Chamber has reached a decision concerning the guilt or innocence of 
the accused, in the aftermath of any reparations award and/or after a predetermined 
period, in order to assess the extent to which any restorative benefit allied to participation 
has been affected by outcomes of the trial, or has otherwise endured as time has passed.
532
 
The Victims’ Justice Index would therefore relate to the experiences of victims 
participating in the specific case, and would provide a clear indication of whether victims 
in that case had achieved a sense of justice.  
The approach is not without its problems however. In particular, while the approach 
described above would give a clear indication of the realisation or otherwise of restorative 
justice elements for victims, it will be a long time from the point at which participant 
status is granted before meaningful results are obtained, and for those victims involved in 
the case, at least, any adjustments made by the Court to its victim-focussed actions and 
services may be too late to significantly affect or improve their own prospects of 
achieving effective and meaningful participation. Moreover, there is a danger that areas of 
restorative shortfall may be case-specific, and so the transferability of assessment findings 
to other cases before the Court may be limited. While, therefore, a case-by-case approach 
will enable the production of a clear and meaningful Victims’ Justice Index in respect of 
the case in question, the approach also limits the potential of the Court to monitor and 
revise its approach to victim engagement on an ongoing basis for the specific benefit of 
the victims participating in the case itself.  
Option 2: In contrast, an assessment approach that involves regular evaluation of victims’ 
justice experiences has the potential to provide data to the Court on its progress in respect 
of its restorative mandate, and hence enable a timely and responsive ongoing review of 
actions relating to victim engagement. Recruitment and initial data collection [Stages 1 
and 2] would occur in the same way as in option 1, but the evaluation of victims’ 
perceptions of justice [Stage 3] would occur instead on a cyclical basis, such as annually. 
Ongoing assessment will better enable an evaluation of the participative journey itself, 
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and enhance the ability of the Court to understand the restorative “ups and downs” of 
participants within that journey. Moreover, ongoing assessment of this form will provide 
an indication of how and at what stages of a case restorative goals might be achieved, as 
well as revealing what, for the participant, remains outstanding in terms of their 
restorative ambitions for the Court. Finally, given the length of trials before the ICC, 
annual assessment will enable consideration of the extent to which victims’ perceptions in 
respect of specific justice parameters change throughout their participative journey. 
Again, however, the approach is not without its problems. In particular, participating 
victims will be at varying stages of their participative journeys, depending upon the cases 
in which they are engaged, and in many cases, the opportunity to realise certain restorative 
goals, such as testimony or reparations, may simply not have arisen at the point of 
assessment. Moreover, while annual assessment would enable the production of a year-
on-year Victims Justice Index, the Index itself may become less meaningful where the 
participative journey for the victim is not itself complete.   
As a result, and as means of responding both to the various advantages and shortfalls in 
the two approaches described above, a combination of options (1) and (2) is proposed for 
the purpose of assessing victims’ justice perceptions at the ICC. Under a combined 
approach, Stages 1 and 2 of the assessment would be conducted as indicated above for 
options 1 and 2. Annual assessment in respect of the justice parameters identified in Stage 
2 would be conducted, ostensibly for internal reference and use [Stages 3 and 4 (prior to 
the application of weighting)], as a means of discerning progress in respect of the 
innovative mandate, enabling the responsive adoption of refinements and adjustments to 
victim-focussed actions during the participative journey, and a formal assessment [Stage 
3] and production of a Victims’ Justice Index [Stages 4 and 5] produced on a case-by-case 
basis at the close of trial proceedings (and subject to follow-up).  
(vii) Temporal scope: assessing enduring impact 
 
Finally, it should be noted that external factors beyond the control of the Court may affect 
the ability of the victim to achieve effective and meaningful participation,
533
 and those 
external factors may continue beyond the victim’s participation experience. In addition, it 
is certainly feasible that any positive psychological impact in the victim may be mediated 
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by subsequent outcome measures of the judicial proceedings, including the judgment of 
the Court in relation to the Defendant’s responsibility for the crimes charged, or the award 
of any reparative measures. In order to consider the extent to which, if at all, any 
restorative sense of justice in the victim endures beyond the participatory experience, a 
longitudinal approach to the assessment is therefore appropriate. 
 
At a practical level, however, post-participation follow-up in the context of the ICC may 
be problematic in some instances. Security concerns for the victim may prevent 
researchers or Court officials from approaching them, and where participants live in 
unsafe areas, travel to them may not be possible. In their survey of the testimony 
experiences of 109 witnesses appearing before the ICC, both Berkeley researchers and 
Victims and Witnesses Unit (“VWU”) staff reported that, in some cases, individuals had 
changed their contact details without notifying the Court,
534
 had no ‘phone or simply 
could not be reached by road, while witnesses who lived a considerable distance from 
urban centres were not contacted for any follow-up survey, either because travel to meet 
researchers in urban centres was deemed to be too arduous for the individual, or because 
of resources were limited.
535
  
 
Inevitably, therefore, the number of victims responding to a follow-up survey will be 
fewer than those engaging with the initial assessment, and given the potential exclusion of 
participants living in unsafe areas or those beyond urban centres, the follow-up sample 
may not be truly representative. Despite the potential limitations of a follow-up survey of 
victims, however, a longitudinal approach remains important to any thorough and 
complete assessment of the participation experience and the achievement of a restorative 
sense of justice for victims. 
3.2.3. Summary of process and some concluding thoughts on Phase I assessment 
Adaption of Backer’s assessment model to reflect the differing legal fora of operation, to 
incorporate additional knowledge available from the clinical field and to better enhance 
accuracy and reliability of assessment findings provides a clear framework for the 
assessment of the achievement or otherwise of a restorative sense of justice in victims 
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participating in proceedings before the ICC. In particular, the assessment approach is 
shown both to be effective with substantive research populations and applicable to victims 
of international crimes, including those of mass victimisation. The proposed assessment 
method is indicated diagrammatically below. 
The proposed approach to Phase I of the assessment of victims’ justice perceptions at the 
ICC, and in particular, of the extent to which participants have been able to achieve a 
sense of justice by virtue of their engagement with the Court, will provide a clear 
indication, through cyclical evaluation and the generation of a case-by-case Victims’ 
Justice Index, of the Court’s progress in the pursuit of its innovative mandate. Moreover, 
the production of specific justice scores in respect of each justice parameter will provide 
tangible markers of any specific areas either of best practice or restorative shortfall.  
Notably, however, the integration of a restorative function within the statutory framework 
of the Court, it is argued, requires the Court to do more than simply observe the various 
respects in which its current practice does or does not fulfil its remit in respect of victims. 
Instead, in order to render the provisions operational in practice the Court must work 
proactively towards the achievement of its innovative mandate. This in turn will require 
an understanding not only of any particular areas of restorative shortfall indicated by 
virtue of Phase I of the assessment process, but also an appreciation of the reason(s) for 
that shortfall. This will thereby enable specific, targeted and evidence-based adjustments 
to the Court’s victim-focussed actions,536 and so ensuring the most cost-efficient approach 
to the achievement of its innovative remit whilst simultaneously operating in the best 
interests of participating victims. A number of illustrative examples of areas where such 
adjustments might be made (subject to assessment findings) are included below. 
With this need in mind, the aim of Phase II of the assessment is to examine and identify 
the reason(s) for any failure in the achievement of a sense of justice in participating 
victims. 
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Figure 3.1: Phase I assessment  
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3.3 Phase II of the assessment: Considering factors with the potential to affect realisation 
of the Court’s restorative mandate  
3.3.1. Introduction 
As already noted,
537
 we know relatively little about why some victims are able to achieve 
some form of positive psychological benefit from their engagement with a judicial 
mechanism while others are not. There are, however, a number of variables, including 
those which are specific to the ICC, which may have the potential to negatively affect the 
ability of victim participants to achieve positively restorative participation. An 
examination of victims’ experiences of these variables with particular reference to any 
areas of restorative shortfall indicated in Phase I of the assessment will provide a means of 
identifying those factors responsible for, or contributory to, any shortfalls in the 
achievement of effective and meaningful participation, thereby providing an opportunity 
not only for the Court to understand the reasons for any failure in respect of its victims’ 
mandate and to adjust or revise its processes or practices accordingly, but also, at a 
broader level, to address a considerable knowledge gap in international transitional justice 
literature.  
With this in mind, this section seeks to examine a range of variables which may 
negatively affect the achievement of effective and meaningful victim participation, and in 
respect of which data collection and analysis is required for the purpose of Phase II of the 
assessment process. The section begins with a brief consideration of the current state of 
knowledge in respect of factors affecting victims’ experiences of judicial engagement, 
indicating the scale of the current knowledge gap in this area. A combined Phase I and 
Phase II proposed assessment process is represented diagrammatically below, at 3.5 
(figure 3.2) and reference is made in this section to the various assessment stages 
indicated therein as a means of positioning the variable within the broader assessment 
framework.. 
3.3.2. The current state of knowledge 
While legal literature contains a number of assumptions concerning factors with the 
potential to affect victims’ achievement of positive engagement with the judicial 
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mechanism in question,
538
 there has been very little empirical investigations and 
verification of those assumptions in the literature,
539
 and there is no reference to findings 
emanating from other disciplines to support them, indicating a gap in legal knowledge in 
this regard.  
Significantly, however, the issue has been the subject of some, albeit limited, clinical 
exploration within the specific context of international transitional justice, including in 
relation to international criminal justice mechanisms. Recourse to relevant clinical studies 
is therefore appropriate in this instance, providing an alternative means of addressing a 
knowledge gap, and of assessing the current state of knowledge in respect of variables 
with the potential to affect the achievement of a restorative sense of justice in victims 
participating in proceedings before the ICC.  
Notably, although clinical research in this area is still developing, a number of possible 
variables have been empirically assessed in relation to victims of international crimes, and 
several of those have been discounted as factors impacting upon positive engagement with 
the mechanisms concerned. Those factors considered to date, together with the outcomes 
of that consideration, are briefly outlined below: 
 
Both Kaminer and others, in their assessment of the impact on 134 victims of giving 
testimony to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and Brouneus, in 
her assessment of the experiences of 1,200 Rwandans of witnessing in the country’s 
gacacas, found that neither the age of the victim nor their religion had any bearing on 
their propensity to evaluate their justice experience as either a positive or negative one. A 
similar conclusion in respect of the victim’s age was reached by Horn and others, in a 
study of the testimony experiences of 171 witnesses appearing before the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.
540
 In addition, Brouneus, in assessing for levels of education and 
                                                          
538
 Including, for example, unrealisable goals for engagement and the need to manage victims’ 
expectations, discussed substantively below, at para 3.4.2. 
539
 With the exception of a gender variance, identified in Berkeley School of Law (n 15), within the 
specific context of procedural justice, and discussed further below, at para 3.4.6. 
540
 Horn and others (n 327) 146-7. Notably, the researchers do not indicate in what respect the 
witnesses might experience testimony as positive or negative, and while the researchers concerned 
are clinicians, the experiences are not described or otherwise presented in clinical, therapeutic 
terms.  
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economic expenditure as possible impacting factors, found no significant correlation in 
either case with the victim’s assessment of their testimony experience.541 The length of 
time spent by victims on the witness stand and the party for whom they appeared were 
also found not to influence the propensity of the victim to rate their experience either 
positively or negatively.
542
 
Notably, both the Kaminer and Brouneus studies found that the nature, extent or degree of 
abuse suffered by the victim had no subsequent impact on how they evaluated their 
experience of engagement.
543
 Moreover, the study conducted by Horn and others found 
that the extent to which victims found the experience of testifying to be a painful one did 
not significantly affect their appraisal of the testimony experience as being either positive 
or negative.
544
 
Significantly, researchers in the Kaminer study identified a differential in the way in 
which men and women victims evaluated their experiences of engagement with the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
545
 and a similar gender disparity was seen 
in the study conducted by Stepakoff and others into the testimony motivations of victims 
appearing before the SCSL.
546
 Gender as a potential affecting variable in the context of 
the ICC is therefore considered in further detail below in the specific context of 
assessment at the ICC.
547
 
In addition, researchers in the Horn study found that victims’ propensity to evaluate 
testimony positively or negatively was affected by the extent to which they felt respected 
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 Ibid. 
542
 Ibid, 146. 
543
 Kaminer and others (n 331) 375; Brouneus (The Trauma of Truth Telling) (n 31) 425 – 426. 
544
 “Painful” in this respect refers to an experience that was upsetting for the victim, and should be 
distinguished from an experience that was “traumatic”, the latter being clinically significant in 
terms of the victim’s psychological health. The distinction between painful and traumatic 
engagement is discussed further below, at para 3.4.7.(ii)(b) in the context of psychologically 
detrimental testimony.  
545
 Kaminer and others (n 331) 376. 
546
 Stepakoff and others (n 380) 19. 
547
 Para 3.4.6. 
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and supported by Court staff, as well as by the degree to which they felt they had been 
adequately prepared for testimony. Both of these elements comprise aspects of procedural 
justice, indicating some level of correlation and dependence between victims’ perceptions 
of a fair and respectful process and their achievement of a restorative sense of justice.  
The role of procedural justice as an enabling factor in the achievement of a restorative 
sense of justice in victims participating in proceedings before the Court is also considered 
in more detail below.
548
 It should be noted here, however, that while the study by Horn 
and others indicates that the achievement of procedural justice elements can affect a 
victim’s positive or negative evaluation of their restorative engagement with the Court in 
question, the impact was not a substantial one.
549
  
Perhaps of most significance to any consideration of why some victims experience 
judicial engagement positively while others do not, however, is the amount of the variance 
between victims’ self-assessed experiences which remains unaccounted for in empirical 
assessment to date. Notably, in the Horn study the authors employed ten potential 
affecting variables in their efforts to explain and account for the diverse and disparate 
range of experiences in the achievement or otherwise of psychologically positive 
engagement: gender, age, the party for whom the victim was appearing, the length of 
testimony, the extent to which the victim was worried about giving testimony prior to the 
event, the level of support given to the victim, the extent to which the victim found 
testimony to be a painful experience, the extent to which the victim felt respected by 
Court staff, the victim’s evaluation of their experience of examination-in-chief, and the 
victim’s evaluation of their experience of cross-examination.550 Significantly, the 
combined potential variables, including those elements of procedural justice identified 
above, were found to account for just 20% of the variance between victims.
551
 The study 
conducted by Horn and others therefore highlights in stark terms the scale of the current 
knowledge gap in this area. 
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 Para 3.4.8.(i). 
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 Horn and others (n 327) 146, and thereby highlighting the inadequacy of a purely procedural 
approach to the assessment of victims’ participation experiences. 
550
 Horn and others (n 327) 144 and throughout. 
551
 Horn and others (n 327) 146. 
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With this in mind, and in order that the Court is better able to understand and respond to 
the reasons for any shortfall in the achievement of its restorative mandate, it is necessary 
to consider alternative and additional variables which have the potential to affect the 
ability of victims to achieve effective and meaningful participation at the ICC.  
Notably, in order that any positive or negative psychological impact is correctly attributed 
to a potentially impacting variable, it is important that the range of variables employed in 
the assessment is complete, or at least, as complete as the assessment process and judicial 
context will allow. A wide range of variables for inclusion within the assessment 
framework are therefore explored in the following section. Potential variables include: 
(3.4.1.) the extent to which the failure to achieve non-restorative justice goals affects the 
achievement of a restorative sense of justice in victims, (3.4.2.) the degree to which 
victims’ justice expectations have been effectively managed by the Court, (3.4.3.) 
difficulties in the realisation of a sense of justice posed by both the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and (3.4.4.) the narrow, forensic focus of the Court, (3.4.5.) 
obstacles engendered by the substantive number of victims participating in proceedings 
before the Court, (3.4.6.) potential gender differentials, (3.4.7.) barriers which arise as a 
result of the psychological health and wellbeing of the participating victim and (3.4.8.) the 
context within which participation occurs for the victim, incorporating in turn both the 
specific context of the Court and the adequacy of its processes, as well as the broader, 
external context within which the participant lives.  
In a number of instances, the proposed potential variable is readily evident in available 
literature but remains subject to empirical validation and hence exists, at present, purely as 
an unproven hypothesis.
552
 Moreover, while there may be speculation in the literature that 
variables may operate to inhibit the achievement of psychologically positive engagement 
in the victim, the variable itself may be undeveloped in terms of how it might be evaluated 
in practice.
553
 In other cases, the variable in question may be beyond the control of, and 
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 Such as the need to manage victims’ expectations or the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
discussed below at paras 3.4.2. and 3.4.3. 
553
 Including, for example, assessment in respect of the forensic focus of the Court, at para 3.4.4. 
and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, at para 3.4.3. 
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external to, the Court, and thereby operate as a limiting factor in the achievement of 
restorative participation.
554
  
Specific gaps in knowledge are identified throughout the course of the following section, 
and areas in which the resulting instrument has the potential to contribute to the 
development of theory and practice are indicated, including in relation to the potential 
impact of the variable on Court practice and reform. Recommendations are made on how 
specific data in respect of potential variables might be gleaned in the particular context of 
the ICC. Finally, it should be noted that the inclusion of elements which relate to the 
psychological health of the victim participant evidences the need for an interdisciplinary 
approach to assessment.  
3.4 Considering alternative affecting variables 
3.4.1. A lack of justice in respect of non-restorative justice parameters 
 
While the nature and focus of victim-oriented action within the Court is naturally 
delimited by the provisions of the Court’s constituent documents, its restorative mandate 
and its processes, victims’ personal justice aims and expectations are not similarly 
constrained, and it is conceivable not only that some of the victims’ justice needs fall 
outside of the restorative ambit of the Court, but also that the non-realisation of these 
additional justice needs will impact upon victims’ perceptions of substantive justice 
through their engagement with the Court. These additional justice goals thereby comprise 
variables with the potential to affect the achievement of a restorative sense of justice in 
victim participants.  
 
With this in mind, and in order to better inform our understanding of why a sense of 
justice impact may have been achieved in some cases but not in others, the assessment 
tool should reflect the full range of victims’ justice goals, rather than only those which are 
consistent with restorative justice theory and the Court’s restorative mandate.555 In 
addition to assessment parameters identified for the purpose of Phase I assessment, 
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 Such as the external context of participation, at para 3.4.8.(ii). 
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 Backer did not do this in his study of victims’ justice experiences of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, which may explain some of the variance found in the study. 
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therefore,
556
 and by reference to the list of aims of victims in approaching an international 
criminal justice mechanism more broadly,
557
 the following parameters should be included 
in the assessment tool and victims’ aims in respect of them identified during the initial 
data collection stage, [Stage 2].  
 
- The extent to which victims are satisfied that they have achieved a form of revenge; 
and 
 
- The extent to which victims feel satisfied that their participation has contributed to 
the prosecution and/or punishment of the accused. 
 
A bivariate analysis of assessment outcomes [Stage 3] of those victims who both 
identified and failed to achieve a non-restorative justice goal and those for whom non-
restorative aims were not indicated will provide basic data on the possible impact of the 
non-realisation of non-restorative justice goals on the achievement of a restorative sense 
of justice in participating victims. 
3.4.2. Victims’ pursuit of unrealistic aims and the management of expectations 
It is reasonable to assume that the potential for effective and meaningful participation will 
be enhanced where the victim’s justice goals in approaching the ICC are reasonable, 
realistic and achievable in the specific context. The natural extension of this hypothesis is 
that the effective management of expectations by the Court will enhance the potential for 
positive, restorative engagement in accordance with the Court’s innovative victims’ 
mandate.  
 
Research in to the experiences of victims approaching international criminal justice 
mechanisms has found that the justice aims of victims may exceed the ambit of what the 
judicial institution in question is able to provide within its mandate, and study authors 
have cautioned the need for the Court concerned to proactively manage the expectations 
of victims seeking to engage with it.
558
 However, as already indicated, there is no research 
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 Para 3.2.2.(i). 
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 At para 2.3.1.(iii) and 2.4.3.(ii). 
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 See, for example, Kirchenbauer and others (n 15) 46; Berkeley School of Law (n 15) 5. 
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which seeks to correlate victims’ experiences of judicial engagement with their initial 
expectations in approaching the institution, and this is the case whether or not those initial 
expectations were realistic. As a result, the extent to which a victim’s unrealistic or 
unachievable justice expectations negatively affect or otherwise exacerbate any resulting 
shortfall in restorative impact is unknown, indicating a knowledge gap.  
 
Conversely, the extent to which any outreach activities of the Court aimed at the 
management and containment of victims’ justice expectations enhances the achievement 
of psychologically positive engagement is similarly unknown. Notably, while authors 
have indicated a need for victims’ justice aspirations to be contained within the ambit of 
what the Court in question is able to provide, studies to date of victims’ experiences have 
failed to consider their findings in the light of any practical attempt by the Court to 
manage victims’ expectations, or to otherwise consider the extent to which victims have 
been exposed to activities aimed at tempering overly-ambitious aims.
559
 As a result, while 
the hypothesis that the management of victims’ expectations will positively affect the 
ability of victims to achieve effective and meaningful participation seems a reasonable 
one, it has not been tested empirically, and as a result, the extent to which victims’ justice 
goals are susceptible to activities aimed at their management and limitation is unclear. 
Moreover, this limitation is replicated within broader transitional justice literature, thereby 
indicating a knowledge gap in the context of international criminal law in particular, and 
international transitional justice more generally. 
 
Within the specific context of the ICC, the potential for overly ambitious, unrealistic or 
unachievable expectations amongst participating victims, and the allied prospect for 
victims’ disappointment and disillusionment in light of the Court’s failure to realise those 
expectations, is manifest, and specific examples of this are discussed below.
560
 Ultimately, 
it is argued here, the problem of unrealistic and/or unachievable justice expectations in 
victims stems from the failure of the Court to expand upon the notion of restorative justice 
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 Including the extent to which charges reflect harm suffered and the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, para 3.4.3., limitations to the achievement of restorative goals posed by the Court’s 
forensic focus, para 3.4.4., and the extent to which individual goals, including testimony, are 
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3.4.5. 
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within the specific context, and as a result, it has come to mean all things to all people. In 
fact, it is feasible, at the very least, that in creating a distinct, victim-focused role for 
survivor participants, justice expectations amongst victims approaching the ICC are 
higher than those of victims when approaching a traditional, retributive mechanisms, 
thereby exacerbating the potential for victim disillusionment, and so rendering activities 
aimed at containing justice aspirations of particular significance.  
 
The first step in any effective management of expectations in participating victims 
approaching the ICC is, of course, to understand precisely what those expectations 
comprise, and this is the goal of Phase I of the proposed assessment tool. An appreciation 
of the nature and scale of unrealistic and/or unachievable justice goals within the victim 
participant community will therefore provide the focus for the Court’s Outreach Unit in 
the conduct of specific and targeted activities aimed at the management of victims’ 
aspirations, thereby enabling an effective and cost-efficient approach which 
simultaneously operates to the potential benefit of victim participants. At the same time, 
knowledge of victims’ goals of their engagement with the Court will enable the 
production of more specific web content (where victims have access) in terms of both 
what the Court hopes to achieve for victims and, crucially, what is beyond the scope of its 
operation, as well as informing and framing initial discussions between victims and their 
legal representatives, including at dedicated meetings convened by Common Legal 
Representatives. 
 
In addition, an understanding of the extent to which victims have been exposed to both 
formal and informal activities aimed at managing expectations will enable a basic 
assessment by the Court of the effectiveness of those activities in relation to the 
achievement of its restorative mandate, including an indication of the extent to which, and 
how, victims’ justice goals are susceptible to limitation in practice.561 
 
The assessment process should therefore seek to verify two specific hypotheses: (i) that 
activities aimed at the management of victims’ expectations will result in the articulation 
of more moderate justice goals; and (ii) that the management of expectations in victims 
improves prospects for positively restorative engagement. 
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With this in mind, the assessment process should explore with victims the extent to which 
they have been exposed to, and influenced by, formal or informal activities which seek to 
affect and contain their justice aspirations. Such activities might include victims’ 
attendance at any dedicated outreach meetings, any discussions or collective meetings 
held with their legal representative, members of their team or intermediaries, and any 
meetings with other Court personnel, including staff within the VPRS and VWU, 
concerning their justice hopes. Assessment should also encompass the extent to which 
victims have received, read and understood Court literature relating to the ambit of its 
restorative mandate, including any information contained on the Court’s website, where 
accessible to the victim.  
 
To this end, in addition to ascertaining participating victims’ justice aims in approaching 
the ICC at the initial data collection stage, information should simultaneously be sought, 
again through the structured interview and/or questionnaire, to assess victim participants’ 
exposure to identified activities aimed at the management of their justice aspirations, 
[Stage 2]. Prior liaison with the Court’s Outreach unit, together with representatives of the 
VPRS, VWU and the victims’ legal representatives, would enable the identification of 
specific examples of literature or activities aimed at containing victims’ justice goals, and 
participants’ exposure to these, including their understanding of the materials, thereby 
assessed by reference to ‘tick-box’ or ‘yes/no’ questions in relation to each activity or 
piece of literature. The degree of victims’ understanding of these can be assessed in turn 
by reference to a five-point Likert scale. Participating victims should also be asked to 
indicate whether and to what extent those activities led them to modify their justice 
aspirations, and again, this can be conducted by reference to a five-point Likert scale.
562
 
 
A simple bivariate analysis of the justice goals of victims who have been exposed to 
activities aimed at the containment of their aspirations and those of victims who have not 
will provide, at a basic level, an indication either of the extent to which the Court’s 
activities have been successful, or the degree to which justice aspirations in victims of 
                                                          
562
 Notably, it is beyond the scope of the proposed assessment tool to conduct a detailed evaluation 
of the Court’s attempts to manage victims’ justice aspirations, and the focus of the assessment 
remains the extent to which effective and meaningful participation has been achieved. Phase II of 
the assessment will, however, provide basic, preliminary guidance to the Court on the impact of its 
expectation-management activities, and may therefore supply the basis of further detailed and 
targeted assessment in this regard. 
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international crimes are amenable to limitation in practice, [Stage 2]. Moreover, an 
examination and comparison of subsequent justice experiences between the two groups 
will indicate the extent to which, if at all, the management of expectations operates as an 
affecting variable in the achievement of effective and meaningful participation at the ICC, 
[Stage 3]. 
 
3.4.3. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
 
While the investigative and prosecutorial remit of the ICC is theoretically broad, in 
practice, resource limitations, prosecutorial priorities and the availability of evidence 
mean that the number of cases brought will be relatively few, representing only a small 
proportion of crimes actually perpetrated. The exercise of Prosecutorial discretion in this 
regard will therefore necessarily affect not only the selected target of a prosecution but 
also the nature of charges brought. In addition, a number of offences, including, in 
particular, offences of sexual violence, are more challenging to establish evidentially, and 
remain under-represented within the practice of the Court.
563
 As a result, where charges 
are brought, they may not encompass the range or extent of abuses experienced by the 
participating victim, and hence cannot respond to and reflect victims’ justice needs in full, 
leading, potentially, to unfulfilled justice hopes and expectations in the victim.
564
 
Moreover, the resulting, “silencing” of victims in respect of aspects of their abuse, 
particularly in relation to acts of sexual violence, can prove frustrating and 
psychologically distressing, and hence may negate the achievement of any effective and 
meaningful participation. 
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The point is best exemplified by an empirical, multidisciplinary (legal/psychological) 
study conducted into the experiences of ten women who appeared before the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone to testify about their experiences of rape and other forms of sexual 
violence at the hands of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).
565
 In all cases, victim-witnesses 
were instructed by the presiding judges not to give evidence of sexual violence because 
such acts were not included in the indictment, but instead, to limit their testimony to non-
sexual forms of abuse. Where victim-witnesses spoke of rape during their testimony, their 
evidence was expunged from the Court record.  
 
Testimony was subsequently reported by the women to be a psychologically negative 
experience, and during post-trial interviews with researchers, the women allied their 
feelings of grave disappointment, dashed expectations, disillusionment and psychological 
distress to the failure of the Court to fully reflect the ambit of their abuse experiences and 
to furnish justice in respect of them.
566
 Notably, while the study is a small one, given that 
relatively few victims physically testify before international criminal justice mechanisms, 
the limited study sample is somewhat inevitable, and the study is otherwise robust. 
Significantly, a comparable problem arose in the context of the ICC in the case of 
Lubanga, indicating that the Court is not immune from similar difficulties. While the 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was characterised by the 
widespread and systematic perpetration of rape, and the use of rape by Lubanga’s Union 
des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) was reported and documented by the UN and NGOs 
alike,
567
 no charges of sexual violence were included in the indictment. Moreover, a 
subsequent attempt by victims’ legal representatives to introduce sexual violence charges, 
through a reclassification of the charges brought, was unsuccessful.
568
 In light of the 
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failure of the application to reclassify the charges, the Defence sought to challenge the 
ability of the judges of the Trial Chamber to interrogate witnesses in relation to evidence 
of harm which fell outside the specific remit of the charges brought.
569
 In the event, the 
Defence’s motion failed. In particular, the Trial Chamber noted that it was able to hear 
evidence during the trial that was of relevance to sentencing or reparations, as well as 
evidence relating to the context and background of the crimes charged, the latter 
including, potentially, allegations of criminality which was beyond the specific charges 
faced by the Defendant.
570
 In practice, however, and in the aftermath of the Defence’s 
motion, the Court was more circumscribed in permitting the introduction of evidence of 
sexual violence, and actively sought to prevent witnesses giving testimony of non-
charged, gender-based crimes.
571
  
In the event, there has been no assessment, psychological or otherwise, of the experiences 
of victim-witnesses affected by the Court’s approach in Lubanga, and as a result, its 
impact in psychological terms is unknown. Given the similarities between this case and 
the case before the SCSL, referred to above, however, it is certainly feasible that victims 
felt equally disappointed and disillusioned, to the obvious detriment of their ability to 
achieve effective and meaningful participation. Moreover, while the example relates to 
victims who were appearing as witnesses, rather than as participants, there is no reason to 
think that the exclusion of sexual violence charges and evidence would not affect all 
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at < http://www.redress.org/Legal_Update_March-April_2010_final.pdf> last accessed 23
rd
 March 
2015, at 2. 
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 Lubanga (Decision on Judicial Questioning) ICC-01/04-01/06-2360 (18 March 2010) [40]. 
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 Trial transcript, Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-276-Red-ENG, 72, lines 9 – 15, cited and 
discussed in Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, ‘Gender Report Card on the International 
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rd
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victims of sexual violence equally, regardless of the capacity within which they engage 
with the Court. 
The SCSL example also raises an important issue about the active generation or positive 
enforcement of justice expectations in the victims concerned. Victim-witnesses in that 
case had a positive expectation that they would be testifying before the Court about their 
experiences of sexual violence. Far from being managed or contained in any way, this 
expectation was actively enforced by the actions of the Prosecutor, who had explicitly 
stated his intent to lead evidence of sexual violence in the trial.
572
 The situation in the case 
of the ICC is less clear, and it may, of course, be that, in the absence of specific sexual 
violence charges in the indictment, victims did not expect to be able to give details of rape 
and other forms of gender-based abuse. It is clear, however, that many victims did seek to 
give evidence of sexual violence during their testimony in the Lubanga case, and that this 
led in turn to an attempt on the part of the victims’ legal representative to recharacterise 
the charges to reflect the sexual violence component. Moreover, this request was initially 
granted by the Trial Chamber, and hence, at that point at least, a positive and reasonable 
expectation in victims was surely created or actively enforced.  
This is not to suggest that attempts to introduce charges of sexual violence which better 
reflect the experiences of victims should be abandoned by the Court or legal 
representatives. Moreover, we do not know what was said during private consultations 
with victims in relation to the potential success of the application to recharacterise the 
charges. It does, however, highlight the need for the Court to be alert not only to the need 
to contain victims’ expectations, but to avoid raising expectations in the absence of any 
accompanying qualification or note of caution. 
Finally, it should be noted that the extent to which victims are able to separate their justice 
needs in terms of those that are before the Court (and hence to experience a sense of 
justice in relation to them) and those that are not is unclear, and the area requires further 
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 The Prosecution indicated in its supplemental pre-trial brief that it intended to introduce 
evidence of sexual violence under the existing counts of physical violence and mental suffering, 
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara and Kanu (Prosecution Supplemental Pre-trial Brief Pursuant to 
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enquiry. The findings of the Kelsall and Stepakoff study suggest, however, that victims’ 
testimony experience was over-shadowed by the Court’s failure to include all aspects of 
abuse within the charges brought.
573
  
 
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the issue of charge selection and, in particular, 
the extent to which charges reflect the abuse experiences of participating victims may, 
therefore, affect the achievement of a sense of justice in victims, and so should be 
considered as a potentially affecting variable for the purpose of Phase II assessment. To 
this end, victim participants should be asked during the initial Phase I data collection stage 
[Stage 2] whether they feel that the charges before the Court (where they have been 
brought) fully encompass their experiences of abuse in respect of the Defendant. Results 
of the Phase I assessment obtained by reference to the Likert scale [at Stage 3] can then be 
disaggregated by those victims whose experiences of abuse were fully encompassed by 
the judicial charges and those victims whose abuse(s) were not wholly encompassed by 
the case brought, and a bivariate analysis conducted in order to assess the extent to which 
charge selection had affected the achievement of a sense of justice in victim participants.   
3.4.4. A forensic focus 
Allied to the issue of the limited charges pursued by the Court is the narrow focus of the 
Court in its quest for the truth in relation to the charges brought, and this specific forensic 
focus has the potential to affect the ability of victims of international crimes to realise 
their restorative goals, and hence may operate as an affecting variable in the achievement 
of a sense of justice in participating victims.  
Notably, the need for victims of atrocities to tell their stories to an engaged listener and to 
receive formal and objective acknowledgment and condemnation of those experiences is 
widely recognised in both psychological
574
 and restorative justice literature,
575
 as well as 
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 Kelsall and Stepakoff (n 564). 
574
 Janoff-Bulman (n 470) 108; Felman and Laub (n 471) 78; Herman (Trauma and Recovery) (n 
327) 155 onwards; Hamber (Do Sleeping Dogs Lie?) (n 361).  
575
 Zehr (n 95) 191; Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16) 521 - 523; Kirchenbauer and 
others (n 15) 19 – 20. 
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in the writings of victims themselves.
576
 Moreover, as noted above,
577
 the desire for some 
victims to tell their stories, to educate the world about the abuses perpetrated and to 
personally denounce the acts committed against them comprise restorative justice goals 
for victims approaching international criminal justice mechanisms.  
In contrast to the wider testimony needs of some victims, however, the truth pursued by 
the Court is directly allied to, and delimited by, the determination of the guilt or innocence 
of the accused in respect of the specific charges brought, and as a result, broader or 
contextual aspects of victims’ experiences are likely to be beyond the Court’s forensic 
focus.  
The difficulties for victims posed by the narrow, forensic focus of an international 
criminal justice mechanism are ostensibly reported in the literature within the context of 
victims as witnesses, and concern, in particular, the inability of victims to narrate their 
experiences in full, restricting the potential for restorative victim engagement.
 578
 While 
there has been considerably less exploration of the issue in the context of victims who 
engage with criminal justice mechanisms as participants, rather than as witnesses, (in part, 
perhaps, due to the relative novelty of the initiative in international criminal law), an 
empirical study conducted by Stover and others into the testimony experiences of civil 
party victims at the ECCC provides some evidence of similar frustrations,
579
 indicating 
that the potential for victim disillusionment in the pursuit of justice goals is similarly 
apparent, despite the creation of a new, discrete role for victims in proceedings.   
In addition to problems for victims in the realisation of their testimony needs, the forensic 
focus of the Court poses further potential difficulties in relation to victims’ needs for 
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 Levi (n 470) 15 – 16.  
577
 Para 2.4.3.(iii). 
578
 Dembour and Haslam, for example, observe that “[i]n the judicial arena… story-telling can only 
take the form of giving legal evidence. It is constrained by the judicial endeavour to establish a 
legally authoritative account of ‘what happened’”, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, 
‘Silencing Hearings?, Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials’ (2004) 15 Eur. J. Int'l L. 151, 154; 
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adversarial effect, and witnesses are thereby confined to answering questions within the parameters 
set down by the questioner. The victim is denied the opportunity to relay his or her own narrative to 
the court using his or her own words…”, in Doak (2005) (n 11), 294, 298; Doak (Therapeutic 
Dimensions) (n 564) at 272. 
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 Stover and others (Confronting Duch) (n 16) 523-4, 530. 
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information about the offence(s) perpetrated.
580
 In particular, victims’ restorative needs for 
broader forms of truth-finding may be ill-suited to a criminal action involving a single 
perpetrator facing specific and defined charges.
581
 As such, there is certainly the potential 
for disappointment amongst participating victims who had hoped, by virtue of their 
engagement with the Court, to achieve a greater understanding of the wider circumstances 
surrounding the abuses suffered.
582
  
Notably, where the Court’s narrow, forensic focus has operated to negatively affect the 
achievement of a sense of justice in participating victims we would expect to see lower 
satisfaction scores in respect of those justice parameters most directly affected (identified 
above), [Stage 3]. In the case of parameters allied to the delivery of testimony in 
particular, lower scores may also be caused by a number of other potentially affecting 
variables, considered further below.
583
 In light of the very limited number of participants 
likely to achieve testimony at the ICC, however,
584
 a more in-depth exploration of these 
issues through interview with the victim would be appropriate.
585
 
3.4.5. A substantial number of participating victims 
 
While the very substantial number of victims participating in proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court presents logistical challenges for the Court, it will almost 
certainly also pose difficulties for victims in the realisation of their restorative justice 
expectations, and may therefore operate as an affecting variable in the achievement of a 
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 Para 2.4.3.(ii). 
581
 In addition, the active pursuit of victims’ broader truth needs at the ICC may violate the 
defendant’s right to a fair and expeditious trial in accordance with Article 68(3) of the Rome 
Statute. 
582
 Similar problems of the pursuit of a narrow notion of truth were identified by Stover in relation 
to the ICTY, noting that “[a]ccording to some witnesses, ‘tribunal truth’, based largely on facts 
about individual events, left little latitude for answering the fundamental ‘why’ questions: Why had 
the defendants set out to destroy communities that had lived in harmony for decades? Why the 
excessive brutality, the mutilations and secret burials of victims? Why the denial and inability to 
accept what they had done was wrong?”, in Stover (Witnesses) (n 164) 117. 
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 Paras 3.4.5 and 3.4.8. 
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 See para 3.4.5.(i). 
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 See below, at para 3.4.5. 
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sense of justice in participating victims. This potential impact is particularly evident in the 
case of justice needs allied to the delivery of testimony. Moreover, those difficulties may 
be compounded by collective forms of legal representation. These aspects are therefore 
discussed further below and recommendations on data collection and assessment are 
made. 
(i) Expectations allied to the delivery of testimony 
 
As of December 2014, the number of victims participating in proceedings before the ICC 
was estimated to be around 10,000.
586
 In contrast, the opportunity for victims to appear 
physically before the Court in their capacity as participants is very limited.  
 
To date, and after first submitting an application and receiving the formal approval of the 
Chamber concerned, a limited number of victim participants have been authorised to 
personally appear before the Court to give sworn oral testimony by virtue of Article 69(3) 
of the Rome Statute,
587
 or to present their views and concerns.  
 
In the Lubanga case, for example, the Court authorised just three participating victims to 
introduce oral evidence in person.
588
 In the Katanga and Ngudjolo case, the number of 
victims allowed to introduce oral evidence was four.
589
 Victims’ legal representatives in 
the Bemba case had initially hoped to enable 17 victims to give oral evidence to the Court, 
but, with the right of the accused to an expeditious trial in mind, were subsequently 
restricted by the Court to eight, and in the event, just two victim participants were 
called.
590
 Three further victim participants in that case were authorised to present their 
views and concerns personally to the Court.
591
 In doing so, their contribution was not 
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 Victims’ Rights Working Group, ‘Participation before the ICC: Some Perspectives from the 
Inside’, (Winter 2014 – Spring 2015) Issue 25, Access 1. 
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 Lubanga (Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to express 
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 Katanga and Ngudjolo (9 November 2010) (n 256). 
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 Bemba (22 February 2012) (n 82), and see paras 2 and 23(i). 
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 Bemba (Decision on the Presentation of Views and Concerns by Victim a/0542/08, a/0394/08 
and a/0511/08) ICC-01/05-01/08-2220 (24 May 2012), and see [7]. 
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deemed to be part of the trial evidence, but instead, comparable to the presentation of 
submissions, and victims were requested to confine their submission to the harm they had 
suffered and the consequences of that harm. 
 
As a result, opportunities for victims to realise restorative justice goals that are ostensibly 
allied to the delivery of testimony before the Court are likely to be frustrated. These 
include the ability of victims to narrate their story to an engaged listener, the chance for 
victims to educate the world about the abuses perpetrated, and their ability to personally 
denounce the abuses committed against them. In addition, where the victim has no other 
way of securing their physical presence in the court room, an inability to testify will also 
mean they are unable to come face-to-face with the alleged perpetrator. 
(ii) Difficulties compounded by collective forms of legal representation 
In addition to difficulties for victim participants in the realisation of justice goals allied in 
whole or in part to judicial testimony, further obstacles to the achievement of restorative 
expectations are posed by approaches designed by the Court to respond to the volume of 
participating victims and to render the endeavour operational in practice, including, in 
particular, collective approaches to legal representation. 
Notably, during group meetings or forums held by Common Legal Representatives for 
participating victims, victim narrative, by which participating victims relate their own 
experiences to the group of fellow participants, can arise spontaneously, at the direct 
instigation of the victims themselves.
592
 While this spontaneous narrative may occur as a 
result of victims’ restorative and rehabilitative needs to relate their stories to an engaged 
listener, narrative in such circumstances also risks the emergence of a dominant group 
understanding or narrative of traumatic events, which in turn can have the effect of stifling 
or silencing individual narrative, or the narratives of less dominant groups. These less 
dominant groups can include women victims of sexual violence, as well as those whose 
individual experiences do not fit with the wider, emerging narrative.
593
 As a result, victims 
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 Private communication with the Case Manager for the Legal Representative for Victims, The 
Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 5
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 September, 2013. 
593
 This is particularly so where the dominant narrative is an heroic one; see in relation to truth 
commission processes, Heidi Grunebaum and Yazir Henri, ‘Re-membering Bodies, Producing 
Histories: Holocaust Survivor Narrative and Truth and Reconciliation Commission Testimony’ In 
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may find themselves without a voice or outlet for the achievement of justice aims that are 
allied to testimony, whether in the formal context the Court, or the informal (i.e. non-
judicial) context of group meetings, and so fail to achieve either recognition and 
acknowledgement of their suffering, or condemnation in respect of the specific abuses 
suffered.
594
  
In relation to those restorative goals which are allied to testimony (identified above), and 
for the purpose of Phase II assessment of the impact of failing to achieve testimony, the 
results for those participants who achieved testimony
595
 – whether formally or informally 
– should be compared with those of survivors who had hoped to testify but did not, [Stage 
3]. Given the limited number of victims able to achieve testimony, a separate sample 
should be recruited for the purpose of the assessment, consisting entirely of victims who 
achieved either form of testimony, and their perceptions in relation to the realisation of 
their justice aims obtained.
596
 
While, however, basic assessment in respect of the achievement of a sense of justice in 
victims who simply failed to achieve testimony is relatively unproblematic, the impact of 
the active suppression of testimony by the emergence of a dominant narrative is more 
challenging to establish. In particular, those negatively affected by the emergence of a 
dominant or group narrative are not readily identifiable, and as a result, assessment in 
                                                                                                                                                                
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 101, 103 - 104. In such circumstances, issues of shame may arise to 
inhibit personal testimony.  
594
 The emergence of a dominant narrative or group understanding of events also presents potential 
evidential difficulties for the Court in terms of mediated or contaminated testimony, discussed 
further in Ellie Smith, ‘Victims in the Witness Stand: Socio-cultural and Psychological Challenges 
to the Achievement of Testimony’ in Kinga Tibori Julia Szabo and Megan Hirst (eds) Victim 
Participation in International Criminal Justice (Springer, forthcoming 2015). 
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 Results having been obtained during Phase I of the assessment, by reference to the Likert scale. 
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 For reasons of space, the recruitment of a testimony sample is not indicated in the diagram, but 
would arise in the aftermath of formal or informal testimony, and if the individual does not already 
form part of the Phase I assessment, they would be asked to indicate their justice aims in 
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of informal testimony arising during the course of group meetings with the Victims’ Common 
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Anushka Sehmi (n 300).  
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respect of their individual justice experiences is not possible. Instead, the potential impact 
of a dominant narrative on the achievement of a sense of justice in participating victims 
should be acknowledged as a possible limitation to the interpretation of assessment 
findings.  
 
Where, however, assessment findings indicate a gender differential in justice experiences 
for participating victims, an issue which is discussed further in the following section, 
specific thought should be given by the Common Legal Representative to the holding of 
gender-specific meetings, where disclosure of sexual violence by women is less likely to 
be inhibited by the presence of male victims, or otherwise ‘silenced’ by an alternative 
narrative.
597
 In addition, or in the alternative, the Court itself, in determining the number 
of groups into which victims can be divided for the purpose of assigning a Common Legal 
Representative, should give specific consideration to the discrete needs of women victims 
and the possibility of a group based either on gender or experience of gender-based 
crimes.
598
 
 
3.4.6. A gender differential 
 
While available studies typically seek to ascertain the gender demographic of the sample 
population, at present, study findings are not consistently disaggregated and analysed by 
gender. Significantly, however, where analysis of findings by gender is undertaken, 
studies reveal possible differences in how men and women experience and respond to 
participation in general, or to testimony in particular, indicating that gender may comprise 
a potentially affecting variable in the achievement of a sense of justice for participating 
victims.  
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In their study of the experiences of 134 survivors of the South African apartheid regime, 
for example, Kaminer and others sought to explore and compare the psychological 
responses and outcomes of those who testified before the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, those who chose to give a closed, written statement to the Commission and 
those who gave neither a closed statement nor oral testimony. The researchers found that 
female respondents reported significantly lower forgiveness rates and mental health 
outcomes when compared to their male counterparts,
599
 but that this differential was 
confined to the group of survivors who gave a public statement to the Commission. 
Moreover, when correlated to abuse experiences, the researchers concluded that the 
gender differential could not be accounted for by the nature of abuse suffered or any 
resulting trauma response,
600
 suggesting instead a potential difference between male and 
female victims in how testimony in particular was perceived.   
 
A gender differential was also detected in the study conducted by Stover and others into 
the experiences of 109 witnesses of crimes committed in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo appearing before the International Criminal Court.
601
 While the study was 
ostensibly allied to the achievement of procedural, as opposed to restorative justice for 
witnesses, subjects of the study were also asked about the perceived efficacy of their 
testimony to the Court. The results revealed that women were less likely than their male 
counterparts to consider that their testimony had helped to achieve either justice or the 
truth.
602 
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Finally, Stepakoff and others, in their study of the motivations for testifying of 200 
witnesses appearing before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, found a difference in 
justice aims between male and female witnesses. The researchers found that women were 
more likely to pursue testimony for personal reasons, such as the desire to speak about 
painful memories and to denounce the wrongs committed against them, while men tended 
towards the articulation of socio-political motives, including the desire to prevent further 
abuses and to build peace.  
 
While, however, the evidence indicates a gender differential in victims’ experiences with 
transitional justice mechanisms, it does not explain the reason(s) for this differential. As a 
result, the targeting by the Court of any specific activities aimed at addressing the 
differential is problematic.  
 
In particular, while the Stepakoff study suggests a male/female differential in justice aims, 
and the Kaminer study indicates a differential in outcomes, as already indicated,
603
 there is 
no study which seeks to directly correlate victims’ original justice aims to outcomes. It is, 
of course, feasible that a tendency for women victims to prioritise as justice needs those 
restorative goals that are less readily achievable in the context of the ICC would lead to a 
restorative shortfall, but the hypothesis requires testing in order that any related Court 
outreach activities can be conducted to better manage expectations. Moreover, it is equally 
feasible that a gender differential may be due instead, or additionally, to the non-inclusion 
of gender-specific crimes in the charges brought before the Court,
604
 procedural aspects of 
the participatory process, including differences in how women victims are treated by or 
respond to Court staff, the level of familial and/or societal support they have compared to 
that of their male counterparts, or a combination of any of the above factors. 
 
In addition, it is unclear whether the various findings in the above studies, in terms either 
of the justice aims expressed by victims or the outcomes of their engagement, are 
culturally specific or whether they would be consistently replicated within other contexts. 
A private interview with the Victims’ Legal Representative and Case Manager for the 
                                                          
603
 Para 3.3.2. 
604
 Discussed at para 3.4.3. 
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STL,
605
 for example, revealed that the vast majority of victims seeking to give oral 
testimony before that tribunal were women, although this is not, of course, necessarily 
indicative either of the particular participants’ emotional health or a guarantee of any 
positive outcome in the aftermath of narration.
606
 It may be that, within a patriarchal 
society, judicial testimony represents a rare opportunity for women to speak about and 
publicly condemn the crimes committed against them. Additionally, or in the alternative, 
it may be, as Stepakoff surmises, that the need of female witnesses to publicly denounce 
the crimes committed against them and to emphasise their position as victims stems from 
the nature of crimes perpetrated against them and the corresponding, ongoing 
stigmatisation they experience within their communities,
607
 again emphasising the 
interconnectedness of the individual and collective impacts of international crimes and the 
need of victims of sexual violence for recognition and acceptance within their 
communities.  
 
With these various factors in mind, a gender-sensitive approach to the Court’s assessment 
of victims’ sense of justice is essential. This would necessarily begin with the collection 
of basic demographic data during Phase I of the assessment [Stage 1], enabling both a 
bivariate analysis of the justice aims of male and female victim-participants [Stage 2], and 
a gender-specific correlation of those aims to restorative outcomes, [Stage 3]. Data 
indicating the extent to which the charges brought against a defendant fully reflect the 
abuses suffered by the participant should also be disaggregated by gender [Stage 2] and 
correlated to corresponding data on justice outcomes, [Stage 3]. A simple bivariate 
analysis of gender experiences by country will also provide some indication of the extent 
to which differentials are culturally relative [Stage 3], and potentially provide the basis for 
cost-efficient outreach activities which are developed and targeted on a (judicial) case-by-
case basis.  
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Restorative outcomes by gender should also be compared to similarly disaggregated 
findings in relation to participants’ experiences of process, obtained in the Berkeley study, 
in order to assess the extent to which procedural justice has a gender-specific impact on 
the achievement of substantive justice for victims at the ICC.  Finally, questioning during 
the initial data collection stage of Phase I as to victims’ levels of familial and/or societal 
support for their participation will enable an examination of the impact of this on the 
achievement of sense of justice for participating victims at the Court.   
 
3.4.7. The psychological health and wellbeing of the victim  
 
Despite the potential for psychological vulnerability in victims engaging with 
international transitional justice mechanisms, the nature and extent of any 
interrelationship or interdependence between psychological ill-health and the achievement 
of positive engagement for victims of international crimes, including the realisation of a 
restorative sense of justice, remains unclear. In particular, within any academic 
consideration of why some victims have been able to achieve some form of 
psychologically positive benefit while others have not, the role of ongoing trauma 
symptomatology has not been identified and explored as a potentially affecting factor, 
indicating a knowledge gap in this respect. 
 
It is, however, conceivable, at the very least, that psychological ill-health will negatively 
impact upon a victim’s psychological response to participation, and thereby operate as an 
affecting variable in their achievement of a sense of justice.
608
 In particular, while it is true 
that many victims who engage with international transitional justice mechanisms may be 
in relatively good psychological health, it is also likely that a significant number of other 
victims will be suffering from some level of ongoing trauma at the time of their 
engagement.
609
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Within the specific context of the ICC, there is clear potential for psychological 
vulnerability in victim participants. Notably, Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute requires 
the Office of the Prosecutor to take specific measures to protect victims’ psychological 
well-being during its investigation.
610
 Potential witnesses are assessed by a Court-funded 
psychologist before being interviewed by an investigator, and those deemed insufficiently 
mentally robust may be excluded from the formal investigative process.
611
 As a result, the 
number of Prosecution witnesses suffering from a significant degree of ongoing trauma is 
likely to be relatively small. 
There is, however, no corresponding statutory protection obligation on victims’ legal 
representatives, and representatives do not receive any assistance from a Court-funded 
psychologist during their consultation, evidence-gathering and evidence-testing activities, 
including in their consideration of which victims should appear before the Court in person 
to testify or to present their views and concerns. Moreover, while participating victims’ 
legal representatives undoubtedly seek to act in the best interests of victims, as expert 
legal practitioners rather than clinicians, they are not equipped to assess a victim’s 
psychological readiness for formal testimony.  
Article 68(3) therefore comprises a potentially broader avenue for engagement with the 
Court for victims than as a prosecution witness, and in the absence of any “screening” 
along the lines operated by the OTP, it is reasonable to assume that the body of victim 
participants, including but not limited to those appearing before the Court, will include 
individuals who are psychologically vulnerable. Moreover, while the Court’s participation 
endeavour was designed with a specific victim focus, the potential nature of engagement, 
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 See Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute.  
611
 Private communication with OTP psychologist, 9
th
 March, 2012. The approach is also 
referenced in para 70 of the OTP’s Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes (June 2014), 
available online at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy-Paper-on-Sexual-and-Gender-
Based-Crimes--June-2014.pdf>, last accessed 24
th
 March 2015. Notably, while such an approach 
might be believed to better protect both the emotional safety of the victim and the integrity of the 
evidence when it is placed before the Court, there has been no psychological assessment, follow-up 
or research conducted into the psychological impact on the victim of rejection by the OTP’s 
investigators. There is, however, some evidence at least that a denial of justice may be experienced 
as psychologically detrimental by victims already suffering a degree of trauma, and this may be 
particularly relevant where engagement with the investigative and prosecutorial process was 
perceived by the victim as an aspect of justice; see, for example, Danieli (Massive trauma) (n 141) 
351; Sveaass and Lavik (n 464), 43-44, noting that in psychological terms the denial of justice 
represents a continuation of violence; Rauchfuss and Schmolze (n 362) 40.  
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including testifying as to the form, impact and extent of harm suffered, also means greater 
exposure of the victim to the trauma story. The potential vulnerability amongst 
participants, coupled with a high degree of exposure to the trauma story, therefore raises 
the possibility of psychologically disadvantageous engagement. 
Notably, the potential impact of psychological ill-health in participating victims is 
amenable to assessment. In particular, (i) if psychological ill-health affects a victim’s 
ability to achieve effective and meaningful participation, we would expect to see lower 
scores given by victims with poor psychological health; and (ii) where participation has 
actively aggravated existing trauma symptoms, we would expect those scores to be lower 
still.  
 
Phase II assessment should therefore ideally incorporate, as a starting point and to the 
extent possible, findings relating to the psychological health of participating victims. Such 
an approach would help not only to ensure that the assessment takes in to consideration all 
factors with the potential to impact upon the victim’s achievement of a sense of justice, 
but also, at a more fundamental level, to contribute to the development of knowledge in 
relation to victims’ participation in international transitional processes more broadly.  
 
That said, however, the practical collection and incorporation of relevant clinical data into 
the assessment process is not without its challenges, and an expert clinical investigation 
and assessment of the psychological well-being of all victims participating in cases before 
the ICC is clearly impractical in terms both of time and resources.
612
 It is therefore 
necessary to consider alternative approaches to data collection in relation to the two 
hypotheses identified above, which are mindful of limited available resources whilst at the 
same time provide the potential for the generation of meaningful data. Taking each of the 
hypotheses in turn: 
 
                                                          
612
 Such an approach would be undesirable in any event in terms of, for example, victim safety and 
the potential identification to the wider community of participating victims, together with the need 
to avoid the Court being viewed as an institution with therapeutic goals.  
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(i) psychological ill-health adversely affects a victim’s ability to achieve effective 
and meaningful participation resulting in lower scores 
 
An assessment based upon a more limited sample of victim participants would provide an 
appropriate means of evaluating the impact of psychological ill-health on the achievement 
of a sense of justice in participating victims at the ICC, [Stage 3]. To this end, a study 
sample comprising only participants suffering from psychological ill-health should be 
recruited, and the resulting justice scores compared with those of a control group in order 
to consider the extent to which, if at all, psychological ill-health in the participant has 
affected their ability to achieve effective and meaningful engagement.  
 
Notably, while the Court’s Trust Fund seeks to provide, amongst other functions, 
rehabilitative services to victims affected by the range of crimes falling within the Court’s 
remit, it’s ground presence tends to lag behind the investigative activities of the Court, and 
as a result it may not, at the time of data collection, be actively operating services within 
the territory of the relevant State. As a result, recruitment to a study sample might best be 
conducted through the auspices of local health service providers, including those operated 
by international or regional medical charities within the affected area. 
 
Ideally, a second group of participants – those known to be in good psychological health – 
would be recruited, and operate as a basis of comparison for the findings obtained from 
the first group. Such an approach would, however, require additional psychological 
assessment as a means of verifying the psychological well-being of group members, and 
where resources are limited, ascertainment of positive psychological health, in a situation 
where many other victims may be psychologically vulnerable, may, quite understandably, 
not be a priority for the Court.  
 
An alternative approach would be simply to compare the restorative outcome scores of the 
study sample of victims known to be suffering from psychological ill-health with the 
scores (pre-weighting) obtained in Phase I of the assessment in respect of the whole study 
population. 
 
Whilst providing a practical and resource-conscious means of data collection, the 
suggested approach is not perfect. In particular, the scores obtained in Phase I of the 
assessment will represent the justice outcome scores of the victim participant community 
as a whole, and will thereby likely include the scores of an indeterminate number of 
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victims within the participant community who are themselves suffering from 
psychological ill-health. That said, however, while the resulting differential might be less 
than that anticipated if a dedicated control group was used, it is still reasonable to expect 
some identifiable differential between the respective justice scores if existing 
psychological ill-health operates to affect victims’ ability to achieve effective and 
meaningful participation. 
 
In addition to the limitation noted above, it should also be acknowledged that 
psychological ill-health in victims is not a static state of mind, and it may be that, over the 
course of the victims’ participatory experience, symptoms resolve or at least significantly 
lessen. This in turn may affect a victim’s subjective assessment of their participation 
experiences, including their achievement of a sense of justice. Significantly, where 
participants have benefitted from ongoing engagement with formal therapeutic services, 
continuous psychological (re)evaluation would naturally occur within the context of those 
support services, and clinical findings arising by virtue of that evaluation, to the extent 
they were available, and where the informed consent of victims had been obtained, would 
need to be incorporated in to the assessment.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that to a large extent, the impact, if any, of psychological ill-
health on the achievement of a sense of justice in victims operates beyond the control of 
the Court, and may thereby serve as a limiting factor to the ability of the ICC to fully 
realise its restorative mandate.
613
  
 
(ii) participation aggravates existing trauma symptoms, resulting in lower scores 
 
While it is conceivable that trauma symptoms in participating victims might be 
exacerbated at various stages of the participatory journey, the potential for the aggravation 
of trauma sequelae is particularly evident in relation to aspects of victim testimony. As a 
result, and in the first instance at least, a more limited and targeted focus of enquiry into 
participants’ psychological health that is directly allied to potentially aggravating aspects 
of the testimony experience may enable the collection of some meaningful data which, in 
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 Although an appreciation of the impact of psychological health on the achievement of the 
Court’s mandate may prove a useful lobbying tool for an increase in funding for victim-related 
services. 
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addition, might be readily available and generated within the day-to-day course of the 
Court’s operation.614  
 
Notably, this narrower approach to data collection is by no means perfect in terms of 
providing a complete picture of the full range of possible impacts of poor psychological 
health on the achievement of restorative benefit. It does at least, however, begin to address 
the neglect of this area to date within existing literature, whilst at the same time operating 
within practical boundaries and resource limitations of the Court, and so has much to 
recommend it.  
 
Significantly, while the occurrence and impact of psychological ill-health in victims 
participating in proceedings before the ICC is largely beyond the control of the Court, the 
aggravation of pre-existing trauma symptoms, and the potential effect of that aggravation 
on the achievement of effective and meaningful participation for victims, lies within the 
Court’s power. Moreover, articulation by the Court in its Strategy of the need to ensure 
that participation is not anti-therapeutic for victims
615
 means that the Court has a self-
imposed, positive duty to avoid engagement that exacerbates pre-existing trauma 
symptoms. 
 
With this in mind, and with particular reference to the collection and evaluation of data for 
the purpose of Phase II assessment, the remainder of this section comprises an 
examination of factors allied to testimony with particular potential to exacerbate pre-
existing symptoms of psychological ill-health. These factors include the psychological 
readiness of the victim and the concurrent rehabilitative journey, the potential for 
psychologically detrimental engagement, and the delivery of psychologically unsafe 
testimony in the context of collective legal representation. Practical factors concerning the 
collection of data are incorporated into the relevant sections, as appropriate. 
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 Use of the material would, of course, be subject to the informed consent of the individual 
concerned. 
615
 Discussed above, at para 2.3.1.(iii). 
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(a) Testimony within the concurrent rehabilitative journey: psychological readiness  
 
The position and timing of judicial testimony within a participant’s concurrent 
rehabilitative journey, and in particular, the extent to which the victim is ready, in 
psychological terms, to speak about their experiences, may operate to affect pre-existing 
symptoms of psychological ill-health in the victim, and hence their ability to achieve a 
sense of justice.  Notably, the assessment of psychological readiness is a feature of clinical 
theory and practice with survivors of international crimes, and therefore provides a useful 
point of comparison with the occurrence of victim testimony in the international criminal 
justice context.   
Within the therapeutic context, narration of the trauma experience takes place at the 
survivor’s own pace, and at a time when they are psychologically ready to articulate the 
event(s) in question. In the absence of psychological readiness, narration of the trauma 
event(s) can be experienced by the survivor as therapeutically detrimental.
616
  
Psychological readiness is assessed in turn in relation to the prior establishment of a 
number of facilitative clinical prerequisites, including the development of a trusting 
relationship between victim and therapist, and the establishment of safety – both physical 
and psychological – in the survivor.617 
Notably, it is apparent from literature relating to narrative in the clinical context that 
victims themselves may seek to articulate their trauma experiences before they are 
clinically ready to do so.
618
 A desire on the part of the victim to narrate their trauma 
                                                          
616
 See, for example, Herman (Trauma and Recovery) (n 327) 172 – 176. 
617
 It is beyond the scope of this research to explore these facilitating prerequisites for therapeutic 
narrative in detail.  For more information, see Herman, who notes that before proceeding to the 
construction and articulation of a narrative (a stage which she refers to as “remembrance and 
mourning”) it is first essential both to establish a healing relationship with the survivor and to 
achieve, as far as possible within the confines of the therapeutic relationship, safety for them; 
Herman (Trauma and Recovery ) (n 327) 155. Notably, not all clinical experts divide the recovery 
process into the same stages, although all clinical approaches are broadly congruous with Herman’s 
model. By way of example, the development of a trusting relationship might be viewed as an 
aspect of safety; Mary Fabri, ‘Reconstructing Safety: Adjustments to the Therapeutic Frame in the 
Treatment of Survivors of Political Torture’ (2001) Vol. 32, No. 5 Professional Psychology, 
Research and Practice 454. 
618
 Beverley Raphael, ‘Early Intervention and the debriefing debate’ in Robert Ursano, Carol S. 
Fullerton and Ann Norwood (eds) Terrorism and Disaster: Individual and Community Mental 
Health Interventions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 154; see also Herman (Trauma and 
Recovery) (n 327) 172. 
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experience, or, in the context of the ICC, to provide testimony to the Court or to officials 
of the Court, does not, therefore, indicate readiness in clinical terms, and may engender 
psychologically disadvantageous engagement. Moreover, while the timing of narration 
within the therapeutic context is a matter of careful deliberation which in turn is directly 
allied to the recovery of the survivor, the timing of testimony within judicial proceedings 
is largely beyond the control of the participating victim, and may not occur at a time 
which coincides with the psychological needs of the survivor within the rehabilitative 
process.
619
 For participating victims who are experiencing ongoing trauma at some level, 
testimony in the absence of psychological readiness may therefore exacerbate trauma 
symptoms, and so affect their achievement of a sense of justice. 
It should be acknowledged here that while the negative psychological impacts of narrative 
in the absence of psychological readiness within the therapeutic context are widely known 
and accepted in clinical practice and literature, the assumption that similarly detrimental 
results would be seen within the judicial context remains untested empirically, and this 
may be due, in part, to the lack of prospective studies with victims of international crimes 
and the relative neglect of the area to date. Given, however, that the phenomenon is 
documented within the more facilitative, victim-centred context of the therapeutic 
environment, the assumption seems a reasonable one. Moreover, the psychological 
screening and exclusion by the OTP of victims who are deemed to be insufficiently 
psychologically robust to stand as witnesses suggests that the Court itself accepts the 
assumption to be true.  
As yet, however, existing research studies which directly involve the assessment of 
victims’ experiences of participation and testimony have failed to consider the absence of 
psychological readiness in the victim as a possible rationale for the disparate results 
between participants, and there is no research which seeks to consider the achievement of 
a sense of justice in particular in light of the victim’s concurrent rehabilitative journey, 
indicating a clear gap in knowledge in this regard. 
With this in mind, and for the purpose of assessment, the scores in respect of individual 
justice parameters provided by victims who have given testimony before the Court should 
be compared and considered in light of any available evidence as to the psychological 
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 See also Rauschenbach and Scalia (n 289) at 452 on the relationship between the timing of 
judicial actions and personal healing needs. 
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readiness of the victim participant, in order to assess the extent to which a lack of 
readiness has affected their achievement of a sense of justice, [Stage 3]. The study sample 
in this instance, will, of course, be very small, and the potential to generate findings of 
broader applicability will therefore be limited. Such an approach would, however, enable 
the Court to at least begin to respond to a knowledge gap, whilst, at a practical level, 
enable, where appropriate, a specific and targeted refocussing of its limited psychological 
resources to the benefit of victims. In particular, thought might be given to the provision 
of psychological support to assist victims’ legal representatives, including Common Legal 
Representatives, in their evidence gathering and testing activities to mirror that already 
provided to the OTP.  
To this end, evidence might be sourced through the activities of the Victims and 
Witnesses Unit of the Court. The VWU is mandated to provide protective and supportive 
measures to ensure the security, physical and psychological well-being of victims and 
witnesses once they are physically before the Court.
620
 In light of the potential 
vulnerability of some victim participants, liaison with the VWU is clearly desirable, and 
the victim themselves, or their legal representatives, may ask for special measures to 
facilitate testimony, including the attendance of a psychologist during testimony and/or a 
psychological debriefing following testimony.
621
 Where testifying has proved to be a 
therapeutically detrimental experience for a participating victim, it is therefore likely that 
recourse will be had to expert clinical staff in the VWU, and there will be some clinical 
assessment of the participant at that stage, including, potentially, a consideration of the 
victim’s psychological readiness for testimony and the prior achievement of facilitative 
recovery stages. As a result, evidence relating to the victim’s progress in their therapeutic 
journey may be readily available and generated within the day-to-day conduct of the 
Court’s protection and safe-guarding activities.622  
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 Article 43(6) of the Rome Statute; Rules 16 – 19 RPE. 
621
 Provided for explicitly in the case of the ICC, Rules 88(1) and (2) RPE. 
622
 Again, the use of victims’ clinical records for the purpose of an assessment of the Court’s 
restorative mandate will require the written, informed consent of the participant concerned. 
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(b) Testimony as psychologically detrimental engagement 
In addition to the issue of psychological readiness and the position of testimony within the 
victim’s therapeutic journey, the nature and quality of the testimony experience itself may 
provoke or exacerbate an adverse psychological reaction in victims suffering from 
ongoing trauma, to the detriment of the victims’ ability to achieve a sense of justice. 
It is important at this stage to distinguish between testimony which is upsetting for the 
victim, and that which is therapeutically injurious for them:  
Testifying about experiences of abuse can be highly distressing for victims. Where, 
however, the testimony experience has been an upsetting one, this does not mean that the 
victim has suffered an adverse psychological reaction or that the experience has been 
otherwise therapeutically detrimental for the individual concerned.
623
 Moreover, as 
already seen, it is apparent that the extent to which testimony was painful or upsetting for 
a victim does not affect their subsequent evaluation of the testimony experience as either 
positive or negative.
624
 Testimony may, however, be problematic in psychological terms 
where the victim participant experiences a trauma reaction at the time, or where testimony 
otherwise exacerbates pre-existing trauma symptoms, and it is this potentially 
psychologically disadvantageous aspect of victim testimony that is the focus of this 
section. 
The therapeutic needs of a victim participant with ongoing trauma symptoms may be 
incompatible with the needs of the Court in a number of ways, and this is particularly the 
case where the participant appears before the Court to give sworn oral testimony by virtue 
of Article 69(3). Again, given the potential therapeutic impacts under discussion, 
reference to clinical practice in the achievement of psychologically beneficial narrative 
within the therapeutic setting is appropriate, and provides a useful point of comparison 
with the judicial context in this regard.  
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 Kaminer and others (n 331) 375. Clinical literature indicates, in fact, that an upsetting testimony 
experience can also be an empowering one for victims of international crimes; see Kelsall and 
Stepakoff (n 564) 366.  It should also be noted that narration of traumatic experiences within the 
therapeutic context can be distressing for the victim, yet it is not therapeutically detrimental. 
624
 Discussed above, at para 3.3.2. 
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Notably, while the survivor in the therapeutic environment is in control of the way in 
which they choose to narrate their experiences, thereby providing an element of personal 
agency and empowerment, this facilitative factor is significantly less evident within the 
judicial processes of international criminal law mechanisms. In many cases, while 
survivors need to re-establish control over their lives, the court requires them to submit to 
rules and procedures which are not of their making and which they may not understand. 
While survivors need to tell their story in their own way, the court will typically require 
them to respond to a series of questions which often disrupt the ability to construct a 
cogent narrative. Finally, while survivors need societal acknowledgement and support, a 
court requires them to undergo a public challenge to their credibility, leading Herman to 
conclude that: 
“…if one set out intentionally to design a system for provoking symptoms of 
posttraumatic stress disorder, it might look very much like a court of law”.625 
In addition to the potential for testimony to aggravate trauma symptoms, testimony may 
actively provoke an acute trauma reaction in the victim, and this is particularly the case 
where the trauma experience itself has affected the way in which the victim’s memories of 
the event(s) have been laid down and processed. Notably, there is a growing consensus in 
clinical literature that traumatic memories are recorded, processed and accessed by 
victims in qualitatively different ways to normal, autobiographical memories.
626
 A 
detailed examination of the impact of trauma on the memories of victims of international 
crimes is beyond the scope of this research.
627
 It should be noted, however, that the 
retrieval of such memories may be subject to specific cues, which can include questioning 
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 Herman (The Mental Health of Crime Victims) (n 322) 159. For a similar view, see also 
Mendeloff (n 16) 613. The factors identified above can, of course, also impact upon the realisation 
of restorative justice parameters for the victim, including their ability to tell their story, to educate 
the world about the events that occurred in their countries and their wish to publicly denounce the 
acts committed against them. 
626
 See generally Chris Brewin, Posttraumatic stress disorder: Malady or myth? (Yale University 
Press 2003); Jane Herlihy, Peter Scragg and Stuart Turner, ‘Discrepancies in autobiographical 
memories - implications for the assessment of asylum seekers: repeated interviews study’ (2002) 
British Medical Journal, 324; Herlihy and Turner (n 48). 
627
 The potential impacts of trauma on victims’ memory, and their corresponding effects on victim 
testimony, is discussed in detail in Ellie Smith (Victims in the Witness Stand) (n 594). In the case 
of memory and testimony in the specific context of victims of sexual violence appearing before the 
ICC, see Ellie Smith (Investigating Rape) (563). 
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during testimony.
628
 Significantly for the purpose of this section, these memories may be 
experienced by the participant in the present, rather than being perceived by them as 
occurring in the past,
 629
 and hence can be both deeply distressing and potentially 
retraumatising for the victim.  
While the possibility for testimony to aggravate pre-existing trauma symptoms is 
recognised in existing academic literature,
630
 the potential impacts of trauma on memory 
and testimony within the international criminal law context have been largely overlooked 
to date. Moreover, while there has been some empirical clinical research which has 
evidenced a negative therapeutic effect of testimony in victims of international crimes, 
there has been no attempt to relate those negative impacts to the ability of the victim to 
achieve a sense of justice in respect of the process more broadly, indicating a gap in 
knowledge.  
 
Again, where the experience of testifying has been therapeutically detrimental for the 
victim, recourse will likely be had to expert clinical staff in the VWU, and there will be a 
clinical assessment of the victim at that stage. Expert clinical data concerning any adverse 
psychological impact of testimony would therefore be generated which, with the victim’s 
informed consent, could be used to enable an examination of the impact of 
psychologically detrimental engagement on the achievement of a sense of justice in the 
victim, [Stage 3]. 
(c) Psychologically unsafe testimony: informal testimony and collective 
representation at the ICC 
The emergence of informal (i.e. non-judicial) testimony during meetings convened by 
victims’ common legal representatives has already been considered in the context of the 
development of a group understanding of the events in question and the consequent 
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 Jane Herlihy, Laura Jobson and Stuart Turner, ‘Just Tell Us What Happened To You: 
Autobiographical Memory And Seeking Asylum’ (2012) 26 Applied Cognitive Psychology 661. 
629
 Steph J. Hellawell and Chris R. Brewin, ‘A comparison of flashbacks and ordinary 
autobiographical memories of trauma: content and language’ (2004) 42(1) Behaviour Research and 
Therapy 1. 
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 Doak (Therapeutic Dimensions) (n 564) generally, and at 283; Stover and others (Confronting 
Duch) (n 16), citing Herman (Trauma and Recovery) (n 327) at 525. 
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silencing of less dominant victim groups.
631
 In addition, however, informal testimony also 
introduces the possibility of psychologically unsafe victim narrative, with the potential to 
negatively affect the achievement by the victim of a sense of justice. 
As already indicated, the VWU is responsible for ensuring the physical safety and 
psychological wellbeing of vulnerable individuals once they are physically before the 
Court. The remit of the unit is thereby limited to formal judicial testimony, and victims’ 
legal representatives do not have the benefit of psychological support in their interaction 
with victims in their evidence-gathering or evidence-testing activities.  
As a result, informal victim testimony during group meetings with legal representatives 
emerges in the absence of any available professional psychological support for potentially 
vulnerable victims, and hence risks psychologically detrimental engagement. Notably, 
there is no clinical assessment or follow-up for those victims who have attested to their 
trauma experiences during group meetings, and as a result, the psychological impact is 
unknown. Moreover, while analysis and comparison of the justice scores of victims 
providing informal testimony with those of the victim participation group as a whole 
would provide a rudimentary assessment of the impact of informal testimony on justice 
outcomes, the lack of clinical follow-up and resulting evidence means that the specific 
impacts of psychologically unsafe testimony cannot be formally assessed in relation to the 
achievement of a sense of justice in the victim, and should therefore be acknowledged as a 
limitation to the interpretation of assessment findings in respect of those participants 
affected.  
3.4.8.  Situating the participation experience in its context 
 
Participation, does not, of course, occur within a vacuum, and the Court cannot be 
divorced from its context. It is conceivable that aspects of the prevailing circumstances 
surrounding the victim’s participation have the potential to affect the achievement of 
effective and meaningful participation. These aspects, in turn, can include elements 
specific to the Court, and in particular, the victim’s experience of process, as well as 
broader aspects of the victim’s circumstances which are beyond the Court experience. 
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 Above, at para 3.4.5.(ii). 
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(i) Within the Court: experience of process 
 
As previously noted, evidence indicates that the realisation of elements of procedural 
justice can affect the ability of victims to achieve some level and form of psychologically 
positive engagement with the justice mechanism in question.
632
 While the impact of 
procedural factors on the achievement of positive participatory experiences is shown by 
clinical evidence to be limited, the impact is not insignificant, and hence the degree of 
victim satisfaction with procedural justice elements should be incorporated in to Phase 2 
of the Court’s assessment process, [Stage 3].  
As already indicated,
633
 an extensive research project concerning the achievement of 
procedural justice for victims participating in proceedings before the ICC is underway, 
and there is little point in ostensibly replicating the study for the purpose of the Court’s 
assessment of the achievement or otherwise of a sense of justice in participating victims. 
Instead, the findings of the Berkeley study should, as far as possible, be reflected in Phase 
2 of the assessment.  
That said, however, it is conceivable and indeed, on the basis of a similar study conducted 
by the same authors involving witnesses appearing before the ICC,
634
 likely, that the data 
generated by the Berkeley study will not be in the most amenable form for direct 
application to the Phase 2 assessment. In particular, it is likely to lack the detail necessary 
to enable a direct correlation of individual findings in respect of the achievement of 
procedural justice and their corresponding restorative sense of justice outcomes. While 
therefore, the suggested approach here is both practical and resource-sensitive, it is 
imperfect in terms of the data produced.
635
  
In practice, however, this may not be a significant difficulty for the Court in its 
assessment of victims’ achievement of effective and meaningful participation: the fact that 
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 At para 3.3.2. See also War Crimes Research Office (2009) (n 338); Robert J. MacCoun, 
‘Voice, Control, and Belonging: the Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness’ (2005) Vol. 1 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 171.  
633
 Para 2.2.2.(iv). 
634
 Berkeley School of Law (n 15). 
635
 It may be that the researchers are able and willing to supply more meaningful data to the Court 
in the form of their individual, pre-report findings, with, of course, the further consent of victims. 
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procedural justice is known to affect victims’ ability to achieve some level or form of 
psychologically positive engagement with a judicial mechanisms means that, as an 
affecting variable, it is not an unknown quantity in this context. As a result, some degree 
of variance between victims’ experiences (in terms of why, for some, participation was 
experienced positively while for others it was not) can feasibly be attributed to it. 
Moreover, the Berkeley study may provide guidance on procedural satisfaction across 
particular aspects of the participation experience, and so enable some level of basic 
correlation of results with those of the Phase 1 assessment. Finally, where the study 
disaggregates by, for example, gender, any procedural justice differential might also be 
relevant to an examination of the achievement of effective and meaningful participation 
between men and women participants.  
(ii) Beyond the Court: the broader context 
 
There are likely to be factors that are external to the Court and beyond its control which 
impact negatively upon the achievement and/or longer-term retention of any positive 
restorative benefit in victim participants.
636
 Such factors thereby operate as limitations to 
the Court’s realisation of its restorative endeavour, and might include ongoing insecurity 
or instability in the victims’ home context and an accompanying lack of any personal 
sense of safety in the victim, continuing isolation and stigmatisation resulting from the 
perpetration of sexual violence, ongoing financial hardship and the possible impact of 
continuing levels of trauma at the societal level.
637
  
 
Assessment findings should therefore be considered in relation to the participant’s broader 
context in order to assess the extent to which, if at all, external factors affect the 
achievement of a sense of justice in the victim. To this end, participants should be asked 
during the initial data collection stage of Phase 1 [Stage 2], and again at the point where 
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 Stover, for example, notes in relation to witnesses returning to their homes after testifying 
before the ICTY that the initial glow they experienced soon faded, Stover (Witnesses) (n 164) 131. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that this was due simply to the passage of time, as Horn and others 
observes in relation to victims appearing before the STL that the length of time between the 
testimony and interviewing for the study varied greatly between victims but had no tangible impact 
on the subsequent evaluation of victims of their testimony experiences, Horn and others (n 327) 
146 - 7.   
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 Notably, clinical literature evidences a complex interrelationship between individual and 
societal trauma. It is beyond the scope of this research to explore this interrelationship in detail; see 
Sveaas and Lavik (n 464) 41 - 2; Rauchfuss and Schmolze (n 362) 40. 
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victims’ scores in relation to their identified justice parameters are ascertained [Stage 3], 
about aspects of their personal wellbeing, including, in particular, their financial and 
physical security, as well as levels of familial and/or community support. Information 
concerning levels of security within the participant’s region is also likely to be a matter of 
public record, and may be readily available from the OTP in relation to any risk 
assessment for the purpose of the conduct of its investigative activities. Information 
relating to concurrent levels of societal trauma may be available either from existing 
assessment activities of mental health needs carried out by the Trust Fund or, in the 
alternative, via external clinical organisations operational within the area. Findings in 
respect of restorative outcomes [Stage 3] could therefore be disaggregated by country, and 
compared and considered in light of prevailing security factors and issues of widespread 
trauma. Findings should also be disaggregated and compared by reference to victims’ 
sense both of financial security and social support. Finally, disaggregated findings should 
be analysed by gender where, for example, a sense of insecurity or need for social support 
may be a more pressing need. 
 
3.5. Summary of potentially affecting variables and concluding thoughts on Phase II 
assessment 
 
Empirical clinical evidence has assessed and discounted a number of factors as having the 
potential to affect a victim’s psychological response to judicial engagement. These factors 
include the victim’s age, religion, level of education, economic status, the time spent 
giving testimony and the party for whom they appeared. The nature, extent and degree of 
abuse suffered, together with the extent to which the victim found the testimony 
experience to be painful, have also been shown not to subsequently affect the propensity 
of the victim to consider their experience to have been either a positive or negative one.  
 
An impact has, however, been documented in the case of gender, as well as in relation to 
procedural elements, although notably, the identified impact accounts only for a relatively 
limited amount of the documented variance between victims’ experiences. With this in 
mind, and as a means of enabling the Court to understand the underlying reasons for any 
restorative shortfall in the operation of its participation endeavour, a number of additional 
variables have been proposed for inclusion in Phase II of the assessment process, which 
may affect the achievement of effective and meaningful participation. Phase II assessment 
variables therefore comprise: 
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- The extent to which the non-realisation of non-restorative justice goals affects the 
achievement of a restorative sense of justice; 
 
- The extent to which victim participants’ expectations have been effectively managed 
by the Court; 
 
- The extent to which charges reflect the ambit of abuse(s) experienced by the victim 
(charge selection and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); 
 
- The impact of the narrow, forensic focus of the Court on the achievement of justice 
aims; 
 
- Difficulties in the achievement of testimony (formal and informal); 
 
- A gender differential; 
 
- Factors emanating from the psychological ill-health of the participant, including any 
aggravation of trauma symptoms during judicial engagement, psychological 
readiness and the delivery of psychologically unsafe informal testimony;  
 
- The impact of the participation context: experience of process; and 
 
- Factors arising from the external participation context. 
  
In addition, two further variables may affect the achievement of a sense of justice in 
participating victims but are not susceptible to evaluation. They are: 
 
- Impact of the emergence of a dominant group narrative; and 
 
- Psychologically detrimental testimony arising within a group context (informal 
testimony). 
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As indicated,
638
 while Phase I and Phase II of the assessment process are described 
separately here, data collection will operate concurrently in respect of them. With this in 
mind, a combined Phase I and Phase II assessment process is illustrated diagrammatically 
below: 
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Figure 3.2: Assessment process (Phase I and II) 
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Having identified and explored a number of additional variables which have the potential 
to negatively affect the achievement of effective and meaningful participation for victims, 
and which may therefore account for the degree of variance in victims’ experiences of 
judicial engagement, it is appropriate to briefly consider how the assessment tool might be 
developed and rendered operational in practice. 
3.6. Rendering the tool operational: practical approach to the development and application 
of the tool 
In order to render the assessment tool physically operational and appropriate to the forum 
it will, of course, require careful and methodical drafting and development, and some 
thoughts on an appropriate approach to its elaboration and temporal scope are included 
below. The section then goes on to consider a number of factors that relate to the practical 
application of the tool itself. Finally, the assessment process described in this chapter is 
not, of course, without its limitations, and the section concludes with some observations to 
that end. 
3.6.1. The physical development of the assessment tool 
The application and assessment of psychological impacts within a judicial context, and for 
a primarily legal audience, is not without its challenges, requiring both the incorporation 
of psychological approaches in a clear and meaningful way whilst ensuring the tool is 
appropriate and applicable to the diverse victim participant community of the ICC. With 
this need in mind, a number of factors relevant to the physical development of the 
assessment tool are explored briefly below. These factors include the need for an 
interdisciplinary approach, the development of a common language between academic 
disciplines and the need to tailor the tool to the ICC’s victim participant community.  
(i) The need for an interdisciplinary approach 
The assessment tool is intended to measure victims’ subjective evaluation of their 
participation experience in direct relation to the achievement of personal justice goals, and 
while the assessment of psychological responses in victims of international crimes is not 
wholly novel to the legal arena, the considerable experience of psychological experts in 
this field, combined with the incorporation of clinical trauma impacts in to the assessment 
tool as a potentially mediating factor in the achievement of effective and meaningful 
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participation, suggests the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the physical 
development of the instrument. 
Notably, however, while an interdisciplinary approach provides, it is suggested, the 
greatest opportunity for meaningful assessment which best reflects the realities of victims’ 
experiences, it is also more complex, and will inevitably entail additional lead-in time 
which will need to be factored in to the development process. 
(ii) The development of a common language between academic disciplines: 
defining terminology 
As noted in the previous chapter,
639
 there is no common or shared terminology between 
legal and clinical disciplines by which to describe the nature of any psychological impact 
experienced by victims of international crimes who engage with transitional justice 
mechanisms. As a result, and in particular, as a corollary of adopting an interdisciplinary 
approach to the physical development of the assessment tool, a shared understanding of 
terms employed for the purpose of the assessment should be developed at the outset of the 
drafting process in order to ensure both internal coherence and consistency within the tool 
itself, and the subsequent framing of the assessment findings in unambiguous terms for an 
ostensibly non-clinical audience.  
 
The notion of a restorative sense of justice for victims participating in proceedings before 
the ICC is developed in the previous chapter, and findings of the assessment can be 
directly allied to it. In addition, a clear delineation of any clinical terms should be 
produced, including those relating to trauma impacts, as well as the concept of trauma 
itself. 
 
(iii) Tailoring the assessment tool to the victim participant community 
 
In order to render the assessment tool fully responsive to the ICC victim participant 
community, particular thought should be given to the validation of the tool. Validation in 
turn should ideally be conducted by, or in conjunction with and led by, a Research 
Psychologist, and should be considered in particular reference to the need to ensure the 
operation of the instrument in relation to different populations in order to ensure that 
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culturally specific markers of satisfaction or disappointment are equally encompassed, and 
that indicators of satisfaction are recognised within the intended study population.
640
  
 
In addition, and as noted above,
641
 our knowledge of victims’ justice aims in approaching 
an international criminal law mechanism emanates largely from research conducted with 
victims appearing before a purely retributive tribunal to testify, rather than within the 
context of any broader participative process. It is therefore conceivable that the list of 
justice goals identified in this research is incomplete in the context of victims participating 
in proceedings before the ICC. As a result, the list of restorative justice aims which form 
the basis and framework of Phase 1 of the assessment process should therefore ideally be 
validated with a cross-sectional focus group of victim participants.
642
  
 
In addition, the tool will require piloting in order to assess the extent to which the 
questions posed within it are comprehensible to the intended research population and 
thereby capable of generating meaningful data for the purpose of assessment. Piloting 
would ideally be conducted through the conduct of focus group(s) of participating victims, 
refinements to the tool made in response to the pilot, and a second pilot, this time of the 
revised tool, conducted with a second group.
643
 While, however, focus groups provide a 
useful means of developing and refining variables and questions for the conduct of 
quantitative research,
644
 they pose their own challenges in the specific context of the ICC. 
In particular, physically bringing victims together presents ethical problems in terms of 
victim confidentiality where victims would not otherwise come into contact with each 
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particular, whether numbers or diagrammatical representations should be employed, and in the 
latter case, whether the diagrammatic representation is meaningful to the participant community; 
employed, for example, in the study by Horn and others (n 327). 
641
 See para 2.3. 
642
 An alternative approach would be to include an “other” box within the Phase 1 assessment 
which would enable researchers to record the nature of any justice goals which are additional to 
those identified. These additional goals could then be considered during a review of the instrument 
and any adjustments made accordingly. Notably, however, the use of a focus group would also 
enable consideration of the suitability and comprehensibility of the language employed in the 
assessment tool. 
643
 The use of a focus group as a means of refining and piloting a quantitative assessment 
instrument is considered further in van Peer and others (n 519), 86 – 89. 
644
 Ibid. 
234 
 
other, as well as possible security concerns and issues of physical access for the 
researchers themselves. In light of these issues, thought would need to be given to, for 
example, the feasibility of convening a focus group in conjunction with any meeting 
called by the Common Legal Representative, or otherwise seeking to conduct the pilot 
with existing victims’ groups within an area affected by the crimes charged.645   
 
3.6.2.  The practical application of the assessment tool: ethical approval and additional 
factors  
 
The proposed assessment framework is ostensibly written here on the basis that it will be 
conducted from within the Court, although, of course, it is feasible that the assessment 
might be conducted by an external body, such as a university, in conjunction with Court 
staff.
 646
 In any event, the relative body will have its own ethical processes, and the 
assessment process should comply with ethical standards. 
 
Participating victims may be psychologically vulnerable and/or have particular concerns 
about the physical security of themselves and their families, and the assessment process, 
including the development, validation and piloting of the assessment tool itself, must 
therefore be sensitive to these issues. Victim engagement with the project should be on the 
basis of informed, written consent. Researchers should, in turn, explain to victims the 
nature and aims of the project, together with the role and extent of the participant’s 
anticipated involvement in it. Researchers should clearly indicate to participating victims 
that their decision in relation to the research will not affect their participatory status before 
the Court, nor the nature of the participation they may expect to achieve. Victims should 
be aware that they are free to withdraw from the assessment at any time without affecting 
their participation in proceedings at the Court, and should be given the contact details of 
an appointed individual who is able to answer any further questions relating to the 
assessment.  
 
                                                          
645
 In addition, piloting might be conducted with a group of victims who are no longer in the 
country, having fled to seek safety elsewhere. In such a case, however, there is the risk that 
responses might be additionally informed by issues of dislocation and isolation, such that the group 
may not be fully representative of the views of victims who remain within affected 
countries/communities. 
646
 In light of its limited resources, this may be the most desirable option for the Court. 
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Researchers should also ensure that issues of confidentiality are fully explained to, and 
understood by, victim participants, and should indicate plans for secure data storage and 
disposal of information concerning the participant at the end of the project. Researchers 
should also assure victims that their data will only be accessible to members of the 
research team, and that the information will not be used for any other purpose. The 
assessment findings themselves do not rely on the specific identification of individual 
victims, and as a result, victims should be assured that their contribution to the research 
will be anonymised in the data. 
 
Given the inclusion in the assessment of questioning concerning the extent to which 
charges fully reflect the abuse experienced by the victim, and the particular vulnerability 
of crimes of sexual violence to issues of proof and Prosecutorial discretion, gender-
appropriate interviewing with women victims, wherever possible, is required. Researchers 
themselves should be trained in interviewing potentially vulnerable survivors.  
 
In addition, while the assessment tool itself is not designed to explore and record the 
victim’s trauma story in full, narrative needs in the participant may mean that the victim 
choses to speak about their experiences to the researcher, as an objective listener, and time 
should therefore be factored in to the researcher’s interviewing schedule to accommodate 
this potential need. Allied to the potential narration by victims of their abuse experiences 
is the risk of vicarious traumatisation in the researcher, and the research schedule should 
therefore also provide opportunities for interviewer debriefing and support where 
appropriate.  
 
Finally, in light of the novelty of the assessment tool within the specific context of 
international criminal justice mechanisms, the tool itself is likely to require some degree 
of modification and refinement during its development and use, and to this end, should be 
kept under regular review. 
 
3.6.3. Acknowledging the potential limitations of the assessment 
A number of limitations to the described assessment process have been identified and 
included throughout this chapter. In addition, it should be noted that the initial data 
collection stage in Phase 1 of the assessment essentially provides a snapshot of justice 
needs at a specific moment in time, and it is conceivable that these needs may shift with 
time, as new priorities arise for the participant. Where this has happened, it is likely to 
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disrupt resulting scores in relation to a victim’s sense of justice. To this end, the 
assessment instrument should be kept under regular review and, if required, an additional 
stage might be included, if deemed to be feasible, to verify justice goals with victims at a 
later stage of their participative journey.  
In addition, it should be acknowledged that where interviews are administered by a staff 
member of the ICC, there is the potential for a positive bias in victims’ responses due to a 
need in victims to please the interviewer. Moreover, while continuity of interviewers may 
be beneficial in terms of the establishment of a relationship of trust between the 
participating victim and the researcher, this also has the potential to aggravate any positive 
bias in victims’ responses. 
This potential effect is known as “social desirability bias”, and is similarly recognised by 
Horn and others in their study in to the witnessing experiences of victims appearing before 
the SCSL. Notably, however, the researchers in the latter instance go on to indicate that 
the effect on victims’ responses may be more nuanced than the Berkeley study implies. In 
particular, they suggest that where the interviewer is known to the victim and a 
relationship of trust exists between them, this might also render the victim more 
comfortable about revealing negative experiences. The use of Court staff for interviewing 
therefore has the potential to affect the results of the assessment one way or another, 
although the nature and extent of that impact is seemingly unclear. Finally, it should be 
noted that the use of external interviewers as a means of avoiding this effect may not 
necessarily address the problem, and this is particularly the case where the introduction of 
strangers to victims may be experienced as especially challenging where victims fear 
identification.
647
 As a result, it is likely that the identity of the researcher/interviewer for 
the purpose of the assessment will affect victims’ responses to some degree. 
3.7. Concluding summary 
There is, at present, no monitoring or assessment of the Court’s victims’ mandate by 
reference either to any restorative parameters or substantive notion of justice in the victim. 
As a result, we simply do not know if and to what extent participating victims achieve a 
sense of justice by virtue of their engagement with the Court. Moreover, and at a more 
fundamental level, there is no assessment tool for the evaluation of victims’ substantive 
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justice experiences in the specific context of international criminal justice, indicating a 
gap in both knowledge and practice.  
Regular assessment and monitoring of the endeavour is essential not only for the 
evaluation of the Court’s progress in respect of its innovative mandate, but also to enable 
the adoption of specific, targeted and cost-efficient measures aimed at the improvement of 
the participatory experience, thereby maximising the potential for victims to achieve 
effective and meaningful participation, whilst operating within a resource and context-
sensitive manner. Assessment in turn should indicate not only whether and in what 
respects the Court is providing effective and meaningful participation, but also the reasons 
for any identified restorative shortfall.  
While the findings of any assessment will not be legally binding on the Court, they are 
likely to be of persuasive value, and so may prompt some form of responsive action. As 
discussed, victim disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the Court threatens its perceived 
legitimacy in the eyes of the affected community, while active victim disengagement or 
withdrawal impinges upon the Court’s investigative and prosecutorial activities.648 Victim 
satisfaction is therefore significant for the legitimacy, perceived relevance and practical 
functioning of the institution. In addition to any wish to ensure justice for victims per se, 
the Court therefore has a specific self-interest in ensuring that its goal for victims is 
realised as far as feasible within the framework of an international criminal justice 
mechanism, and a full understanding of victims’ justice hopes and needs is therefore of 
particular value to it.  
Realisation of the full spectrum of victims’ justice needs is clearly both impracticable and 
undesirable in the specific context of the Court. As already noted, it is not, first and 
foremost, a restorative justice mechanism, and the realisation of any restorative notions it 
has incorporated into its innovative mandate is necessarily subject to the primacy of the 
Court’s retributive function and the right of the Defendant to a fair and expeditious trial.  
With this limitation in mind, a number of concrete examples of how the Court might 
respond to particular assessment findings have been indicated in this Chapter, including in 
relation to the conduct of activities by the Court’s Outreach Unit,649 measures to respond 
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649
 Para 3.4.2. 
238 
 
to any gender differential in justice experiences,
650
 and steps which may serve to limit 
negative reactions to narrative in victims with ongoing psychological needs.
651
  
In addition, and again, subject to the findings of any assessment, a number of other actions 
which seek to respond to unrealised justice goals and which entail little in terms of 
resources might be considered by the Court. In particular, in many cases before the Court, 
the fact that gross violations have occurred is not in dispute, and instead, argument 
focuses on the Defendant’s responsibility or otherwise for those violations.652 Moreover, 
in light of the Court’s practice of identifying and prosecuting high-ranking officers and 
leaders, as opposed to foot-soldiers, this is a situation that is likely to continue. In such a 
situation, and without prejudice to the Defendant’s right to a fair and expeditious trial, the 
Court, through its judges, might consider making a formal statement at the opening of a 
trial in which it explicitly and publicly recognises and denounces the crime(s) that took 
place, and acknowledges the harm suffered by the many victims. Thought might also be 
given to listing the names of the dead as an appendix or schedule to any judgment in order 
to respond to the needs of many victims to bear witness on behalf of loved ones who did 
not survive the crimes charged.
653
 Finally, and again in situations where the fact of 
violations is not in issue before the Court, while the truth needs of victims are likely to be 
more expansive than the forensic focus of the Court, thought might also be given to the 
possibility of sharing with victims additional information gleaned by the OTP in its 
investigation which goes beyond the narrower focus of the trial itself.
654
  
With an array of specific assessment needs in mind, and as a response to the identified 
knowledge gap in this area, the author has proposed a framework for assessment that is 
both sympathetic to the exigencies of the Court and appropriate to the victim participant 
community. Moreover, the proposed assessment model will provide clear indicators of 
specific areas of restorative shortfall, through the production of justice scores in respect of 
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the various restorative parameters, as well as an overall Victims Justice Index for the 
Court, thereby facilitating a readily intelligible and accessible means of charting progress 
in the pursuit of effective and meaningful participation. 
Finally, as indicated, we still know relatively little about why some victims experience 
judicial engagement positively while others do not. Thanks to empirical clinical research, 
the scale of that knowledge gap can be broadly quantified, with 80% of variance between 
victims’ experiences remaining unaccounted for. With this particular knowledge gap in 
mind, the author proposes a number of additional and alternative variables which may, it 
is argued, affect the ability of victims to achieve psychologically positive participation in 
proceedings before the ICC, and which are included for evaluation in the proposed 
assessment tool framework.   
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Conclusion  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse, develop and concretise the concept of restorative 
justice in international criminal law in order to render it tangible, applicable and 
measureable within the specific context of the ICC. To this end, this thesis (1) identifies 
and delineates an appropriate restorative aim for the International Criminal Court for 
participating victims, and (2) examines and demonstrates how the Court’s progress in the 
pursuit of its restorative mandate can be assessed in practice. 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, the restorative rationale for victim participation is examined by 
reference to its drafting history, documentary sources, the prevailing pro-victim context 
and literature emanating from the Court itself. The examination reaffirms the Court’s 
restorative mandate, and the Chapter demonstrates that, as drafted, Article 68(3) of the 
Rome Statute offers genuine potential for the provision of participation that could be 
experienced by individual participating victims as effective and meaningful. It is, 
therefore, in principle at least, a system with promise for the victim.
655
  
The Chapter goes on to demonstrate, however, that while the restorative basis and 
rationale for the provision is expressly acknowledged by the Court at a theoretical level, 
there is no recognition of the provision’s restorative object and purpose in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, evidencing a disconnect between the theoretical discussion of the 
endeavour within the Court, and its practical interpretation and application.
 656
 This thesis 
shows instead that in the absence of a clear guiding focus or aim, the restorative mandate 
is in danger either of being subsumed by the Court’s retributive function657 or of being 
usurped by a less ambitious quest for procedural justice for victims.
658
 In addition, 
Chapter 1 submits that the current practices of the Court indicate that it may be losing 
sight of the individual victim as intended beneficiary of the right in favour of a more 
collective approach to participation or one which situates the victim in a representative 
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capacity,
659
 to the detriment of the potential of victims to achieve effective and meaningful 
participation. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis responds to the problem of what restorative justice means in the 
context of international criminal law, including what restorative justice would comprise in 
practical terms for participating victims. Part I of Chapter 2 identifies, examines and 
argues for an appropriate overarching goal for restorative action at the ICC: the 
achievement of a sense of justice in participating victims.
 660
 In Part II of Chapter 2, and 
by reference to clinical theory, the notion of a sense of justice is developed for application 
within a judicial forum and with specific reference to victims of international crimes. To 
this end, this thesis proposes a definition of a sense of justice in victims of international 
crimes as: 
A psychological state in which the victim feels that adequate amends have been 
made for a wrong committed.
661
  
For the purpose of application in the specific context of the ICC, and as an overarching 
aim for its restorative action, this goal is understood as the pursuit of a sense of justice that 
is considered by a substantial number of victim participants to be adequate. An adequate 
sense of justice would, in turn, comprise a position wherein, while perhaps neither perfect 
nor complete for some victims, their experience(s) of abuse are no longer seen by them as 
unfinished business, but instead, they are able to look and move forward.
662
 A “substantial 
number of victims”, this thesis argues, should, in the first instance, comprise more than a 
simple majority, and the percentage should be adjusted upwards where monitoring 
activities evidence increasingly positive scores for the achievement in victims of a sense 
of justice.
663
  
In Part II of Chapter 2, the sense of justice goal is disaggregated into its constituent parts 
with a view to rendering the concept of restorative justice tangible, applicable and 
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operational within the practices and procedures of the Court. In doing so, the chapter 
provides concrete indicators of what restorative justice comprises for victims of 
international crimes.
 664
 These indicators are: 
- The formal public acknowledgment of the crime(s) committed; 
- Public moral denunciation of the crimes committed (validation); 
- The public acknowledgment of the pain suffered; 
- The ability of victims to tell their story; 
- The ability of victims to educate the world and bear witness to the abuses that 
occurred; 
- The ability of victims to publically denounce the wrongs committed against them; 
- The ability of victims to confront the accused; 
- The achievement of justice for loved ones and the ability of victims to bear witness 
on behalf of those who did not survive;  
- The discovery of the truth about the crimes committed and the fate of loved ones; 
- The prevention of further abuse; 
- The ability of victims to contribute to broader peace goals; 
- The receipt of reparations; 
- The receipt of an apology; and 
- The healing of mental harm. 
The parameters, in turn, are developed by reference to the findings of clinical research 
concerning the aims of victims of international crimes, and are analysed in terms of their 
compatibility with restorative justice theory.  
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Chapter 3 of this thesis responds to the current lack of monitoring of the Court’s 
participation endeavour by reference to any restorative aims or parameters. It considers 
how the Court’s progress in the pursuit of its restorative mandate can be evaluated,665 and 
the detailed framework of a psycho-legal assessment tool for the monitoring and 
evaluation of the Court’s pursuit of restorative justice for participating victims is 
developed. To this end, the thesis proposes assessment of victims’ satisfaction in relation 
to the achievement of restorative justice parameters, identified in Chapter 2, on a five-
point Likert scale. The Chapter then argues for the production of a Victims Justice Index 
in respect of the Court as a means of providing clear and readily comprehensible, case-
by-case markers of the Court’s progress in the pursuit of its restorative mandate.666 The 
production of justice scores in respect of the individual justice parameters identified in 
Chapter 2 are proposed in order that any areas of restorative shortfall can be easily 
identified.
667
    
Chapter 3 goes on to examine variables which have the potential to affect the achievement 
of effective and meaningful participation in victims of international crimes, and proposes 
a number of additional variables for assessment.
668
 The proposed variables for 
incorporation into the assessment tool are: 
- Whether, and the extent to which the non-realisation by victims of justice goals that 
are not consistent with restorative justice theory (such as a desire for revenge or goals 
that are otherwise better allied to a retributive justice model) affects their ability to 
achieve a restorative sense of justice; 
 
- The extent to which participating victims’ expectations have been effectively 
managed and contained by the Court such that they are realistic in the context; 
 
- The extent to which the charges before the Court reflect in full the ambit of abuse(s) 
experienced by the victim. Challenges may arise in particular as a result of charge 
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selection and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with the effect that proceedings 
may not be fully responsive to the harm suffered and justice therefore seen by the 
victim as incomplete; 
 
- The impact of the narrow, forensic focus of the Court on the achievement of justice 
aims, and in particular, on the ability of the victim to learn the truth about the context 
and nature of abuses perpetrated, together with the fate and whereabouts of loved 
ones; 
 
- Difficulties in the achievement of testimony, both within the formal judicial setting 
and the informal context of group meetings. Difficulties may be generated in 
particular as a result of the very limited opportunities for formal testimony, and the 
emergence of a dominant narrative in the group context which may operate to stifle 
other narratives, including those of women victims of sexual violence; 
 
- A gender differential in victims’ perceptions of justice experiences. This is identified 
in legal and clinical research with victims of international crimes, and therefore 
justifies the consideration of outcomes by gender; 
 
- Factors emanating from the psychological ill-health of the participant, including any 
aggravation of trauma symptoms during judicial engagement, psychological 
readiness and the delivery of psychologically unsafe testimony during informal group 
meetings; and 
 
- The impact of the participation context. This can include victims’ experiences of 
process, as well as factors external to the Court which instead relate to the victim’s 
broader context, and which therefore lie beyond the control of the Court.  
The identified variables are incorporated into the framework assessment tool through the 
inclusion of additional questions in the proposed questionnaire and, in the case of non-
restorative justice goals, as additional justice parameters. In the case of trauma impacts, 
the tool envisages the engagement of clinical specialists from within the Court’s Victims 
and Witnesses Unit.  
The proposed tool itself is not without its limitations. In particular, data collection does 
not, at present, take into account the possibility that the justice needs of participating 
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victims may change over time. In addition, there is the potential for bias in victims’ 
responses, including where they have a relationship of trust with the interviewer. Follow-
up may be problematic where security concerns mean that it is not appropriate to approach 
the victim, or where the victim is inaccessible for researchers because the area where they 
live has become or remains unstable and unsafe. Finally, a number of variables – 
including the potential impact of the emergence of a dominant group narrative and the 
occurrence of psychologically detrimental testimony within the informal, group context – 
are not, at present, susceptible to monitoring. These factors will therefore qualify the 
results of any assessment to some extent. While, however, the proposed approach to 
assessment is not, and cannot be, perfect, the framework assessment tool represents a 
substantial step in addressing the significant knowledge gap in this area, and has the 
potential to provide a real contribution to theory and practice. 
Implications for theory 
In identifying and defining an appropriate restorative goal for the Court, and in amplifying 
and delineating its content, this thesis has advanced restorative justice theory in the 
context of international criminal law. While the specific focus of this thesis is on the 
experiences of victims engaging with the International Criminal Court as participants, the 
development of restorative justice in the particular context has implications for academic 
and practitioner discussion of the victim participation endeavour more broadly. In 
particular, the identification of the constituent elements of restorative justice for victims of 
international crimes advances understanding and knowledge in the field, and provides the 
basis and context for debate concerning the pursuit of effective and meaningful 
participation within the Court, as well as the framework for any future review or overhaul 
of the endeavour by the Court which might be anticipated. Moreover, while the 
development of restorative justice theory is situated here within the specific context of the 
International Criminal Court, the parameters identified relate to victims approaching 
international criminal justice mechanisms more broadly, and hence can be employed 
beyond the ICC to other international criminal justice mechanisms such as the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon. 
In addition, in integrating the various perspectives, insights, approaches and methods 
within legal and psychological literature, this thesis provides a more comprehensive 
understanding of victims’ justice needs in the context, and enables cognitive 
advancements in both disciplines. Within the legal context, this thesis has engaged 
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psychological concepts and practices to further legal understanding in a number of ways: 
in its discussion and analysis of the Court’s innovative endeavour by reference to 
psychological aims and impacts,
669
 in its consideration of the consistency of clinical 
findings of victims’ aims with restorative justice theory,670 and in the identification of the 
framework for an assessment tool that is designed to gauge psychological impacts and 
operate in accordance with a clinical assessment method, where the content and focus of 
assessment has been generated by reference to legal theory and the needs of a judicial 
mechanism. Moreover, in reconceptualising psychological aims, identified in clinical 
literature, as justice parameters consistent with restorative justice theory, this thesis 
repositions those aims as legal rights, thereby informing and advancing clinical 
understanding of the needs identified. The interdisciplinary approach to this research as a 
means of addressing a complex problem that has both legal and psychological elements 
has therefore provided an innovative means of considering and responding to the 
challenges identified. 
Implications and recommendations for practice 
The identification in this thesis of an overarching goal for restorative action at the Court 
has the potential to impact significantly on the institution’s practice should it chose to 
adopt the finding. In particular, recognition of the restorative aim would provide a clear, 
guiding focus for victim-centred action at the Court, increasing the potential for consistent 
practices that are, in turn, predictable for participating victims and their legal 
representatives, and responsive to the innovative mandate, thereby supporting the 
legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the affected community.  
While the Court has a mandate to provide elements of restorative justice to participating 
victims, however, it is not a wholly restorative mechanism, and instead, must seek to 
realise restorative impacts for participating victims within a primarily retributive process. 
As this thesis indicates, the retributive function of the Court has the potential to affect the 
realisation of a number of the identified justice parameters, including the ability of victims 
to achieve goals allied to the delivery of testimony
671
 or those which concern broader truth 
                                                          
669
 Paras 2.3.1. and 2.3.2. 
670
 Para 2.4.3. 
671
 Para 3.4.5.(i). 
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needs.
672
 In order to minimise the potential for victim disillusionment, the Court must 
indicate to victims, through its outreach and information activities, the extent to which the 
full realisation of those parameters may be inhibited by the particular context of their 
application.   
The monitoring and evaluation of victims’ participation experiences by reference to 
restorative aims will facilitate the adoption by the Court of targeted, resource-sensitive 
measures within the Court to respond to areas of restorative shortfall, and specific, albeit 
hypothetical illustrative examples of such possible measures are included in this thesis. It 
would thereby operate both in the best interests of participating victims and the Court 
itself. It is therefore recommended that the Court, either itself or in conjunction with 
external researchers, and on completion of the development of an assessment tool, initiate 
an ongoing, rolling assessment of its innovative endeavour. 
On a broader level, in construing victims’ psychological aims as parameters of a sense of 
justice in victims, this thesis identifies what justice means for victims in the aftermath of 
widespread and systematic violations. Where, therefore, international criminal justice 
mechanisms seek or claim to provide substantive justice for victims, the identified 
parameters provide the basis for discussion of what “justice” for victims comprises,673  
and so enables the development of legal approaches and practices that are responsive to 
victims’ justice needs, enhancing the potential for the achievement of justice for victims 
of atrocities. Moreover, as this thesis demonstrates, the achievement of substantive justice 
for victims is measureable, and so provides the potential for assessing and validating the 
underlying aim of those mechanisms. Moreover, the conduct of monitoring within more 
than one tribunal would provide the opportunity for comparison between assessment 
outcomes and the cross-fertilisation of approaches where examples of best practice 
emerge.   
Directions for future research 
This thesis engenders an ambitious research agenda of its own: 
                                                          
672
 Para 3.4.4. 
673
 As indicated above, at para 3.2.2.(iv), victims justice needs will be diverse, and will be 
represented by a number of parameters from the list identified in this thesis at para 2.4.3.(ii). 
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(i)  The detailed assessment framework proposed in Chapter 3 provides the 
structural basis for the development and production of a formal assessment tool for 
application at the International Criminal Court. The proposed assessment tool is intended 
to evaluate the psychological impact on victims of participation, and to that end, borrows 
heavily from clinical assessment methods. In light of the interdisciplinary nature of the 
proposed tool, assessment should be robust in psychological terms, as well as providing 
meaningful, systematically-sourced information to the Court as a legal mechanism, 
indicating the need for an interdisciplinary approach to its further development. In 
particular, psychological engagement is required in order that questions are phrased in a 
way which renders them readily comprehensible to a diverse victim participant 
population, to consider and apply an appropriate means of representing the Likert scale to 
victims, and in order to validate the instrument with a view to ensuring that generated data 
is reliable.  
In addition, assessment at the ICC would require the active participation of the Court 
itself. The head of the Victim Participation and Reparation Section has indicated her 
interest in principle in the proposed assessment process, and further discussion is 
scheduled to take place once the procedural justice findings of the Berkeley study become 
available, in the autumn of 2015.
674
 
(ii)  Research is also required to develop a common terminology between the legal 
and clinical fields to refer to the psychological impacts of engagement by victims with 
international justice mechanisms. The development of a common language would help to 
clarify the terms of the debate in the alternative academic discipline. In addition, an 
appreciation of the terms and content of the alternative discipline will effectively serve to 
expand the available knowledge base upon which researchers in this field can draw, 
thereby enabling an advancement of understanding. Finally, a common language enables 
the establishment of a shared conceptual framework between interested disciplines for the 
conduct of research,
675
 and therefore provides the basis for the conduct of future 
interdisciplinary work in this complex area. Again, the process of developing and/or 
defining terminology should be an interdisciplinary one. 
                                                          
674
 Private communication between E. Smith and F. McKay, November 2014. 
675
 See, for example, Patricia Rosenfield ‘The potential of transdisciplinary research for sustaining 
and extending linkages between the health and social sciences’ (1992) 35 Social Science and 
Medicine 1343. 
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(iii)  While the particular focus of this thesis is on the restorative aim and impact of 
participation on victims, the thesis argues that the Court’s restorative aim should be 
pursued within a process that victims feel is fair and which is not anti-therapeutic, where 
these elements comprise ancillary goals to the Court’s pursuit of its restorative mandate. 
As yet, there has been no evaluation of participating victims’ experiences from a purely 
clinical perspective with a view to assessing whether engagement has been anti-
therapeutic for victims. This thesis has highlighted some of the challenges involved in 
conducting a clinical assessment of victims engaging with the endeavour.
676
 It may, 
however, be feasible to conduct a review of the practices and procedures of the Court in 
relation to their potential to replicate or reproduce in victims the characteristic impacts of 
abusive behaviour. A similar approach is currently adopted in relation to the formal 
practices and procedures of trauma treatment centres, where processes and practices are 
examined in light of their potential to replicate in the survivor feelings of debility, 
dependency, disorientation and an ongoing sense of dread.
677
    
(iv)  Finally, as yet, there is no research which seeks to gauge the success of the 
Court in the pursuit of its broader peace aims, including in particular, whether the 
achievement or otherwise of a positive restorative impact in individual victims has quelled 
any desire in them for revenge. A parameter to this effect, however, is included in the 
proposed assessment tool framework, and so would provide a basis, at least, for future 
exploration of this area.   
                                                          
676
 Paras 3.4.5 and 3.4.7. 
677
 These four characteristics are indicated, for example, in Peter Suedfeld, Psychology and 
Torture, (Hemisphere 1990) 3. 
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